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Abstract
In this thesis, we study Gaussian processes generated by certain linear transfor-
mations of two Gaussian martingales. This class of transformations is motivated by
nancial equilibrium models with heterogeneous information.
In Chapter 2 we derive the canonical decomposition of such processes, which are
constructed in an enlarged ltration, as semimartingales in their own ltration. The
resulting drift is described in terms of Volterra kernels. In particular we characterize
those processes which are Brownian motions in their own ltration. In Chapter 3
we construct new orthogonal decompositions of Brownian ltrations.
In Chapters 4 to 6 we are concerned with applications of our characterization
results in the context of mathematical models of insider trading. We analyze exten-
sions of the nancial equilibriummodel of Kyle [42] and Back [7] where the Gaussian
martingale describing the insider information is specied in various ways. In par-
ticular we discuss the structure of insider strategies which remain inconspicuous in
the sense that the resulting cumulative demand is again a Brownian motion.
i

Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir die Struktur von Gauschen Prozessen, die
durch gewisse lineare Transformationen von zwei Gauschen Martingalen erzeugt
werden. Die Klasse dieser Transformationen ist durch nanzmathematische Gleich-
gewichtsmodelle mit heterogener Information motiviert.
In Kapital 2 bestimmen wir fur solche Prozesse, die zunachst in einer erwei-
terten Filtrierung konstruiert werden, die kanonische Zerlegung als Semimartin-
gale in ihrer eigenen Filtrierung. Die resultierende Drift wird durch Volterra-Kerne
beschrieben. Insbesondere charakterisieren wir diejenigen Prozesse, die in ihrer ei-
genen Filtrierung eine Brownsche Bewegung bilden. In Kapital 3 konstruieren wir
neue orthogonale Zerlegungen der Brownschen Filtrierungen.
In den Kapitaln 4 bis 6 wenden wir unsere Resultate zur Charakterisierung
Brownscher Bewegungen im Kontext nanzmathematischer Modelle an, in denen
es Marktteilnehmer mit zusatzlicher Insider-Information gibt. Wir untersuchen Er-
weiterungen eines Gleichgewichtsmodells von Kyle [42] und Back [7], in denen die
Insider-Information in verschiedener Weise durch Gausche Martingale speziziert
wird. Insbesondere klaren wir die Struktur von Insider-Strategien, die insofern
unauallig bleiben, als sich die resultierende Gesamtnachfrage wie eine Brownsche
Bewegung verhalt.
iii
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CHAPTER 0
Introduction
In 1900, Brownian motion was introduced by Bachelier [6] as a model for price
uctuation in the stock market. Since then, the analysis of Brownian motion has
become a central topic in the mathematical theory of stochastic processes, quite
independent of the original nancial motivation. In particular, Brownian motion
plays a fundamental role in the theory of continuous martingales, and it is the basis
for Ito^'s development of stochastic calculus.
Since the 60ies, there is a renewed interest in the nancial interpretation of
Brownian motion. Diusion models driven by Brownian motion have become the
canonical framework for analyzing the structure of nancial derivatives. The Black-
Scholes formula for the price of an option is derived by computing the cost of a
perfect hedging strategy which duplicates the pay-o of the option. The gain of
the strategy is computed as a stochastic integral of the underlying price process X.
The construction of a suitable hedging strategy involves the methods of Ito^'s calcu-
lus and their connection to partial dierential equations. In such models, investors
only use the information provided by the canonical ltration of the price process X.
Moreover, they are viewed as price takers, i.e., the underlying diusion process of
stock prices is not inuenced by the investors' strategies. In recent years, there is a
growing literature which departs from these assumptions and introduces additional
market microstructure. For a \large investor", the price process may be modied
by his investment strategy; see, e.g., Jarrow [34], [35], Frey [25], Cvitanic-Ma [19].
Moreover, the information available to the agents may be heterogeneous, i.e., some
\insider" may have access to a ltration which is larger than the canonical ltra-
tion (F
X
t
); see, e.g., Karatzas-Pikovsky [39], Amendinger-Imkeller-Schweizer [5],
Pikovsvy [50], Grorud-Pontier [28] and Amendinger [3]. From a nancial point of
view, it is of interest to introduce both eects simultaneously and to analyze their
interplay. This has been discussed in the work of Kyle [42] and Back [7]. Related
models appear, e.g., in Glosten-Milgrom [26], Kyle [41], [43], Easley-O'Hara [22],
Admati-Peiderer [1], [2], Grossman [29], Back [8], [9], O'Hara [49], Biais-Rochet
[13] and Cho-El Karoui [15], [16].
In this thesis, we follow the approach of Kyle [42] and Back [7]. Our purpose
is to investigate some mathematical problems which appear in this context. From
a mathematical point of view, the problems related to insider trading of a large
investor belong to the theory of enlargement of ltrations and stochastic ltering.
In Chapters 1 to 3 we are going to concentrate on the mathematical analysis of
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such problems. In Chapters 4 to 6 we will return to the nancial interpretation
and discuss some application of the results in Chapters 1 to 3 in the context of a
nancial equilibrium model.
In order to motivate the following discussion, we rst consider a well-known
classical example. LetX = (X
t
)
0t1
be a Brownian motion with canonical ltration
(F
X
t
). In the enlarged ltration generated by (F
X
t
) and the nal value X
1
, the
process X admits the representation
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
X
1
 X
u
1  u
du; (0.1)
where (W
t
) is a Brownian motion with respect to the enlarged ltration and is
independent of X
1
; see, e.g., Jeulin-Yor [36]. In our context, we emphasize an-
other aspect of this equation. Let W be a Brownian motion, and let X
1
be an
N(0; 1)-distributed random variable independent of W . The process X dened as
the solution of linear stochastic dierential equation (0.1) is a Brownian bridge tied
to the nal value X
1
. Furthermore, X is again a Brownian motion with respect to
its own ltration. Thus, the linear drift in (0.1) drives the Brownian motion W to
the new terminal value X
1
, using the information in the enlarged ltration. But
it does so in such a way that the law of the process remains unchanged, i.e., the
resulting process X is again a Brownian motion. In this sense, the controlling drift
in (0.1) remains inconspicuous.
From this point of view, some natural questions arise. Replacing the normal
random variable X
1
in (0.1) by some independent Gaussian martingale (S
t
), can
we characterize those drifts in the enlarged ltration (F
W;S
t
), which are linear in
W and S, such that the original Brownian motion (W
t
) is driven to the nal value
S
1
? Can we construct such drifts which remain inconspicuous in the sense that the
resulting process (X
t
) is again a Brownian motion? More generally, can we compute
the Doob-Meyer decomposition as a semimartingale in its own ltration? Consider,
for example, the process X given by
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
~
W
u
 X
u
1  u
du;
where
~
W is a Wiener process independent of W . In Section 2.1 we will show that
this Gaussian process converges to
~
W
1
as t! 1, but that it is no longer a Brownian
motion with respect to its own ltration. In fact, the canonical decomposition of X
in its own ltration is given by
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
(B + 1)(1  s)
 A
  (A+ 1)(1  s)
 B
A(1  u)
A
  B(1  u)
B
dX
s
du; (0.2)
for 0  t < 1, where A = (1 +
p
5)=2, B = (1  
p
5)=2, and (B
t
) is a Brownian
motion.
In Chapter 2 we explore the general structure of this problem. This may be
viewed as a case study in stochastic ltering. In order to prepare our analysis,
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we recall in Chapter 1 some basic facts concerning the representation of Gaussian
processes in terms of linear transformations of Brownian motion; this is based on
Kallianpur [38] and Hida-Hitsuda [32]. We review the structure of the Kalman-Bucy
lter and of the Volterra representation of a Gaussian process X in the form
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
l(s; u)dB
u
ds; (0.3)
where B is a standard Brownian motion and l(s; u) is a Volterra kernel; see Denition
1.3. In Theorem 1.2, we characterize those Volterra kernels which generate a new
Brownian motion; this is based on Follmer-Wu-Yor [24]. We also introduce the
canonical decomposition of a Gaussian process X of the form
X
t
=
Z
t
0
F (t; u)dB
u
;
where (B
t
) is a Brownian motion such that the ltrations (F
X
t
) and (F
B
t
) coincide.
In Proposition 1.2 we describe the relation between the canonical decomposition and
the Volterra representation.
In the second chapter we study Gaussian processes X dened as solutions of
linear stochastic equation driven by a Brownian motion W and an independent
Gaussian martingale S. Explicitly, X is given by
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0

f(s)S
0
+
Z
s
0
F (s; u)dS
u
+
Z
s
0
H(s; u)dX
u

ds; (0.4)
where f , F and H satisfy some integrability conditions. First we use some methods
of stochastic ltering theory to obtain the canonical decomposition of such processes
as semimartingales in their own ltration; see Theorem 2.1. Based on this result,
we characterize those transformations which generate a new Brownian motion. In
Theorem 2.2 we show that X is a Brownian motion if and only if the kernel H(s; u)
satises the relation
 H(t; s) +
Z
s
0
H(t; u)H(s; u)du = f(t)f(s)var(S
0
) +
Z
s
0
F (t; u)F (s; u)d(var(S
u
));
for almost all s  t. In particular, if S is a Gaussian martingale with E[S
2
1
] = 1 and
satises
Z
t
0
u
(var(S
u
)  u)
2
du <1 and
Z
t
0
1
var(S
u
)  u
du <1; (0.5)
for all t < 1, then the process X satisfying
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
var(S
u
)  u
du (0.6)
is a Brownian motion with respect to its own ltration, and X
t
converges to S
1
as
t ! 1. On the other hand, consider the case where S is a Brownian motion
~
W .
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Clearly, condition (0.5) does not hold in this case. In fact, it can be shown that
there is no Brownian motion of the form
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0
Y
u
du;
where Y is an (F
W;
~
W
t
)-adapted drift, which converges to
~
W
1
as t! 1; see Proposition
2.3 below and Proposition 5.1 in Follmer-Wu-Yor [23].
In Chapter 3 we investigate another aspect of our basic example 0.1. In fact,
equation (0.1) induces an orthogonal decomposition of the Brownian ltration in
the form
F
X
t
= F
W
t
 (X
t
);
see Jeulin-Yor [37]. Our purpose is to construct some related orthogonal decompo-
sition; this is based on Wu-Yor [56]. First we continue the discussion in Chapter 2
and characterize Brownian motions X of the form
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
(f(u)
~
W
u
+ g(u)X
u
)du; (0.7)
where f and g satisfy weaker integrability conditions than in Chapter 2. Suppose
that the solution X of the equation (0.7) is a Brownian motion, and that one of
the functions f and g is not identical to 0. Then the ltration generated by X
is strictly smaller than the ltration generated by W and
~
W . In addition, we
construct a second Brownian motion Y in the natural ltration of W and
~
W , which
is independent of the Brownian motion X. Using the process Y , we construct two
sequences (X
(n)
) and (Y
(n)
) of Brownian motions in (F
W;
~
W
t
) which are independent
of each other, and such that the corresponding natural ltrations decrease. For each
n  1, this induces an orthogonal decomposition of the ltration generated by X
and by Y :
F
X
t
= F
X
(0)
t
= (X
(0)
t
) (X
(1)
t
)     (X
(n)
t
) F
X
(n+1)
t
;
F
Y
t
= F
Y
(0)
t
= (Y
(0)
t
) (Y
(1)
t
)     (Y
(n)
t
) F
Y
(n+1)
t
:
In Chapter 4 we introduce a simple nancial market model with insider trading
of large investors; this is based on Kyle [42] and Back [7]. We recall the denition
of equilibrium in the sense of Back. Prices of the underlying stock are set by some
\market maker" as a function P
t
= h(X
t
; t) of the aggregate cumulative demand
X
t
up to time t. There are \noise traders" whose cumulative demand is given by
a Brownian motion (W
t
). Moreover, there is an \insider " who has in advance
additional information on the price P
1
= h(S
1
; 1) at the nal time 1, where S
1
is
normal random variable with distribution N(0; 1) which is independent of (W
t
). An
insider strategy species a cumulative demand (I
t
) based on the enlarged ltration
generated by (W
t
) and S
1
. Such a strategy will be called \inconspicuous" if the
resulting aggregate demand X = W + I is again a Brownian motion. Using Ito^'s
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calculus, it can be shown that the insider's expected gain is maximal as soon as
his demand drives the aggregate demand X
t
to the nal value S
1
as t ! 1. An
equilibrium is dened by a pricing rule h(; t) (0  t < 1) and by an insider strategy
(I
t
) such that I is inconspicuous and maximizes the expected gain. As shown in Back
[7], the mathematical discussion of the basic example in (0.1) proves the existence
of such an equilibrium, where the pricing rule h(; ) is determined as the solution
h(x; t) =
1
p
2(1  t)
Z
1
 1
h(y; 1) exp

 
(y   x)
2
2(1  t)

dy (0.8)
of the heat equation

1
2
 +
@
@t

h = 0;
with terminal value h(; 1).
In Section 4.3 we study situation where the insider obtains increasing information
by observing a Gaussian martingale (S
t
); the discussion in Back [7] corresponds to
the special case S
t
 S
1
when the nal information is already available at time 0.
We restrict our analysis to insider strategies which are linear in S and X. Thus, we
can use our results in Chapter 2. In particular, the characterization of Brownian
motion in Section 2.3 to describe those strategies which are inconspicuous. Moreover,
we examine the existence of equilibrium in the case of increasing information. In
particular, we consider the case where the insider information is given by observing
a Gaussian martingale S which satises (0.5) for all t < 1. We show that there is
an equilibrium in this case. More precisely, the optimal insider strategy is given by
I
t
=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
var(S
u
)  u
du; (0.9)
and the pricing rule is again given by (0.8). If the insider information S is a Brownian
motion
~
W , then it can be shown that there is no equilibrium, i.e., the insider cannot
reach his maximal prot without being discovered.
In Chapter 5 we discuss some extension of the insider trading model presented in
Chapter 4 and a modied notion of equilibrium. Again we require that the insider
strategy is inconspicuous, i.e., the insider uses strategies which turn the cumulative
order in the market into a Brownian motion. The pricing rule is assumed to min-
imize the combined expected prot of the informed and uninformed traders. We
give necessary and suÆcient conditions on the rational pricing rule and on optimal
inconspicuous insider strategies. We show that the rational pricing rule is of the
form (0.8), and that a strategy is optimal in a set of inconspicuous strategies if it
minimizes the L
2
-distance with the nal signal S
1
among the strategies in this set.
In addition, we study some modied versions of insider information, in particular
the case of noisy information and of delayed information, and a model with two
insiders with dierent degrees of information.
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In Chapter 6 we introduce information costs. The extra information the insider
gets is no longer cost-free. Is it protable to purchase the information? If yes, how
can he invest in an optimal way? Which kind of information should he buy? We
analyze some examples in dierent settings.
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CHAPTER 1
Representations of Gaussian processes
In the present chapter we deal with representations of Gaussian processes in
terms of Brownian motion. In Section 1.1 we recall some basic facts about Gaussian
processes including the linear Kalman-Bucy lter. In Section 1.2 two representations
of Gaussian processes are introduced and analyzed: the canonical representation in
terms of linear functionals of Brownian motion, and the Volterra representation as
the sum of a Brownian motion and an absolutely continuous process whose density is
given by linear functionals of Brownian motion. We discuss the relationship between
these two representations and then give some examples. In Section 1.3 we collect
some lemmas which will be useful in the sequel. In the last section of this chapter,
we shall characterize Volterra representations of a Gaussian process which generate
a Brownian motion.
1.1. Gaussian processes and the Kalman-Bucy lter
Let (
;F ;P) be a probability space. First we recall the denitions and some
properties of Gaussian process and Brownian motion.
Definition 1.1. (1) A stochastic process X = (X
t
)
t0
on (
;F ;P) is called
a Gaussian process, if any nite linear combination
P
a
i
X
t
i
, a
i
2 R, t
i
 0, is a
Gaussian random variable.
(2) A process X is called a (standard, one-dimensional) Brownian motion with
respect to a ltration (F
t
)
t0
, if it satises the following two conditions:
i) X is a continuous, (F
t
)-adapted Gaussian process.
ii) For s  t the increment X
t
 X
s
is independent of F
s
and normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance t  s.
Note that if X is a Brownian motion with respect to the ltration (F
t
), then it
is a Brownian motion relative to the ltration generated by X. For simplicity, we
denote -algebra generated by stochastic process X up to time t by
F
X
t
:= fX
u
; u  tg;
where the superscript denotes the process which generates this -algebra (e.g., F
X;Y
denotes the ltration generated by the processes X and Y ).
There are several methods to check whether a process is a Brownian motion.
The following two will be often used in this thesis:
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(1) A process X is a Brownian motion with respect to its natural ltration (F
X
t
) if
and only if it is a continuous Gaussian process with covariance E[X
s
X
t
] = s^t.
(2) (Levy's Theorem) A continuous (F
t
)-adapted process X is a Brownian mo-
tion with respect to (F
t
)
t0
if and only if it is a (local) martingale relative to
(F
t
)
t0
and for all t  0 the quadratic variation hXi
t
is given by t.
The rst statement is just a slight variation of the denition of Brownian motions;
as to the second, see, e.g., Karatzas-Shreve [40], Protter [51], Revuz-Yor [52].
A key tool of stochastic ltering theory is the Kalman-Bucy lter; see, for in-
stance, Davis [20], Liptser-Shiryaev [46], Kallianpur [38], Rogers-Williams [54]. In
this section we will describe its basic structure and we single out a special case which
is relevant for our discussion in the next chapter.
Suppose X, W and Z are three Gaussian processes. The process Z cannot be
directly observed and is called signal or system process. The process W is an (F
t
)-
Brownian motion and is called the noise process. The process X, which depends
on Z and W , is observable, and therefore we call it observation process. The goal
of the Kalman-Bucy lter is to nd the conditional expectation of f(Z
t
) relative
to the -algebra F
X
t
, for a real measurable function f . In other words, we try to
use the observation process to estimate a function of the signal process. Since this
conditional expectation is usually not linear in X, this is called a nonlinear ltering
problem.
Let us begin with the following standard formulation of the Kalman-Bucy lter:
Theorem 1.1 (Kallianpur [38]). Suppose them-dimensional signal process (Z
t
)
t0
and the n-dimensional observation process (X
t
)
t0
are given by the stochastic dier-
ential equations
dZ
t
= [A
0
(t) + A
1
(t)Z
t
+ A
2
(t)X
t
]dt+ U(t)d

W
t
(1.1)
and
dX
t
= [C
0
(t) + C
1
(t)Z
t
+ C
2
(t)X
t
]dt+ V (t)d

W
t
; (1.2)
with initial values X
0
= Z
0
= 0, where (

W
t
)
t0
is an (n+m)-dimensional Brownian
motion, A
i
, C
i
, U and V (i = 0; 1; 2) are deterministic matrices of appropriate
dimensions, the entries in A
i
and C
i
(i = 0; 1; 2) are integrable and those in U and
V are square-integrable. Then
^
Z
t
:= E[Z
t
jF
X
t
];
the conditional expectation of Z
t
with respect to F
X
t
, satises
d
^
Z
t
= [A
0
(t) + A
1
(t)
^
Z
t
+ A
2
(t)X
t
]dt+ [P (t)C
T
1
(t) + U(t)V
T
(t)][V (t)V
T
(t)]
 
1
2
dB
t
;
(1.3)
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with
^
Z
0
= 0. Here (B
t
)
t0
is an (F
X
t
)-martingale (called the innovation process),
dened by
B
t
:= X
t
 
Z
t
0
(C
0
(u) + C
1
(u)
^
Z
u
+ C
2
(u)X
u
)du: (1.4)
Furthermore, the mm matrix P (t),
P (t) = E
h
 
Z
t
  E

Z
t


F
X
t

2



F
X
t
i
=

E
h
Z
(i)
t
Z
(j)
t



F
X
t
i
  E
h
Z
(i)
t



F
X
t
i
E
h
Z
(j)
t



F
X
t
i
i;j
;
the conditional variance of Z = (Z
(1)
t
;    ; Z
(m)
t
), satises the ordinary dierential
equation
P
0
(t) = A
1
(t)P (t) + P (t)A
T
1
(t) + U(t)U
T
(t)
= [P (t)C
T
1
(t) + U(t)V
T
(t)][V (t)V
T
(t)]
 1
[C
1
(t)P (t) + V (t)U
T
(t)]; (1.5)
with initial condition P (0) = 0.
Consider two independent Brownian motions W and
~
W . In the sequel we will
consider linear stochastic dierential equations
dX
t
= dW
t
+ Y
t
dt; (1.6)
with initial value X
0
= 0, where (Y
t
) is a linear functional in W ,
~
W and X. Explic-
itly, Y
t
is of the form
Y
t
=
Z
t
0
F (t; u)dW
u
+
Z
t
0
G(t; u)d
~
W
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u
;
where F , G and H satisfy some integrability conditions. The solution X is clearly
a Gaussian process.
Remark 1.1. If the drift term Y is not linear, then the resulting process X
given by (1.6) is in general not a Gaussian process. For example, the process (W
t
+
R
t
0
j
~
W
u
jdu) is no longer Gaussian. But this does not mean that all resulting processes
X of the form (1.6) with a nonlinear drift term are not Gaussian. In Section 1.3 we
shall give an example of a Gaussian process with nonlinear drift term.
The following is a simple application of Theorem 1.1.
Proposition 1.1. Let W ,
~
W be two independent 1-dimensional Wiener pro-
cesses and X satisfy
dX
t
= dW
t
+ f(t)
Z
t
0
g(u)d
~
W
u
dt; (1.7)
with initial condition X
0
= 0, where f and g satisfy
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
f
2
(u)g
2
(v)dvdu <1;
for all t < 1. Then
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(1) the innovation process B is an (F
X
t
)-Brownian motion.
(2) E

Z
t
0
g(u)d
~
W
u




F
X
t

=
Z
t
0
f(u)p(u)dB
u
;
(3) E
h
~
W
t



F
X
t
i
=
Z
t
0
f(u)q(u)dB
u
;
where p, q are the solutions of the following system of dierential equations:
8
>
<
>
:
q
0
(t) + f
2
(t)p(t)q(t) = g(t);
p
0
(t) + f
2
(t)p
2
(t) = g
2
(t);
(1.8)
with initial values p(0) = q(0) = 0.
Proof. Consider in Theorem 1.1 the particular case m = 2, n = 1, A
i
 0 for
i 2 f0; 1; 2g, C
0
= C
2
= 0,
C
1
(t) =

0 f(t)

;
U(t) =
 
1 0 0
g(t) 0 0
!
; V (t) =

0 1 0

;
and a 3-dimensional Brownian motion

W
t
=

~
W
t
W
t
^
W
t

T
. It follows from (1.2)
and (1.4) that
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0
f(u)Z
(2)
u
du = B
t
+
Z
t
0
f(u)
^
Z
(2)
u
du;
where (Z
(i)
t
) and (
^
Z
(i)
t
) stand for the i-th component of (Z
t
) and (
^
Z
t
), respectively.
This implies that the quadratic variation of the (F
X
t
)-martingale B equals t. By
Levy's Theorem, B is a Brownian motion relative to the ltration (F
X
t
) and hence
the rst assertion follows. Let
P (t) =
 
r(t) q(t)
q(t) p(t)
!
denote the conditional variance matrix. Due to (1.3) the conditional expectation
^
Z
t
is given by
^
Z
t
=
 
^
Z
(1)
u
^
Z
(2)
u
!
=
Z
t
0
P (u)(C
1
(u))
T
dB
u
=
0
B
B
@
Z
t
0
f(u)q(u)dB
u
Z
t
0
f(u)p(u)dB
u
1
C
C
A
:
By (1.5) we see that the functions p(t) and q(t) are determined by
 
r
0
(t) q
0
(t)
q
0
(t) p
0
(t)
!
= U(t)U
T
(t)  P (t)C
T
1
(t)C
1
(t)P (t)
=
 
1  f
2
(t)q
2
(t) g(t)  f
2
(t)p(t)q(t)
g(t)  f
2
(t)p(t)q(t) g
2
(t)  f
2
(t)p
2
(t)
!
;
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which results in the assertions 2 and 3.
Let us consider the following illustration of this proposition.
Example 1.1. Suppose the signal process (Z
t
)
0t1
is given by
dZ
t
= d
~
W
t
+ aZ
t
dt; (1.9)
and the observation process (X
t
)
0t1
satises
dX
t
= dW
t
+ cZ
t
dt; (1.10)
for two independent Brownian motions (W
t
)
0t1
, (
~
W
t
)
0t1
and constants a, c.
Solving (1.9) and substituting it into (1.10) yield the representation
X
t
=W
t
+ c
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
e
a(u v)
d
~
W
v
du:
Using Proposition 1.1, we can compute the conditional expectations
E[
~
W
t
jF
X
t
] =
Z
t
0
c[c
2
e
2t
+ 2a(a+ )e
t
  (a+ )
2
]
[c
2
e
2t
+ (a+ )
2
]
dB
u
;
and
E

Z
t
0
e
 au
d
~
W
u




F
X
t

=
Z
t
0
ce
 au
(e
2u
  1)
(   a)e
2u
+  + a
dB
u
;
where  :=
p
a
2
+ c
2
. The second statement has been shown in Rogers-Williams
[54] P.327-329.
In Chapter 2 we will discuss an extension of the linear Kalman-Bucy lter and
some further applications.
1.2. Canonical representation and Volterra representation
Consider a centered Gaussian process X = (X
t
)
0t1
on a probability space
(
;F ;P). In this section we focus on some representations for the process X and
their relationship. Let us begin with the denition of the canonical representation.
Definition 1.2 (Hida-Hitsuda [32]). Suppose there exist a Brownian motion
B and a kernel given by a measurable function F (t; u) on [0; 1] [0; 1] satisfying
Z
t
0
F (t; u)du <1;
for all t, such that X admits the representation
X
t
=
Z
t
0
F (t; u)dB
u
: (1.11)
If the ltrations generated by X and B are the same, i.e., F
X
t
= F
B
t
for all t, then
(1.11) is called the canonical representation of X, and F (t; u) is the canonical kernel.
Next we introduce the denition of a Volterra kernel and the Volterra represen-
tation.
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Definition 1.3. (i) A measurable function l(s; u) on (0; 1)  (0; 1) is called
Volterra kernel if l(s; u) = 0, for 0 < s < u < 1. If, furthermore, l is square-
integrable on (0; 1) (0; 1), we shall call l(s; u) a square-integrable Volterra kernel.
(ii) Suppose that the process X can be represented in the form:
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
l(s; u)dB
u
ds; (1.12)
where B is a Brownian motion with respect to its own ltration (F
B
t
) and l(s; u) is
a Volterra kernel satisfying
Z
1
0

Z
s
0
l
2
(s; u)du

1
2
ds <1: (1.13)
Then the representation (1.12) is called a Volterra representation of X. If l(s; u)
is a square-integrable Volterra kernel, then we say that (1.12) is a square-integrable
Volterra representation.
(iii) A Volterra kernel l(s; u) is said to be continuously dierentiable if the kernel
^
l
dened by
^
l(s; u) :=
8
>
<
>
:
l(s; u); s  u;
l(u; s); s < u;
is continuously dierentiable for all 0  u; s  1.
Remark 1.2. Note that the condition (1.13) guarantees that the stochastic in-
tegral
R
t
0
R
s
0
l(s; u)dB
u
ds in (1.12) is well-dened for all t  1.
Remark 1.3. The Volterra representation (1.12) with a square-integrable Volterra
kernel species the Doob-Meyer decomposition of X as a semimartingale with re-
spect to its own ltration (F
X
t
): the martingale part is given by the Brownian mo-
tion B, and the predictable process of bounded variation is given by the absolutely
continuous process (
R
t
0
R
s
0
l(s; u)dB
u
ds).
Hitsuda [33] shows that the law of a Gaussian process (X
t
)
0t1
with E(X
t
) = 0
is equivalent to Wiener measure if and only if X admits a Volterra representation
with a square-integrable Volterra kernel, i.e., we can construct a Wiener process B on
(
;F ;P) and a square-integrable Volterra kernel l such that (1.12) holds. Moreover,
this representation is unique in the sense that if X has another square-integrable
Volterra representation
X
t
=
~
B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
~
l(s; u)d
~
B
u
ds;
then B =
~
B and l(s; u) =
~
l(s; u) for almost all s; u 2 (0; 1); see Hida-Hitsuda
[32]. But it l 62 L
2
((0; 1)  (0; 1)), this representation is no longer unique. In the
last section of this chapter we shall discuss dierent Volterra representations of a
Brownian motion.
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Using the stochastic Fubini Theorem (see, e.g., Protter [51]) we can write the
representation (1.12) as
X
t
=
Z
t
0

1 +
Z
t
u
l(v; u)dv

dB
u
; (1.14)
provided the Volterra kernel l(t; s) is square-integrable. The following theorem iden-
ties the representation (1.14) as the canonical representation (1.11) of X.
Proposition 1.2. Consider a processX which admits a square-integrable Volterra
representation (1:12). Then we have (F
X
t
) = (F
B
t
). In other words, a process which
has a square-integrable Volterra representation (1:12) admits a canonical represen-
tation (1:14).
Proof. Given a square-integrable Volterra kernel l, there is a unique square-
integrable Volterra kernel R
l
which satises the equations
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
l(t; s) +R
l
(t; s) +
Z
t
s
l(t; u)R
l
(u; s)du = 0;
l(t; s) +R
l
(t; s) +
Z
t
s
R
l
(t; u)l(u; s)du = 0;
(1.15)
for almost all s  t. We call R
l
the resolvent kernel of l; see Chapter 4 in Yosida
[58] or Hida-Hitsuda [32]. As in Hida-Hitsuda [32] p.136-137, we can now use the
kernel R
l
in order to reconstruct B in terms of X:
dX
t
+
Z
t
0
R
l
(t; u)dX
u
dt
= dB
t
+
Z
t
0
l(t; u)dB
u
dt+
Z
t
0
R
l
(t; u)

dB
u
+
Z
u
0
l(u; v)dB
v
du

dt
= dB
t
+
Z
t
0

l(t; u) +R
l
(t; u) +
Z
t
u
R
l
(t; v)l(v; u)dv

dB
u
dt
= dB
t
:
Thus, we have
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
l(s; u)dB
u
ds; (1.16)
and
B
t
= X
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
l
(s; u)dX
u
ds: (1.17)
Therefore, the ltration generated by X coincides with the one generated by B.
Hence (1.12) is the canonical decomposition of X in its own ltration. Thus, we
know that the representation (1.14) is a canonical representation.
14 1. REPRESENTATIONS OF GAUSSIAN PROCESSES
Remark 1.4. Equation (1.17) in the proof shows in particular how the Brownian
motion (B
t
) in (1.12) can be reconstructed from (X
t
) by a linear transformation.
This method of reconstruction will often be used in the sequel. We can apply this
method not only in the case of a Brownian motion B. For example, the solution of
an integral equation
m(t) = f(t) +
Z
t
0
l(t; u)f(u)du
is given by
f(t) = m(t) +
Z
t
0
R
l
(t; u)m(u)du:
Further properties and applications of Volterra kernels can be found in Gohberg-
Krein [27] and Corduneanu [18].
Remark 1.5. For a Volterra kernel l that satises (1.13) but is not square-
integrable, there exists also a corresponding resolvent kernel, but the latter is no
longer square-integrable. In some cases, the associated resolvent kernel even does
not satisfy (1.13). For instance, the resolvent kernel of l(t; s) =  1=t is given by
R
l
(t; s) = 1=s for s  t, which does not satisfy (1.13). If l and R
l
both satisfy (1.13)
we know that (1.16) and (1.17) hold and this results in (F
X
t
) = (F
B
t
). For example,
the resolvent kernel of a Volterra kernel l(t; s) = 1=t is given by R
l
(t; s) =  s=t
2
,
which satises (1.13). From this result and the stochastic Fubini Theorem we can
represent the random variable
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
B
u
u
du; (1.18)
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
log
t
u
dB
u
=
Z
t
0

1 + log
t
u

dB
u
(1.19)
as
B
t
= X
t
 
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
v
u
2
dX
v
du:
Hence, (F
X
t
) = (F
B
t
). Consequently, (1.19) is a canonical representation of X, but
(1.18) is not a square-integrable Volterra representation, because the Volterra kernel
l(t; s) = 1=t is not in L
2
((0; 1)  (0; 1)). From this example we can also see that
a square-integrable Volterra representation is not guaranteed to exist even though
(F
X
t
) and (F
B
t
) might coincide.
1.3. Some auxiliary lemmas
Denote the space of all continuous functions on [0; 1] by C[0; 1] and let (B
t
) denote
the canonical right continuous ltration generated by the coordinate process. We
begin by recalling the denition of \nonanticipative functionals" in Kallianpur [38].
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Definition 1.4. A B
1
 B[0; 1]-measurable functional  : C[0; 1] [0; 1]  ! R
is called nonanticipative if the process dened by ((; t))
0t1
is adapted to the
ltration (B
t
).
The next lemma shows how a square-integrable Volterra representation can be
constructed for a particular class of Gaussian processes.
Lemma 1.1 (Theorem 9.4.1 of Kallianpur [38]). Let  be a nonanticipative func-
tional, W = (W
t
)
0t1
a Wiener process and  = (
t
)
0t1
a Gaussian process
satisfying

t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
(; s)ds; (1.20)
with
P

! 2 
 :
Z
t
0

2
((!); s)ds <1

= 1; (1.21)
for all t < 1. Then  can be expressed in terms of W by the formula

t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dW
u
ds;
for all t < 1, P-a.s., where G is a square-integrable Volterra kernel. In other words,
 possesses a square-integrable Volterra representation.
From this Lemma and the discussion of Hitsuda [33] in Section 1.2 above, we see
that the law of centered Gaussian process  of Lemma 1.1 is equivalent to Wiener
measure.
Lemma 1.2 (Lemma 2.3 of Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]). Suppose the process (X
t
)
t0
satises
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0
Y
u
du;
with an (F
t
)
t0
-Brownian motion (W
t
)
t0
and an (F
t
)-adapted process (Y
t
)
t0
sat-
isfying
R
t
0
EjY
u
jdu <1 for all t.
(i) The Doob-Meyer decomposition of X as a semimartingale in its natural ltration
(F
X
t
) is given by
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
E[Y
u
jF
X
u
]du; (1.22)
where the process B dened by (1.22) is an (F
X
t
)-Brownian motion, which is often
called the innovation process of X. In particular, (X
t
)
t0
is a Brownian motion if
and only if
E[Y
u
jF
X
u
] = 0; dP  du  a:s::
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(ii) Furthermore, if the function s 7 ! Y
s
is L
1
-continuous on (0;1) and (X
t
)
t0
is
a Gaussian process, then (X
t
)
t0
is a Brownian motion if and only if
E(X
s
Y
t
) = 0; (1.23)
for all 0 < s  t.
The previous lemma provides the construction of the Doob-Meyer decomposition
and an alternative characterization of Brownian motion which will be useful in the
rest of the thesis. For example, by combining this Lemma and Proposition 1.1 we
have the following corollary and example.
Corollary 1.1. Suppose the process X is given by (1.7). Then the canonical
decomposition of X is of the form
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
f(u)
Z
u
0
f(v)p(v)dB
v
du; (1.24)
where p(t) is the solution of (1.8). Moreover, (1.24) is a square-integrable Volterra
representation of X.
Example 1.2. By the above corollary we get that the canonical decomposition
of X mentioned in Example 1.1 is given by
X
t
= B
t
+ c
2
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
e
a(s u)
(e
2u
  1)
(   a)e
2u
+  + a
dB
u
ds;
where (B
t
)
0t1
is an (F
X
t
)-Brownian motion.
With the help of Lemma 1.2 we can also construct a Gaussian process with
nonlinear drift term:
Example 1.3. Consider a Wiener process (X
t
)
0t1
satisfying
dX
t
= dW
t
+
X
1
 X
t
1  t
dt; (1.25)
where (W
t
)
0t1
is a Brownian motion. Clearly, the process X is a Gaussian
semimartingale with respect to the ltration generated by the process (W
t
) and
the random variable X
1
, and it is also one with respect to the enlarged ltration

F
t
:= fX
t
; sgn(X
1
)g. By Lemma 1.2 the canonical decomposition ofX with respect
to this -algebra is of the form
X
t
=
~
W
t
+
Z
t
0
E[X
1
j

F
u
] X
u
1  u
du
where (
~
W
t
)
0t1
is an (

F
t
)-Brownian motion. Therefore, we have to calculate the
explicit form of the conditional expectation of X
1
with respect to (

F
t
):
E[X
1
j

F
t
] = E[X
1
jX
t
; sgn(X
1
)] = E[X
1
jX
t
; X
1
> 0]
= X
t
+ E[X
1
 X
t
jX
t
; X
1
 X
t
>  X
t
]:
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Let Y be an N(0; 1)-distributed random variable. We can rewrite the second term
in the above equation as
p
1  tE[Y jY >  
X
t
p
1  t
]:
Moreover,
E[Y jY > a] =
R
1
a
y(y)dy
P [Y > a]
=
(a)
2(1  (a))
;
with normal distribution  and its density function . Taking a =  
1
p
1 t
X
t
, we get
E[X
1
jX
t
; sgn(X
1
)] = X
t
+
p
1  t
2
(
1
p
1 t
X
t
)
(
1
p
1 t
X
t
)
:
Therefore, we can write (1.25) as
dX
t
= d
~
W
t
+
1
2
p
1  t
(
1
p
1 t
X
t
)
(
1
p
1 t
X
t
)
dt:
Thus the drift term of the Gaussian process X is clearly non-linear.
1.4. Volterra representations of Brownian motion
Consider a stochastic process (X
t
)
t0
on a probability space (
;F ;P) which
admits a Volterra representation
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
l(s; u)dB
u
ds: (1.26)
As already mentioned in Section 1.2, Hitsuda [33] shows that the law ofX is identical
to that of a Brownian motion under some equivalent measure
~
P  P if and only if X
admits a square-integrable Volterra representation. Hence, from the uniqueness of
the Doob-Meyer decomposition we know that if X is a Brownian motion admitting
a Volterra representation (1.26), then the associated Volterra kernel l is not square-
integrable unless l  0. For the case l 6 0, we can conclude that (F
X
t
) $ (F
B
t
),
i.e., the ltration generated by X is strictly smaller than the one generated by
B. Otherwise, the representation (1.26) would be the Doob-Meyer decomposition
of X as a semimartingale in its own ltration. Uniqueness of the Doob-Meyer
decomposition would imply l  0, which is obviously a contradiction. But is it
possible to nd a Volterra representation for Brownian motion, where the kernel l
is not square-integrable? If so, how does the associated Volterra kernel look like?
Theorem 1.2. The process (X
t
)
t0
satisfying (1.26) is a Brownian motion if
and only if the Volterra kernel  l is self-reproducing, i.e.,
l(t; s) +
Z
s
0
l(t; v)l(s; v)dv = 0; (1.27)
for all t and for almost all s  t. Furthermore, if the process (X
t
)
t0
is a Brownian
motion, then fX
s
; s  tg is independent of
R
t
0
l(t; u)dB
u
for all t > 0.
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Proof. Thanks to the second assertion in Lemma 1.2 we see that (X
t
) is a
Brownian motion if and only if
E

X
s
Z
t
0
l(t; u)dB
u

= 0;
for all s  t. It follows from (1.26) that
E

X
s
Z
t
0
l(t; u)dB
u

=
Z
s
0
l(t; u)du+
Z
s
0
Z
u
0
l(t; v)l(u; v)dvdu:
Taking derivatives with respect to s, we get the rst assertion. Furthermore. since
both X and
R
t
0
l(t; u)dB
u
are jointly Gaussian, the second assertion follows.
Remark 1.6. The terminology \self-reproducing" is used in Neveu [48] in a
dierent context.
Remark 1.7. If the Volterra kernel l(t; s) is continous, then it satises the fol-
lowing properties:
(i) l(t; t)  0.
(ii) jl(t; s)j 
p
l(t; t)l(s; s).
(iii) If l(t; s) 6 0, then l(t; t) =2 L
1
(0; 1), and this implies l =2 L
2
((0; 1)(0; 1)). This
is consistent with the above discussion. In particular we see that a non-zero
self-reproducing Volterra kernel l is not square-integrable.
Proof. Since l is continuous, we get that l satises (1.27) for all t and for all
s  t. Taking s = t, we have
l(t; t) =  
Z
t
0
l
2
(t; u)du; (1.28)
which leads to assertion (i). Then it follows from Holder's inequality that
jl(t; s)j 

Z
s
0
l
2
(t; v)dv

1
2

Z
s
0
l
2
(s; v)dv

1
2


Z
t
0
l
2
(t; v)dv

1
2

Z
s
0
l
2
(s; v)dv

1
2
=
p
l(t; t)l(s; s):
This gives (ii). As for (iii), assume l 6 0. Since l is continuous, we see that l(t; t) 6= 0
for some t 2 [0; 1] due to (1.28). Let us write
fs : l(s; s) 6= 0g =
[
i
(a
i
; b
i
);
with disjoint intervals (a
i
; b
i
). Substituting (ii) in (1.27), we get
jl(t; s)j   
p
l(t; t)l(s; s)
Z
s
0
l(v; v)dv:
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This implies
 l(s; s)  l(s; s)
Z
s
0
l(v; v)dv;
for all s. Since l(s; s) = 0 for s  a := inf
i
a
i
, we obtain
Z
s
a
l(v; v)dv =
Z
s
0
l(v; v)dv   1 (1.29)
for all s 2
S
i
[a
i
; b
i
]. Either we have a = a
i
for some i or a is an accumulation point
of (a
i
). In both cases, (1.29) implies l(t; t) =2 L
1
(0; 1). In particular, we have
Z
t
0
Z
v
0
l
2
(v; u)dvdu =
Z
t
0
l(v; v)dv =  1:
In order to illustrate Theorem 1.2 more explicitly, let us look at some special
cases:
Corollary 1.2. Let X be a process given by
X
t
= B
t
 
Z
t
0
a(u)
Z
u
0
b(v)dB
v
du;
with X
0
= 0, where a, b are deterministic functions with a 6 0,
R
t
0
b
2
(u)du 6= 0 and
Z
t
0
ja(u)j

Z
u
0
b
2
(v)dv

1
2
du <1;
for all t > 0. Then X is a Brownian motion if and only if
a(t) =  
b(t)
R
t
0
b
2
(v)dv
;
i.e., the process X is of the form
X
t
= B
t
 
Z
t
0
b(u)
R
u
0
b
2
(v)dv
Z
u
0
b(r)dB
r
du: (1.30)
Furthermore, if X is a Brownian motion, then the -algebra F
X
t
is orthogonal to
the stochastic integral
R
t
0
b(u)dB
u
for all t.
Proof. Substituting the Volterra kernel l(t; s) = a(t)b(s) in (1.27) we see that
X is a Brownian motion if and only if
b(s) + a(s)
Z
s
0
b
2
(u)du = 0;
from which we derive (1.30). For s  t, we have
E

X
s
Z
t
0
b(u)dB
u

=
Z
s
0
b(u)du 
Z
s
0
b(u)
R
u
0
b
2
(v)dv
Z
u
0
b
2
(r)drdu = 0:
This completes the proof.
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If b is as in Corollary 1.2, then it is easy to check that the kernel
l(s; u) :=  
b(s)b(u)
Z
s
0
b
2
(v)dv
satises all properties stated in Remark 1.7. In particular, if we take b(t) = t
k
for
k >  
1
2
, we see that the process
X
t
= B
t
  (2k + 1)
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
u
 k 1
v
k
dB
v
du
is a Brownian motion. This has been discussed in Levy [44], [45], Chiu [14] and
Hibino-Hitsuda-Muraoka [31]. Especially, for the case k = 0, i.e., the Brownian
motion
X
t
= B
t
 
Z
t
0
B
u
u
du;
has been studied in a number of papers, e.g., Deheuvels [21], Jeulin-Yor [37], Yor
[57]. And we also know that the -algebra F
X
t
is strictly smaller than F
B
t
for all
t > 0. In fact, we have the decomposition
F
B
t
= F
X
t
 (B
t
)
for all t; see Jeulin-Yor [37] or Chapter 1 of Yor [57]. In Chapter 3 below we shall
also discuss some generalizations of this process and the corresponding orthogonal
decompositions of the Brownian ltration.
CHAPTER 2
Brownian motions generated by linear stochastic equations
LetW be a Wiener process, and let S be a continuous square-integrable Gaussian
martingale which is independent of W . Consider a Gaussian process X satisfying
the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+ Y
t
dt; (2.1)
where the drift term Y is linear in S and X. Explicitly, Y
t
is of the form
Y
t
= f(t)S
0
+
Z
t
0
F (t; u)dS
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u
; (2.2)
where f , F and H are deterministic functions satisfying some suitable integrability
conditions. Our aim is to construct the Doob-Meyer decomposition of such processes
X as semimartingales in their own ltration. It will also be called the canonical de-
composition of X. In particular, we characterize the drifts Y such that the resulting
process X is a Brownian motion in its own ltration. In addition, we investigate the
problem of choosing Y in such a way that X
t
converges to the nal value S
1
as t! 1.
This analysis is motivated by an equilibrium problem in mathematical nance re-
lated the role of insider trading. The nancial interpretation will be discussed in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
We begin in Section 2.1 with the discussion of a special case where S is also a
Wiener process. In Section 2.2 we shall derive the canonical decomposition of Gauss-
ian processes with linear drift term. Using this result, we are able to characterize
the processes satisfying (2.1) with drift term (2.2) which are Brownian motions in
their own ltrations; see Section 2.3. Some examples of such Brownian motions will
be given in the last section of this chapter.
2.1. An example of canonical decomposition
Let (W
t
)
0t1
be a standard Brownian motion with respect to its canonical ltra-
tion (F
W
t
)
0t1
. Now let (
~
W
t
)
0t1
be another standard Brownian motion indepen-
dent of (W
t
)
0t1
. Denote the ltration generated by these two Brownian motions
by (F
W;
~
W
t
)
0t1
.
We know that the solution (
~
X
t
)
0t1
of the stochastic dierential equation
d
~
X
t
= dW
t
+
~
W
1
 
~
X
t
1  t
dt; (2.3)
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with initial value
~
X
0
= 0, is a standard Brownian motion with respect to (F
~
X
t
) which
converges to the nal value
~
W
1
(cf., for example, Jeulin-Yor [36]). Now we look at
the process (X
t
)
0t1
starting in X
0
= 0 which is dened by a similar stochastic
dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
~
W
t
 X
t
1  t
dt: (2.4)
Clearly, for any t 2 [0; 1], X
t
is normally distributed, and (X
t
) has quadratic varia-
tion hXi
t
= t. The following lemma shows even that X
t
approaches
~
W
1
as t ! 1.
However, we will see that (X
t
)
0t1
is no longer a Brownian motion.
Lemma 2.1. X
t
!
~
W
1
as t! 1:
Proof. The explicit solution of (2.4) is given by
X
t
= (1  t)
Z
t
0
~
W
s
(1  s)
2
ds+ (1  t)
Z
t
0
1
(1  s)
dW
s
: (2.5)
The rst term approaches
~
W
1
and the second goes to 0 as t ! 1, and this implies
the result. Alternatively, we could note that the process 2
 
1
2
(X  
~
W ) satises the
equation of a Brownian bridge tied down to the nal value 0.
Lemma 2.2. For 0  s  t < 1, we have
E[X
t
~
W
t
] = t+ (1  t) log(1  t); (2.6)
and the covariance function of X is given by
E[X
s
X
t
] = s+ 2s(1  t) + (2  s  t) log(1  s): (2.7)
Proof. Applying the integration by parts formula to the rst integral in (2.5),
the solution of (2.4) is given by
X
t
= (1  t)
Z
t
0
dW
s
  d
~
W
s
1  s
+
~
W
t
:
Since (W
t
) and (
~
W
t
) are independent, we establish
E[X
t
~
W
t
] = t + (1  t)E
"
Z
t
0
~
W
t
(dW
s
  d
~
W
s
)
1  s
#
= t + (1  t) log(1  t);
and
E[X
s
X
t
] = E[
~
W
s
~
W
t
] + (1  t)(1  s)E
2
4
 
Z
s
0
dW
u
  d
~
W
u
1  u
!
2
3
5
+ (1  s)E
"
~
W
t
Z
s
0
dW
u
  d
~
W
u
1  u
#
+ (1  t)E
"
~
W
s
Z
t
0
dW
u
  d
~
W
u
1  u
#
= s+ 2s(1  t) + (2  s  t) log(1  s):
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This Lemma shows that the process (X
t
)
0t1
is not a Brownian motion, since
its covariance function diers from s ^ t. But from (2.4) we see that it is a semi-
martingale with respect to the ltration (F
W;
~
W
t
)
0t1
, and therefore it is obviously
a semimartingale relative to its natural ltration. A natural question arises: what
is the explicit form of its canonical decomposition? This is the purpose we want to
carry out in the present section.
A simple application of Lemma 1.2 shows that
Corollary 2.1. Let the process (X
t
)
0t1
satisfy (2.4). Then the process B,
dened as
B
t
:= X
t
 
Z
t
0
E[
~
W
u
jF
X
u
] X
u
1  u
du; (2.8)
is a Brownian motion relative to (F
X
t
)
0t1
.
Proof. Set
Y
u
=
~
W
u
 X
u
1  u
;
then from the rst assertion in Lemma 1.2, we obtain the required result.
Recalling Lemma 1.2 we know that the process B given by (2.8) is the innovation
process of X. Therefore, if we desire to get the canonical decomposition of X
t
, we
only have to compute the conditional expectation of
~
W
t
relative to the -algebra
F
X
t
. If this is substituted in Corollary 2.1, then we get the desired result.
Lemma 2.3. Set A :=
1
2
(1 +
p
5) and B :=
1
2
(1 
p
5). Then for 0  t < 1,
E[
~
W
t
jF
X
t
] =
Z
t
0
(B + 1)(1  s)
 A
  (A+ 1)(1  s)
 B
A(1  t)
 B
  B(1  t)
 A
dX
s
+X
t
: (2.9)
Proof. Due to (2.8), we may choose a nonanticipative functional  such that
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
(X; s)ds:
Using Lemma 1.1, X can be represented by
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dB
u
ds;
where G is a square-integrable Volterra kernel. Let R
G
be the square-integrable
resolvent kernel ofG, then applying a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition
1.2, we deduce
B
t
= X
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
G
(s; u)dX
u
ds: (2.10)
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Comparing (2.8) and (2.10), we may therefore assume that the conditional expec-
tation of
~
W
t
with respect to the -algebra F
X
t
is of the form
E[
~
W
t
jF
X
t
] =
Z
t
0
a(t; u)dX
u
;
with a continuously dierentiable square-integrable Volterra kernel a(t; u). Applying
the projection property of the conditional expectation
E[X
s
(
~
W
t
  E[
~
W
t
jF
X
t
])] = 0;
for all 0  s  t < 1, as well as the martingale property we obtain
E(X
s
~
W
s
)  a(t; t)E(X
s
X
t
) =  
Z
t
0
a
2
(t; u)E(X
s
X
u
)du:
Using (2.6), (2.7) and computing explicitly the left hand side (LHS) and the right
hand side (RHS) in this equation, we get
LHS = s+ (1  s) log(1  s)  a(t; t)(s+ 2s(1  t) + (2  s  t) log(1  s)):
RHS =  
Z
s
0
a
2
(t; u)(u+ 2u(1  s) + (2  s  u) log(1  u))du
 
Z
t
s
a
2
(t; u)(s+ 2s(1  u) + (2  s  u) log(1  s))du:
Taking the second derivatives with respect to s on both sides implies
1
1  s
 
a(t; t)(t  s)
(1  s)
2
= a
2
(t; s) 
Z
t
s
a
2
(t; u)(u  s)
(1  s)
2
du:
Multiplication of both sides with (1  s)
2
leads to
1  s  a(t; t)(t  s) = a
2
(t; s)(1  s)
2
 
Z
t
s
a
2
(t; u)(u  s)du;
and this implies
1  s = a
2
(t; s)(1  s)
2
+
Z
t
s
a(t; u)du:
Taking further derivatives with respect to s on both sides we get
(1  s)
2
a
22
(t; s)  2(1  s)a
2
(t; s)  a(t; s) + 1 = 0:
The solution of this dierential equation is given by
a(t; s) = c
1
(t)(1  s)
 A
+ c
2
(t)(1  s)
 B
+ 1:
Substituting this equation in RHS and comparing the coeÆcients of s, log(1   s)
and s log(1  s) in LHS and RHS, we derive the desired result.
Therefore, combining Corollary 2.1 and Lemma 2.3 allows us to conclude the
following proposition.
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Proposition 2.1. The canonical decomposition of the process X in (2.4) is
given by
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
(B + 1)(1  s)
 A
  (A+ 1)(1  s)
 B
A(1  u)
A
 B(1  u)
B
dX
s
du; (2.11)
for 0  t < 1.
Remark 2.1. As an alternative, we can use the Kalman-Bucy lter to get the
same result. We may set

t
:=W
t
+
Z
t
0
~
W
u
1  u
du:
Applying Proposition 1.1 with f = 1=(1  t) and g  1 and Lemma 1.2 we can get
the canonical decomposition of 

t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
1
2(1  u)
 
1 
p
5(A(1  s)
A
+B(1  s)
B
)
A(1  s)
A
  B(1  s)
B
!
dB
s
du:
Substituting it into
X
t
= 
t
 
Z
t
0
X
u
1  u
du
derives the canonical decomposition of X
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
1
2(1  u)
 
1 
p
5(A(1  s)
A
+B(1  s)
B
)
A(1  s)
A
  B(1  s)
B
!
dB
s
du 
Z
t
0
X
u
1  u
du:
Applying Ito^'s product rule and the stochastic Fubini Theorem we obtain
X
t
= (1  t)

Z
t
0
dB
u
1  u
+
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
1
2(1  u)
2
 
1 
p
5(A(1  s)
A
+B(1  s)
B
)
A(1  s)
A
  B(1  s)
B
!
dB
s
du
#
= B
t
 
1  t
2
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
1
(1  u)
2
 
1 +
p
5(A(1  s)
A
+B(1  s)
B
)
A(1  s)
A
 B(1  s)
B
!
dB
s
du
= B
t
 
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
(A+ 1)(1  s)
A 1
  (B + 1)(1  s)
B 1
A(1  s)
A
 B(1  s)
B
dB
s
du (2.12)
Comparing these two equations (2.11) and (2.12), we see they are of the same form
as (1.16) and (1.17) in the proof of Proposition 1.2, and that their kernels fulll the
relation (1.15). In other words, they are square-integrable resolvent kernels to each
other, and (2.12) is the square-integrable Volterra representation of X.
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2.2. Linear stochastic equations and canonical decomposition
LetW be a Wiener process, and let S be a continuous square-integrable centered
Gaussian martingale which is independent of W . For simplicity, we denote the
variance of S
t
by V (t) and assume V (1) = E[S
2
1
] = 1. Furthermore, we assume
that V (t) is dierentiable. Suppose the process X satises the stochastic functional
dierential equation with linear drift
dX
t
= dW
t
+

f(t)S
0
+
Z
t
0
F (t; u)dS
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u

dt; (2.13)
where f 2 L
2
(0; 1) \ C(0; 1) and F (t; u)
p
V
0
(u) and H(t; u) are square-integrable
Volterra kernels on (0; 1) (0; 1) (Since V (s) is non-decreasing in s, V
0
(s)  0, this
implies
p
V
0
(s) is well-dened.). We assume X
0
= 0. The following theorem will
give the canonical decomposition of X, i.e., the Doob-Meyer decomposition of X as
a semimartingale in its own ltration.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose X satises (2.13). Then its canonical decomposition is
given by
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0

Z
s
0
G(s; u)dB
u
+
Z
s
0
H(s; u)dX
u

ds; (2.14)
where B is a Brownian motion. Here G is a square-integrable Volterra kernel deter-
mined by the integral equation
G(t; s) +
Z
s
0
G(t; u)G(s; u)du = f(t)f(s)V (0) +
Z
s
0
F (t; u)F (s; u)V
0
(u)du: (2.15)
Moreover, we have (F
X
t
) = (F
B
t
), i.e., the ltrations generated by X and B are the
same.
Proof. 1) Dene a process  by

t
:=W
t
+
Z
t
0

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v

du: (2.16)
Due to Lemma 1.2 we know that there exists a Brownian motion B such that

t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
E

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v




F

u

du:
Since E[f(u)S
0
+
R
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v
jF

u
](!) can be chosen to be both jointly measurable
in u and ! and (F

u
)-adapted, we can write
E

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v




F

u

= (; u)
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with a nonanticipative functional . Furthermore, it follows from
E

Z
t
0

2
(; u)du

= E
"
Z
t
0

E

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v




F

u

2
du
#
 E
"
Z
t
0

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v

2
du
#
=
Z
t
0

f
2
(u) +
Z
u
0
F
2
(u; v)dv

du <1
that
Z
t
0

2
((!); s)ds <1; P   a.s.;
for all t < 1. Applying Lemma 1.1 we know that  can be represented as

t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dB
u
ds; P   a.s.; (2.17)
which is a square-integrable Volterra representation with respect to the Brownian
motion B. As for the relation between F and G, we can look at the equations (2.16)
and (2.17). For s  t, the covariance function of  in (2.16) is given by
E[
s

t
] = E[W
s
W
t
] + E

Z
s
0

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v

du


Z
t
0

f(p)S
0
+
Z
p
0
F (p; q)dS
q

dp

= s+

Z
s
0
f(u)du

Z
t
0
f(p)dp

V (0)
+2
Z
s
0
Z
u
0
Z
v
0
F (u; r)F (v; r)V
0
(r)drdvdu
+
Z
t
s
Z
s
0
Z
v
0
F (u; r)F (v; r)V
0
(r)drdvdu: (2.18)
And the covariance function of  satisfying (2.17) is given by
E[
s

t
] = s+
Z
s
0
Z
u
0
G(u; v)dvdu+
Z
t
s
Z
s
0
G(u; v)dvdu
+2
Z
s
0
Z
u
0
Z
v
0
G(u; r)G(v; r)drdvdu
+
Z
t
s
Z
s
0
Z
v
0
G(u; r)G(v; r)drdvdu: (2.19)
The right-hand sides of these two equations should coincide. Dierentiating rst
with respect to t, and then with respect to s yield (2.15). From (2.17) and Propo-
sition 1.2, we know that the ltrations generated by  and by B are coincide.
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2) From (2.13) and (2.16), we see that
dX
t
= d
t
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u
dt:
Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.2, we conclude that (F
X
t
) =
(F

t
). This implies (F
X
t
) = (F
B
t
) due to 1). The canonical decomposition of X is
therefore given by (2.14).
Remark 2.2. In the notation of Kallianpur [38] p.235, equation (2.15) can be
viewed as the factorization S = (I +G)(I +G
?
) of the integral operator S dened
by I + FF
?
+
~
F
~
F
?
, where F ,
~
F , G are integral operators with square-integrable
Volterra kernels f(t)
p
V (0), F (t; s)
p
V
0
(s) and G(t; s), respectively. More precisely,
for all g; h 2 L
2
(0; 1), we have
h(I + FF
?
+
~
F
~
F
?
)g; hi = h(I +G)(I +G
?
)g; hi:
In order to see this, let g(u) = I
(0;s)
(u) and h(u) = I
(0;t)
(u) with 0  s  t  1.
Using the properties of Volterra kernels, we have
h(I + FF
?
+
~
F
~
F
?
)g; hi = hg; hi+ hF
?
g; F
?
hi+ h
~
F
?
g;
~
F
?
hi
=
Z
1
0
g(u)h(u)du+
Z
1
0

Z
1
0
f(v)g(v)
p
V (0)dv

Z
1
0
f(r)h(r)
p
V (0)dr

du
+
Z
1
0

Z
1
0
F (v; u)g(v)
p
V
0
(u)dv

Z
1
0
F (r; u)h(r)
p
V
0
(u)dr

du
= s+

Z
t
0
f(v)dv

Z
s
0
f(r)dr

V (0)
+
Z
s
0

Z
s
u
F (v; u)dv

Z
t
u
F (r; u)dr

V
0
(u)du;
which equals the right-hand side of (2.18). On the other hand,
h(I +G)(I +G
?
)g; hi = h(I +G
?
)g; (I +G
?
)hi
=
Z
1
0

g(u) +
Z
1
0
G(v; u)g(v)dv)(h(u) +
Z
1
0
G(v; u)h(v)dv

du
=
Z
s
0

1 +
Z
s
u
G(v; u)dv

1 +
Z
t
u
G(v; u)dv

du;
which is exactly the right-hand side of (2.19).
Remark 2.3. (i) Comparing (2.13), (2.14) and Lemma 1.2, we see that
E

f(t)S
0
+
Z
t
0
F (t; u)dS
u




F
X
t

=
Z
t
0
G(t; u)dB
u
; (2.20)
for f 2 L
1
(0; 1) \ C(0; 1) and Volterra kernel F satisfying
Z
1
0
Z
u
0
F
2
(u; v)V
0
(v)dvdu <1:
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(ii) We have obtained the conditional expectation in (2.20) under the assumption
that F (t; u)
p
V
0
(u) is a square-integrable Volterra kernel. In fact, it is enough to
assume that F satises
Z
1
0

Z
u
0
F
2
(u; v)V
0
(v)dv

1
2
du <1:
It is not diÆcult to show that for all s  t,
E

X
s

f(t)S
0
+
Z
t
0
F (t; u)dS
u
 
Z
t
0
G(t; u)dB
u

= 0;
and this result leads to the conclusion.
The representation (2.14) provides a canonical representation, but on the right-
hand side there is still a term of X. Can we represent X through B alone? In the
following we are going to give another representation for the process X satisfying
(2.14).
Proposition 2.2. The unique strong solution of (2.14) is given by
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0

G(s; u) +R
 H
(s; u) +
Z
s
u
R
 H
(s; v)G(v; u)dv

dB
u
ds; (2.21)
where R
 H
is the resolvent kernel of  H, i.e., R
 H
satises the equations
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
R
 H
(t; s) = H(t; s) +
Z
t
s
R
 H
(t; u)H(u; s)du;
R
 H
(t; s) = H(t; s) +
Z
t
s
H(t; u)R
 H
(u; s)du:
Proof. Dene

t
:= B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dB
u
ds = X
t
 
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
H(s; u)dX
u
ds: (2.22)
Therefore similarly to the proof of Proposition 1.2 we get
X
t
= 
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
 H
(s; u)d
u
ds:
Substituting the rst representation of (2.22) into the above equation, we get (2.21).
In order to show the uniqueness of the solution, we assume there is another solution
Y of (2.14). Then from (2.22) we know that

t
= Y
t
 
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
H(s; u)dY
u
ds;
and this implies
Y
t
= 
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
 H
(s; u)d
u
ds = X
t
; P   a.s.:
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Since F (t; u)
p
V
0
(u) and H(t; u) are square-integrable and since (F
X
t
) = (F
B
t
)
due to Theorem 2.1, we can conclude that (2.21) is a square-integrable Volterra
representation of X.
Let us look at the special case where S is a standard Brownian motion
~
W . Thus,
X satises the linear stochastic functional dierential equation
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0

Z
s
0
F (s; u)d
~
W
u
+
Z
s
0
H(s; u)dX
u

ds; (2.23)
with square-integrable Volterra kernels F and H on (0; 1)  (0; 1). The following
corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.2 (Theorem 4.1 of Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]). The canonical decom-
position of X satisfying (2.23) is given by
dX
t
= dB
t
+

Z
t
0
G
F
(t; u)dB
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u

dt; (2.24)
where G
F
is determined by
G
F
(t; s) +
Z
s
0
G
F
(t; u)G
F
(s; u)du =
Z
s
0
F (t; u)F (s; u)du; (2.25)
for almost all s  t.
When F admits a factorization F (t; s) = f(t)g(s) for some continuous functions
f and g which satisfy
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
f
2
(u)g
2
(v)dvdu <1; (2.26)
for all t < 1, we can write the above corollary more explicitly.
Corollary 2.3 (Corollary 4.1 of Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]). Suppose the processX
is given by X
0
= 0 and
dX
t
= dW
t
+

f(t)
Z
t
0
g(u)d
~
W
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u

dt; (2.27)
where f; g 2 C
1
(0; 1) satises (2.26), f 6= 0 a.s., and H(t; s) is a square-integrable
Volterra kernel. Then the canonical decomposition of X is of the form
dX
t
= dB
t
+

f(t)
Z
t
0
(u)dB
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u

dt; (2.28)
where the function (t) is the solution of the dierential equation

(t)
f(t)

0
+ 
2
(t) = g
2
(t); (2.29)
with initial condition (0) = 0.
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Proof. We have only to prove that the solution of (2.25) is given by G
F
(t; s) =
f(t)(s), where  satises (2.29) with initial value (0) = 0. In fact, the right-hand
side of (2.25) is equal to
G
F
(t; s) +
Z
s
0
G
F
(t; u)G
F
(s; u)du = f(t)(s) + f(t)f(s)
Z
s
0

2
(u)du
= f(t)(s) + f(t)f(s)

Z
s
0
g
2
(u)du 
(s)
f(s)

= f(t)f(s)
Z
s
0
g
2
(u)du =
Z
s
0
F (t; u)F (s; u)du;
which is exactly the left-hand side of (2.25).
Remark 2.4. Due to the special form of (2.27), this corollary can be also proved
by the Kalman-Bucy lter. Combining Theorem 1.1 and Proposition 1.1 we can get
the canonical decomposition of a process X of the form
dX
t
= dW
t
+ f(t)
Z
t
0
g(u)d
~
W
u
dt:
With a simple trick we can extend it to (2.27). In fact, the second equation in
(1.8) and (2.29) are equivalent, since if we set p(t) := (t)=f(t) in (1.8), these two
equations are identical.
Let A(a:b) be a class of functions dened by
A(a; b) :=

' : ' measurable,
Z
t
a
s'
2
(s)ds <1 for all a  t < b

:
For the case g  1, we can rewrite the integral condition (2.26) on the square-
integrable Volterra kernel F as the condition f 2 A(0; 1). Under this condition, the
equation (2.29) can be written as

(t)
f(t)

0
+ 
2
(t) = 1;
with f 6 0 and (0) = 0. The corresponding solution is given by
(t) =
f(t)	(t)
	
0
(t)
; (2.30)
where 	(t) is the solution of the Sturm-Liouville equation
	
00
(t) = f
2
(t)	(t); (2.31)
with boundary conditions 	(0) = 0 and 	
0
(0+) = 1. Using this result we can
construct the following examples.
Example 2.1. Consider a process (X
t
)
0t1
satisfying the stochastic dierential
equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
a
1  t
(
~
W
t
 X
t
)dt;
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that is, f(t) =  h(t) = a=(1  t), with a nonzero constant a. Then the correspond-
ing Sturm-Liouville equation is

00
(u) =
a
2
(1  u)
2
(u); (2.32)
The following argument is due to M. Yor (see, Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]). It is immediate
to check that a function (1 u)

solves (2.32) if and only if ( 1) = a
2
, an equation
which admits the two solutions: 
+
(a) and 
 
(a), given by


(a) :=
1
2

r
a
2
+
1
4
:
Clearly, 
 
(a) < 0 < 
+
(a). Thus, the decreasing solution of (2.32) is
(u) = (1  u)

+
(a)
:
And from the denition and the boundary condition of 	(u) we can get
	(u) =
(1  u)

 
(a)
  (1  u)

+
(a)
p
1 + 4a
2
:
From (2.20), the conditional expectation of
~
W
t
relative to F
X
t
is given by
E[
~
W
t
jF
X
t
] :=
1
	
0
(t)
Z
t
0
	(u)

a
1  u
dX
u
+
a
2
(1  u)
2
X
u
du

= X
t
+ a
Z
t
0
(
 
(a) + 1)(1  u)
 
+
(a)
  (
+
(a) + 1)(1  u)
 
 
(a)

+
(a)(1  t)
 
 
(a)
  
 
(a)(1  t)
 
+
(a)
dX
u
:
In particular, if a = 1, then 
+
(1) = A and 
 
(1) = B, dened as in Lemma 2.3,
and we are led to the same result as in Section 2.1.
Example 2.2. Consider the simple example. Suppose the process X is given by
dX
t
= dW
t
+ a(
~
W
t
 X
t
)dt;
with a nonzero constant a. The desired solution of the corresponding Sturm-Liouville
equation is of the form
	(t) =
1
2a
(e
at
  e
 at
):
Hence, the conditional expectation of
~
W
t
with respect to F
X
t
is given by
E[
~
W
t
jF
X
t
] = X
t
 
2
e
at
+ e
 at
Z
t
0
e
 au
dX
u
:
Therefore, the canonical decomposition of X
t
has the form
X
t
= B
t
 
Z
t
0
2a
e
au
+ e
 au

Z
u
0
e
 av
dX
v

du;
where (B
t
)
0t1
is a Brownian motion relative to (F
X
t
)
0t1
.
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2.3. Characterization of Brownian motions
In the last section we have shown how to compute the canonical decomposition
of a Gaussian process with linear drift term. In the present section we are concerned
with the applications of these theorems. Applying Theorem 2.1 we get the following
characterization of Brownian motions.
Theorem 2.2. The process X satisfying (2.13) is a Brownian motion if and
only if the square-integrable Volterra kernel H satises
H(t; u) =  G(t; u);
where G is determined by (2.15).
Proof. 1) Suppose X is a Wiener process with respect to its own ltration
(F
X
t
). By the uniqueness of the Doob-Meyer decomposition in (F
X
t
) and our repre-
sentation (2.14), we have B = X and
Z
t
0
(G(t; u) +H(t; u)) dX
u
= 0; (2.33)
P- a.s. for almost all t. But (2.33) implies
G(t; u) +H(t; u) = 0;
for almost all u  t, since X is a Brownian motion.
2) Conversely, assume that G(t; u) =  H(t; u). The canonical representation (2.14)
can be written as
X
t
= B
t
+
Z
t
0

Z
s
0
G(s; u)dB
u
 
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dX
u

ds:
This implies
X
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dX
u
ds = B
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dB
u
ds:
We can now apply the reconstruction argument in the proof of Proposition 1.2 to
conclude X = B. In other words, X is a Brownian motion.
Using this theorem we see that
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0

f(s)S
0
+
Z
s
0
F (s; u)dS
u
 
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dX
u

ds; (2.34)
with a square-integrable Volterra kernel G satisfying (2.15), is a Brownian motion
with respect to its own ltration. From (2.34) we have
X
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
G(s; u)dX
u
ds = 
t
:= W
t
+
Z
t
0

f(s)S
0
+
Z
s
0
F (s; u)dS
u

ds:
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As in the proof of Proposition 1.2, the solution of (2.34) is given by
X
t
= 
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
G
(s; u)d
u
ds
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
G
(s; u)dW
u
ds+
Z
t
0

f(s)S
0
+
Z
s
0
F (s; u)dS
u

ds
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
G
(s; u)

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v

duds; (2.35)
where R
G
is the resolvent kernel of G. The next theorem characterizes those cases
where a Brownian motion X with (2.34) is tied to the nal value S
1
of the process
S.
Theorem 2.3. Let X be a Brownian motion satisfying (2.34) with a square-
integrable Volterra kernel G given by (2.15). This process converges to S
1
if and
only if there exists a function c(t) whose integral from 0 to 1 is equal to 1 such that
f(t)V (0) +
Z
t
0
F (t; u)V
0
(u)du = c(t) +
Z
t
0
G(t; u)c(u)du:
Proof. The formula (2.35) ensures the expectation of X
t
S
t
is given by
E[X
t
S
t
] =
Z
t
0

f(s)V (0) +
Z
s
0
F (s; u)V
0
(u)du

ds
+
Z
t
0
Z
s
0
R
G
(s; u)

f(u)V (0) +
Z
u
0
F (u; v)V
0
(v)dv

duds:
Hence, we can calculate the value of
E[(X
t
  S
t
)
2
] = E[X
2
t
] + E[S
2
t
]  2E[X
t
S
t
] = t+ V (t)  2E[X
t
S
t
]:
The process X
t
converges to S
1
if and only if E[(X
t
  S
t
)
2
] ! 0 as t ! 1. This
implies that the necessary and suÆcient condition for the process X tied to the nal
value S
1
is E[X
1
S
1
] = 1. In other words,
Z
1
0

f(s)V (0) +
Z
s
0
F (s; u)V
0
(u)du

ds
+
Z
1
0
Z
s
0
R
G
(s; u)

f(u)V (0) +
Z
u
0
F (u; v)V
0
(v)dv

duds = 1:
Let
c(s) := f(s)V (0) +
Z
s
0
F (s; u)V
0
(u)du
+
Z
s
0
R
G
(s; u)

f(u) +
Z
u
0
F (u; v)V
0
(v)dv

du;
we get the necessary and suÆcient conditions for the convergence of X
t
to S
1
are
Z
1
0
c(u)du = 1;
2.3. CHARACTERIZATION OF BROWNIAN MOTIONS 35
and
f(t)V (0) +
Z
t
0
F (t; u)V
0
(u)du = c(t) +
Z
t
0
G(t; u)c(u)du:
Using the above two theorems we can derive the following special case.
Theorem 2.4. (i) Suppose the process X satises
dX
t
= dW
t
+ (f(t)S
t
+ g(t)X
t
) dt; (2.36)
with initial value X
0
= 0, where f and g are two non-zero continuous functions
satisfying
Z
t
0
f
2
(u)V (u)du <1;
for all t < 1 and g 2 A(0; 1). Then this process (X
t
)
0t1
is a Brownian motion if
and only if it satises the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
cS
t
  c
2
X
t
V (t)  c
2
t
dt; (2.37)
with a constant c satisfying the integrability conditions
1
V (u)  c
2
u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
loc
([0; 1)): (2.38)
(ii) If the variance function of S satises (2:38) with c = 1, i.e.,
1
V (u)  u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
loc
([0; 1)); (2.39)
then the process (X
t
)
0t1
given by the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
S
t
 X
t
V (t)  t
dt; (2.40)
is a standard Brownian motion. Furthermore, X
t
converges to S
1
as t! 1.
Proof. 1) We want to show that (2.37) is the only possible form such that the
process X with (2.36) is a Brownian motion with respect to its own ltration. It
follows from Theorem 2.2 that the process X is a Brownian motion if and only if
the function f and g satisfy
f(t)f(s)V (s) = g(t)(sg(s)  1)
for s  t. The associated solution of this equation is given by
f(t) =
c
V (t)  c
2
t
; g(t) =
 c
2
V (t)  c
2
t
;
for some constant c.
36 2. BROWNIAN MOTIONS GENERATED BY LINEAR STOCHASTIC EQUATIONS
2) Conversely, the solution of (2.37) is given by
X
t
=
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
c
2
V (v)  c
2
v
dv

dW
u
+
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
c
2
V (v)  c
2
v
dv

cS
u
V (u)  c
2
u
du: (2.41)
Note that the stochastic integral is well-dened due to condition (2.38). In particu-
lar, if the condition (2.39) holds, the solution of (2.40) is given by
X
t
=
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
1
V (v)  v
dv

dW
u
+
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
1
V (v)  v
dv

S
u
V (u)  u
du:
(2.42)
3) If X is given by (2.40), due to (2.42) we obtain
E[X
t
S
t
] =
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
1
V (v)  v
dv

E[S
u
S
t
]
V (u)  u
du
=
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
1
V (v)  v
dv

du
+
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
1
V (v)  v
dv

u
V (u)  u
du
= t;
using an integration by parts. Therefore,
E[(X
t
  S
t
)
2
] = E[X
2
t
] + E[S
2
t
]  2E[X
t
S
t
] = V (t)  t; (2.43)
which is non-negative for all t  1 and converges to 0 as t! 1.
Using this theorem, we obtain immediately the following result.
Corollary 2.4. If there exists a positive constant k such that (2:38) holds, then
for all jcj  k, the process X given by (2:37) is a Brownian motion.
What kind of process S does satisfy the condition (2.39)? For a given Gaussian
martingale S, which condition on the constant c will guarantee that condition (2.38)
holds? In the following we will discuss some examples and some conditions on the
process S and the constant c.
Lemma 2.4. (i) If c satises (2:38), then
c
2
 m := inf
0t1

V (u)
u

: (2.44)
(ii) If m < 1, then (2:38) does not hold for c = 
p
m.
Proof. 1) Let c be a constant satisfying
inf
0u1

V (u)
u

< c
2
< sup
0u1

V (u)
u

:
2.3. CHARACTERIZATION OF BROWNIAN MOTIONS 37
1
1
0
V (t)
c
2
(
~
t  ")
~
t
~
t  "
c
2
c
2
~
t
Figure 2.1
Then the curves y = V (t) and y = c
2
t intersect at at least one point on (0; 1). Let
~
t 2 (0; 1) be such a point, i.e., V (
~
t) = c
2
~
t. We distinguish three cases to discuss.
(a) V (t) = c
2
t for all t 2 (
~
t  ";
~
t) with some " 2 (0;
~
t): In this case the integral of
1=(V (u)  c
2
u) in this neighborhood is equal to 1. This implies
Z
~
t
0
1
V (u)  c
2
u
du =1:
(b) V (t) < c
2
t for all t 2 (
~
t  ";
~
t) with some " 2 (0;
~
t): Let
t
1
:= maxft <
~
t : V (t) = c
2
tg:
Since V (t) is nonnegative and nondecreasing, t
1
 0 and c
2
t > V (t) > c
2
t
1
for all
t 2 (t
1
;
~
t). Hence,
Z
~
t
t
1
1
V (u)  c
2
u
du 
Z
~
t
t
1
1
c
2
(t
1
  u)
=  1:
(c) V (t) > c
2
t for all t 2 (
~
t   ";
~
t) with some " 2 (0;
~
t): Therefore, the variance
function V (t) satises
c
2
(
~
t  ") < c
2
u  V (u)  c
2
~
t; for all
~
t  " < u 
~
t;
see Figure 2.1. Hence,
Z
~
t
~
t "
1
V (u)  c
2
u
du 
Z
~
t
~
t "
1
c
2
~
t  c
2
(
~
t  ")
du =
1
c
2
Z
~
t
~
t "
1
"
du =
1
c
2
;
for all " 2 (0;
~
t). This implies
Z
~
t
0
1
V (u)  u
du =1;
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i.e., the condition (2.38) obviously does not hold.
In summary, if condition (2.38) holds, the constant c must satisfy
c
2
 m := inf
0u1

V (u)
u

or c
2
M := sup
0u1

V (u)
u

:
2) Consider a constant c satisfying
c
2
M := sup
0u1

V (u)
u

:
We may assume M <1. Then V (t) Mt for all t 2 [0; 1]. This leads us to
1
V (u)  c
2
u


1
M   c
2

1
u
;
which is not integrable at time 0. Therefore, from 1) and 2) we get the assertion (i).
3) If m < 1, the curves y = V (t) and y = mt intersect at at least one point. Using
the argument 1), we see that (2.38) does not hold.
Therefore, (2.44) provides only a necessary condition for the integrability con-
dition (2.38). There exist even such cases, that all constant c satisfying (2.44), but
none of them, except 0, is valid for (2.38). For example, if S is a Brownian motion,
i.e., V (t) = t, then for all c 2 R, the function 1=(V (t)  c
2
t) is not integrable, but
sup
0t1

V (t)
t

= inf
0t1

V (t)
t

= 1:
Lemma 2.5. (i) If V (t) > t for all t < 1 (this implies S
0
6 0), then (2:39) holds.
(ii) If V (t) = t
p
for 0 < p < 1, then (2:39) holds.
(iii) If S satises the condition (2:39), then t < V (t)  1 for all t 2 (0; 1).
Proof. 1) Since V (u)  u > 0 for all u 2 [0; t], we have
V (u)  u  inf
v2[0;t]
(V (v)  v) > 0;
for all u 2 [0; t]. Therefore,
Z
t
0
u
(V (u)  u)
2
du =
Z
t
0
1
(V (u)  u)
2
du 
Z
t
0
1
inf
u2[0;t]
(V (u)  u)
2
du
=
t
inf
u2[0;t]
(V (u)  u)
2
<1;
and
Z
t
0
1
V (u)  u
du 
t
inf
u2[0;t]
(V (u)  u)
<1:
2) For V (t) = t
p
with 0 < p < 1, we have
Z
t
0
u
(V (u)  u)
2
du =
Z
t
0
1
u
2p 1
  2u
p
+ u
du  c
1
Z
t
0
u
 (2p 1)
du = c
2
t
2(1 p)
<1;
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and
Z
t
0
1
V (u)  u
du =
Z
t
0
1
u
p
  u
du  c
3
t
1 p
<1;
where c
i
, i = 1; 2; 3, are suitable positive constants.
3) From (2.43), we get V (t)  t, for all t 2 (0; 1). If there exists
~
t 2 (0; 1) such that
V (
~
t) =
~
t, using a similar argument as in the proof 1) (case (c)) of Remark 2.4 we
get the desired results.
Remark 2.5. If we drop the condition var(S
1
) = 1, and dene
t
0
:= infft  0 : t  var(S
t
)g;
then a similar argument of Theorem 2.4 shows that the process (X
t
)
0tt
0
satisfying
(2.37) is a Brownian motion up to time t
0
.
Applying Theorem 2.4, Remark 2.5 and above discussion, we can provide the
following examples and applications.
Example 2.3. Setting S
t
 S
1
 N [0; 1], then from Theorem 2.4 we get that
the process X with
dX
t
= dW
t
+
S
1
 X
t
1  t
dt;
is a Brownian motion and converges to S
1
. This example is of course well-known,
see, e.g., Jeulin-Yor [36].
Example 2.4. If the martingale (S
t
)
0t1
is given by
S
t
:=
p
ÆN +
R
t
0
g(u)d
~
W
u
q
Æ +
R
1
0
g
2
(u)du
;
where N  N(0; 1), Æ > 0, g 2 L
2
(0; 1) and
~
W is a Wiener process independent of
W , condition in Lemma 2.5 (i) amounts to
Z
1
t
g
2
(u)du < (1  t)

Æ +
Z
1
0
g
2
(u)du

:
Under this condition the process X given
dX
t
= dW
t
+
(Æ +
R
1
0
g
2
(u)du)(S
t
 X
t
)
Æ +
R
t
0
g
2
(u)du  (Æ +
R
1
0
g
2
(u)du)t
dt;
is a Brownian motion converging to S
1
.
Example 2.5. Suppose the variance function V (t) of the Gaussian martingale
S is
1
4
(2t
2
+ t + 1). Then we have
V (t)
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
< t; if t >
1
2
;
> t; if t <
1
2
:
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Hence, V (t) does not satisfy (2.39). It is easy to check that
m = inf
0t1

1
4
(2t
2
+ t+ 1)
t

=
1 + 2
p
2
4
:
This implies the condition (2.38) is valid, if c
2
< (1 + 2
p
2)=4 (for c
2
= (1+2
p
2)=4,
the condition (2.38) does not hold). Hence, the process (X
t
)
0t1
satisfying the
stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
cS
t
  c
2
X
t
1
2
t
2
+ (
1
4
  c
2
)t+
1
4
dt;
is a Brownian motion, for c
2
< (1 + 2
p
2)=4.
In the following we consider a process X satisfying a linear stochastic functional
dierential equation driven by two independent Brownian motions W and
~
W . By
Corollary 2.2 and Theorem 2.2 we get the following criterion for X to be a Brownian
motion.
Corollary 2.5 (Theorem 5.1 of Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]). A processX satisfying
dX
t
= dW
t
+

Z
t
0
F (t; u)d
~
W
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u

dt;
is a Wiener process with respect to its own ltration (F
X
t
) if and only if H(t; s) =
 G
F
(t; s), where G
F
is the square-integrable Volterra kernel determined by
G
F
(t; s) +
Z
s
0
G
F
(t; u)G
F
(s; u)du =
Z
s
0
F (t; u)F (s; u)du:
Using a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 2.2, we get the following
conclusion.
Lemma 2.6. The unique solution of the equation
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0

Z
s
0
F (s; u)d
~
W
u
 
Z
s
0
G
F
(s; u)dX
u

ds
is given by
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0

Z
s
0
L
F
(s; u)dW
u
+
Z
s
0
(F (s; u) +
Z
s
u
L
F
(s; v)F (v; u)dv)d
~
W
u

ds:
Here L
F
is the resolvent kernel of G
F
, i.e., L
F
satises the equation
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
G
F
(t; s) + L
F
(t; s) +
Z
t
s
L
F
(t; u)G
F
(u; s)du = 0;
G
F
(t; s) + L
F
(t; s) +
Z
t
s
G
F
(t; u)L
F
(u; s)du = 0;
for s  t.
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As in the last section we want to look at some special cases. Let F (t; s) =
f(t)g(s) with some functions f; g 2 C
1
(0; 1) satisfying
Z
t
0
Z
u
0
f
2
(u)g
2
(v)dvdu <1;
for all t < 1. Then we obtain immediately from Corollary 2.3, Corollary 2.5 and
(2.30) the following result.
Corollary 2.6 (Corollary 5.1 and 5.2 of Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]). Suppose the pro-
cess (X
t
)
0t1
satises
dX
t
= dW
t
+

f(t)
Z
t
0
g(u)d
~
W
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u

dt;
with f; g 2 C
1
(0; 1) satisfying (2.26) and f 6= 0, a.s. and a square-integrable Volterra
kernel H(t; s). Then X is a Brownian motion if and only if
H(t; u) =  f(t)(u);
where (t) is the solution of (2.29) with initial condition (0) = 0. In other words,
if (X
t
)
0t1
is a Brownian motion with respect to its own ltration, it must be of the
form
dX
t
= dW
t
+ f(t)

Z
t
0
g(u)d
~
W
u
 
Z
t
0
(u)dX
u

dt: (2.45)
In particular, if g  1, (2.45) can be written as
dX
t
= dW
t
+ f(t)

~
W
t
 
Z
t
0
f(u)	(u)
	
0
(u)
dX
u

dt; (2.46)
where 	(t) satises (2.31) with initial conditions 	(0) = 0 and 	
0
(0+) = 1.
Remark 2.6. If X satises the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+ (f(t)
~
W
t
+ h(t)X
t
)dt; (2.47)
with f; h 2 C
1
(0; 1) \ A(0; 1), and if one of the functions f(t) and h(t) is not
identically 0, then X cannot be a Brownian motion.
Proof. Suppose X is a Brownian motion satisfying (2.47). Then from (2.46)
we know that
Z
t
0
f(u)	(u)
	
0
(u)
dX
u
= cX
t
;
for some constant c. Consequently, we see that
f(t)	(t) = c	
0
(t): (2.48)
Substituting (2.48) into (2.31), we get
	
00
(t) = cf(t)	
0
(t):
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Hence, the corresponding solution of the Sturm-Liouville equation is given by
	(t) =
Z
t
0
exp

c
Z
u
0
f(v)dv

du:
Substituting this solution again in (2.48), and taking derivatives on both sides with
respect to t, we have
cf
0
(t) + (1  c
2
)f
2
(t) = 0;
whose solution is of the form
f(t) =
c
1  c
2
1
t
:
If c 6= 0, this function f does not belong to the class A(0; 1).
In the above remark it has been shown that any process satisfying (2.47) with
f; h 2 C
1
(0; 1) \ A(0; 1), cannot be a Brownian motion unless f  h  0. But as
we shall see in the next chapter, there does exist a Brownian motion satisfying the
stochastic dierential equation (2.47). The main dierence is that the functions f
and h which we are going to discuss in Chapter 3 do not belong to the class A(0; 1).
Clearly, the condition (2.39) does not hold, if (S
t
)
0t1
is a standard Brownian
motion
~
W . In fact, the following proposition in Follmer-Wu-Yor [23] shows that a
processes X of the form
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
Y
s
ds (2.49)
cannot converge to
~
W
1
, if Y is adapted to (F
W;
~
W
t
).
Proposition 2.3 (Proposition 5.1 of Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]). Let X be a Brow-
nian motion of the form (2.49) with a drift term (Y
t
)
0t1
adapted to (F
t
). If Z is
any (F
t
)-Brownian motion such that X
1
= Z
1
;P-a.s., then we have Z
t
= X
t
= W
t
,
and in particular, Y
t
= 0, dt dP-a.s..
2.4. Some examples of Brownian motions
At the end of this chapter we want to give some examples of Brownian motions
of the form (2.13).
Example 2.6. Let k  2 and
f(t) =
p
k(k + 1)t
2k
+ k(k + 1)
2
t
k
t
k+1
+ (k + 1)t
:
Then the solution of the Sturm-Liouville equation is given by
	(t) =
1
k + 1
t
k+1
+ t:
This implies that the process X satisfying
dX
t
= dW
t
+
p
k(k + 1)t
2k
+ k(k + 1)
2
t
k
t
k+1
+ (k + 1)t
 
~
W
t
 
r
k
k + 1
Z
t
0
p
u
2k
+ (k + 1)u
k
u
k
+ 1
dX
u
!
dt
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is a Brownian motion. For the case k = 2, we see that the process X satisfying
dX
t
= dW
t
+
p
6t
2
+ 18
t + 3
 
~
W
t
 
r
2
3
Z
t
0
p
u
4
+ 3u
2
u
2
+ 1
dX
u
!
dt
is a Brownian motion with respect to its natural ltration.
Example 2.7. Consider the case t 2 [0; 1). Let
f(t) =

p
2
sec


2
t

:
Then the solution of the corresponding Sturm-Liouville equation is given by
	(t) = tan


2
t

:
Hence, the process (X
t
)
0t1
starting in X
0
= 0 and satisfying
dX
t
= dW
t
+

p
2
sec


2
t


~
W
t
 
p
2
Z
t
0
sin


2
u

dX
u

dt;
is a Brownian motion.
Example 2.8. Setting Æ  1 and g(t)  c in Example 2.4, we see that the
process X satisfying
dX
t
= dW
t
+
(1 + c
2
)(N + c
~
W
t
 
p
1 + c
2
X
t
)
p
1 + c
2
(1  t)
dt
is a Brownian motion.
In the end, we want to give an example of process X of the form
dX
t
= dW
t
+

f(t)
~
W
1
+
Z
t
0
F (t; u)d
~
W
u
+
Z
t
0
H(t; u)dX
u

dt;
with initial value X
0
= 0, f 2 C
1
(0; 1) \ L
2
(0; 1) and square-integrable Volterra
kernels F;H 2 C
1;1
((0; 1)  (0; 1)). We are going to apply Theorem 2.4 together
with Remark 2.5, and for this we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose the process S is given by
S
t
:= f(t)
~
W
1
+
Z
t
0
F (t; u)d
~
W
u
;
with f 2 L
2
(0; 1)\C
1
(0; 1) and a square-integrable Volterra kernel F 2 C
1;1
((0; 1)
(0; 1)). Then the following three statements are equivalent:
(i) S is a martingale with respect to the ltration (F
~
W
t
_ (
~
W
1
)).
(ii) The relation between f and F is given by
F (t; u) =  f(t) + (f(u)  f
0
(u)(1  u)); (2.50)
i.e., S is given by
S
t
= f(t)(
~
W
1
 
~
W
t
) +
Z
t
0
(f(u)  (1  u)f
0
(u))d
~
W
u
: (2.51)
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(iii) f and F are given by
8
>
<
>
:
F (t; u) = m(t) + n(u);
f(t) = c m(t);
(2.52)
where c, k are constants and m(t), n(t) satisfy
(1  t)m(t) 
Z
t
0
n(u)du = k: (2.53)
Proof. (i) ) (ii): Let
G
t
:= F
~
W
t
_ (
~
W
1
):
Suppose S is a martingale, then
0 = E[S
t
  S
s
jG
s
]
= E

(f(t)  f(s))
~
W
1
+

Z
t
0
F (t; u)d
~
W
u
 
Z
s
0
F (s; u)d
~
W
u





G
s

= (f(t)  f(s))
~
W
1
+
Z
s
0
(F (t; u)  F (s; u))d
~
W
u
+ F (t; t)E[
~
W
t
jG
s
]
 F (t; s)
~
W
s
 
Z
t
s
F
2
(t; u)E[
~
W
u
jG
s
]du: (2.54)
Since
~
W is a Brownian motion, we have
E[
~
W
t
jG
s
] = E[
~
W
t
 
~
W
s
jG
s
] +
~
W
s
=
t  s
1  s
(
~
W
1
 
~
W
s
) +
~
W
s
: (2.55)
Substituting this formula in (2.54), we see
0 = (f(t)  f(s))
~
W
1
+
Z
s
0
(F (t; u)  F (s; u))d
~
W
u
+
1
1  s
Z
t
s
F (t; u)du(
~
W
1
 
~
W
s
)
= (f(t)  f(s) +
1
1  s
Z
t
s
F (t; u)du)(
~
W
1
 
~
W
t
) + (f(t)  f(s))
~
W
t
+
1
1  s
Z
t
s
F (t; u)du(
~
W
t
 
~
W
s
) +
Z
s
0
(F (t; u)  F (s; u))d
~
W
u
:
From the fact that
~
W
1
 
~
W
t
and
~
W
u
are independent for all u  t, we know that
f(t)  f(s) +
1
1  s
Z
t
s
F (t; u)du = 0:
Dierentiating with respect to s , we get (2.50).
(ii) ) (iii): Due to (2.50) we obtain the rst equation in (2.52). Therefore,
m(t) + f(t) = f(u)  f
0
(u)(1  u)  n(u) = constant c;
for all u  t. Hence,
f(u)  f
0
(u)(1  u)  n(u) = c;
with f(u) = c m(u), and it implies (2.53).
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(iii)) (i): If F and f are of the form (2.52), we have to check that E[S
t
 S
s
jG
s
] = 0
for all s  t. From (2.54) and (2.55), we see that
E[S
t
  S
s
jG
s
]
= (f(t)  f(s))
~
W
1
+
Z
s
0
(F (t; u)  F (s; u))d
~
W
u
+
1
1  s
Z
t
s
F (t; u)du(
~
W
1
 
~
W
s
):
Substituting (2.52) and (2.53) in this formula, we get the desired result.
This result can be seen as a special case of Theorem 3.4 in Amendinger [4].
Example 2.9. The process (S
t
)
0t1
satisfying
S
t
=
~
W
t
 
Z
t
0
~
W
1
 
~
W
u
1  u
du
= log(1  t)
~
W
1
+
Z
t
0
(1 + log(1  u)  log(1  t))d
~
W
u
;
is a martingale with respect to (G
t
). Furthermore, it is a Brownian motion.
Due to Lemma 2.7 and Remark 2.5 we get the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. Let f 2 L
1
(0; T ) for all T <1 and
t
o
:= inf

t  0 : f
2
(t)(1  t) +
Z
t
0
(f(u)  (1  u)f
0
(u))
2
du  t

:
Then the process X starting in X
0
= 0 and satisfying the stochastic dierential
equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
f(t)(
~
W
1
 
~
W
t
) +
R
t
0
(f(u)  (1  u)f
0
(u))d
~
W
u
 X
t
f
2
(t)(1  t) +
R
t
0
(f(u)  (1  u)f
0
(u))
2
du  t
dt
is a Brownian motion on [0; t
0
].
Proof. Substituting (2.51) into Remark 2.5, we get the desired result.
Example 2.10. (i) For the case f(t)  c > 0, the process (X
t
)
0tc
2
withX
0
= 0
and
dX
t
= dW
t
+
c
~
W
1
 X
t
c
2
  t
dt;
is a Brownian motion. Furthermore, X
t
converges to c
~
W
1
as t! c
2
.
(ii) For f(t) = 1 + t, we see that
t
0
= inf

t  0 :
1
3
t
3
  t
2
+ 1  0

= 1  2 cos

5
9


 1:3473:
Hence, the process X satisfying
dX
t
= dW
t
+
(1 + t)(
~
W
1
 
~
W
t
) + 2
R
t
0
ud
~
W
u
 X
t
1
3
t
3
  t
2
+ 1
dt;
is a Brownian motion up to time t
0
.
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CHAPTER 3
Orthogonal decompositions of Brownian ltrations
Consider a process X satisfying the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+ (f(t)
~
W
t
+ h(t)X
t
)dt; (3.1)
with X
0
= 0, where W ,
~
W are two independent Wiener processes. We have seen in
Remark 2.6 that X cannot be a Brownian motion if f and h belong to the space
A(0; 1) \ C(0; 1) with f
2
+ h
2
6 0. In this chapter, we will show that there exist
Brownian motions of the form (3.1) if the conditions on f and h are relaxed.
Following Yor [57] we describe in Section 3.1 a basic orthogonal decomposition
of the Brownian ltration. In Section 3.2 we will construct a Brownian motion X of
the form (3.1), and then another Brownian motion Y which is represented in terms
of W and
~
W and is independent of X. Using iteration, we get two sequences of
Brownian motions X
(n)
and Y
(n)
, which are independent of each other. This leads
to the construction of new orthogonal decompositions of Brownian ltrations; see
Wu-Yor [56]. In Section 3.3 a similar decomposition of a Brownian motion related
to X will be investigated. In Section 3.4 we replace X by W on the right-hand side
of (3.1) and characterize Brownian motions of the form
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0
(f(u)
~
W
u
+ g(u)W
u
)du:
3.1. The basic example of an orthogonal decomposition
Let (B
t
)
t0
be a standard Brownian motion. In Jeulin-Yor [37] and Chapter 1
of Yor [57] it has been shown that the natural ltration generated by (B
t
)
t0
can
be decomposed into the direct sum of two independent -algebras
F
B
t
= G
t
 (B
t
) (3.2)
for all t  0, where the -algebra G
t
is given by
G
t
:= 

B
u
 
u
t
B
t
; u  t

= 

Z
t
0
f(u)dB
u
; f 2 L
2
[0; t];
Z
t
0
f(u)du = 0

= 

B
u
 
Z
u
0
B
t
  B
v
t  v
dv; u  t

= 

B
u
 
Z
u
0
B
v
v
dv; u  t

:
47
48 3. ORTHOGONAL DECOMPOSITIONS OF BROWNIAN FILTRATIONS
Dene an operator T as
T (B)
t
:= B
t
 
Z
t
0
B
u
u
du: (3.3)
It has been established that the process (T (B)
t
)
t0
is a Brownian motion; see De-
heuvels [21] and Chapter 1 in Yor [57]. For the sake of convenience, we write
T
0
(B) = B. Consequently, for any non-negative integer n, the process (T
n
(B)
t
)
t0
is a Brownian motion relative to its natural ltration. Using this notation we can
rewrite the decomposition (3.2) as
F
B
t
= (B
t
) (T (B)
u
; u  t):
Using the same argument as above iteratively, we can get an orthogonal decompo-
sition of -algebra F
B
t
in the following form:
F
B
t
= (B
t
) (T (B)
t
) (T
2
(B)
u
; u  t)
= (B
t
) (T (B)
t
) (T
2
(B)
t
) (T
3
(B)
u
; u  t) =    : (3.4)
From Yor [57] Chapter 1, we know that the random variable T
n
(B)
1
can be
represented as
T
n
(B)
1
=
Z
1
0
L
n
(log(
1
u
))dB
u
;
where (L
n
(u))
n0
is the classical Laguerre polynomials dened as
L
n
(u) =
n
X
k=0
 
n
k
!
( u)
k
k!
; (3.5)
which is a sequence of orthonormal polynomials for the measure e
 u
du in R
+
; in
other words, for m;n 2 N [ f0g,
Z
1
0
L
m
(u)L
n
(u)e
 u
du = Æ
m;n
:
Remark 3.1. Since (t
 
1
2
T
n
(B)
t
)
n2N
is an orthonormal system in L
2
(P), we con-
clude that for xed t  0, the sequence (T
n
(B)
t
)
n0
is not strongly L
2
-convergent,
but converges weakly to 0 in L
2
.
3.2. Construction of orthogonal decompositions of Brownian ltrations
In this section we want to construct a Brownian motion satisfying the stochastic
dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+ (f(t)
~
W
t
+ g(t)X
t
)dt; (3.6)
where f and g satisfy some integral conditions (which we will discuss later). This
will involve some orthogonal decompositions of the Brownian ltration similar to
(3.4).
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Let W ,
~
W be two independent Wiener processes. Consider the process X satis-
fying the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
c
~
W
t
  c
2
X
t
(1  c
2
)t
dt; (3.7)
with X
0
= 0 and some constant jcj < 1. If c = 0, then X
t
= W
t
. If c 6= 0, the
solution to this equation is given by
X
t
=
Z
t
0

u
t

a
dW
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0

1 

u
t

a

d
~
W
u
; (3.8)
with the constant a dened by
a :=
c
2
1  c
2
:
Using this formula, we see that X satises the identity
dX
t
= dW
t
  at
 a 1
Z
t
0
u
a
dW
u
dt+

a
c

t
 a 1
Z
t
0
u
a
d
~
W
u
dt: (3.9)
Proposition 3.1. For all constant 0  jcj < 1 the process X satisfying the
stochastic dierential equation (3.7) is a Brownian motion with respect to its own
ltration (F
X
t
).
Proof. For the case c = 0 it is clear, since X = W is a Brownian motion. For
0 < jcj < 1 and s  t, we compute the covariance function of X using (3.8)
E[X
s
X
t
] =
Z
s
0

u
s

a

u
t

a
du+
1
c
2
Z
s
0

1 

u
s

a

1 

u
t

a

du = s:
This ensures that the Gaussian process X is a standard Brownian motion with
respect to its natural ltration.
Remark 3.2. In Remark 2.6 we saw that the solution of (3.6) cannot be a
Brownian motion, provided that f; g 2 C
1
(0; 1)\A(0; 1). However, the function 1=t
does not belong to A(0; 1), but to

A(0; 1), where

A(0; T ) is dened by

A(0; T ) := f'(u) :
Z
t
0
p
uj'(u)jdu <1 for all t < Tg:
In the following discussion of (3.7), we will always exclude the trivial case c = 0.
Now, we want to construct a new Brownian motion from W and
~
W which is
independent of X. Our rst attempt is a Brownian motion, say
~
Y , of the form
d
~
Y
t
= d
~
W
t
+
 cW
t
  c
2
~
Y
t
(1  c
2
)t
dt:
We can easily check that X
t
and
~
Y
t
are independent for all t. But the processes
X and
~
Y are not independent. Hence we have to look for other Brownian motions
which might be independent of X. The following proposition gives us one example.
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Proposition 3.2. The process Y satisfying the stochastic dierential equation
dY
t
= d
~
W
t
+
cW
t
  (1  c
2
)
~
W
t
  c
2
Y
t
(1  c
2
)t
dt; (3.10)
is a Brownian motion independent of X.
Proof. The solution of (3.10) is given by
Y
t
=
1
c
Z
t
0

1 

u
t

a

dW
u
 
Z
t
0

1
a
 
a+ 1
a

u
t

a

d
~
W
u
: (3.11)
Then for s  t, it can be shown that E[Y
s
Y
t
] = s. It means that Y is a Brownian
motion. Furthermore, we have E[X
s
Y
t
] = E[X
t
Y
s
] = 0, for all s  t. This implies
X and Y are independent.
Remark 3.3. At the beginning of Section 3.1 we saw that the process (T (
~
W )
t
)
t0
dened by
T (
~
W )
t
=
~
W
t
 
Z
t
0
~
W
u
u
du;
is a Brownian motion and that its natural ltration (F
T (
~
W )
t
) is strictly smaller than
(F
~
W
t
). Using this notation, (3.10) can be written in the form
dY
t
= dT (
~
W )
t
+
cW
t
  c
2
Y
t
(1  c
2
)t
dt:
Since W and
~
W are independent, the processes T (
~
W ) and W are clearly also in-
dependent. In the same way, we know that the process (T (W )
t
)
t0
is a Brownian
motion independent of
~
W as well as T (
~
W ), and that F
T (W )
t
$ F
W
t
. Using again the
same argument as in Proposition 3.2, we know that the process
~
X satisfying
d
~
X
t
= dT (W )
t
+
cT (
~
W )
t
  c
2
~
X
t
(1  c
2
)t
dt; (3.12)
is a Brownian motion independent of Y . Looking at the processes X and
~
X, we
see that the equations (3.12) and (3.7) have the same form. Only the -algebras
generated by the driving Brownian motions T (W ) and T (
~
W ) are strictly smaller
than those generated by W and
~
W , respectively. Hence, we get also F
~
X
t
 F
X
t
.
Furthermore, from
~
X
s
=
Z
s
0

u
s

a
dT (W )
u
+
1
c
Z
s
0

1 

u
s

a

dT (
~
W )
u
=
Z
s
0

u
s

a

dW
u
 
W
u
u
du

+
1
c
Z
s
0

1 

u
s

a

 
d
~
W
u
 
~
W
u
u
du
!
;
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we deduce
E[X
t
~
X
s
] =
Z
t
0

u
s

a

u
t

a
du 
Z
s
0
1
u

u
s

a
Z
u
0

v
t

a
dvdu
+
1
c
2
Z
t
0

1 

u
s

a

1 

u
t

a

du
 
1
c
2
Z
s
0
1
u

1 

u
s

a

Z
u
0

1 

v
t

a

dvdu
= 0;
for all s  t. This implies F
~
X
t
$ F
X
t
.
Iterating this procedure, we dene
X
(n)
t
:=
Z
t
0

u
t

a
dT
n
(W )
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0

1 

u
t

a

dT
n
(
~
W )
u
; (3.13)
and
Y
(n)
t
:=
1
c
Z
t
0

1 

u
t

a

dT
n
(W )
u
+
Z
t
0

u
t

a
dT
n+1
(
~
W )
u
; (3.14)
for n  0 and 0 < jcj < 1. In other words, the processes X
(n)
and Y
(n)
satisfy the
stochastic dierential equations
dX
(n)
t
= dT
n
(W )
t
+
cT
n
(
~
W )
t
  c
2
X
(n)
t
(1  c
2
)t
dt; (3.15)
and
dY
(n)
t
= dT
n+1
(
~
W )
t
+
cT
n
(W )
t
  c
2
Y
(n)
t
(1  c
2
)t
dt: (3.16)
From Proposition 3.2 and Remark 3.3 we know that for each n  0 the processes
X
(n)
and Y
(n)
are Brownian motions and
F
X
t
= F
X
(0)
t
% F
X
(1)
t
%    % F
X
(n)
t
%    ;
F
Y
t
= F
Y
(0)
t
% F
Y
(1)
t
%    % F
Y
(n)
t
%    :
Furthermore, the processes X
(n)
and Y
(n)
, Y
(n)
and X
(n+1)
are mutually indepen-
dent. The next lemma provides a representation of X
(n)
and Y
(n)
as stochastic
integrals with respect to W and
~
W .
Lemma 3.1. The processes X
(n)
and Y
(n)
can be represented as
X
(n)
t
=
Z
t
0
p
(n)
(log
t
u
)dW
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(n)
(log
t
u
)d
~
W
u
; (3.17)
Y
(n)
t
=
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(n)
(log
t
u
)dW
u
+
Z
t
0
p
(n+1)
(log
t
u
)d
~
W
u
; (3.18)
where functions p
(n)
(u) and q
(n)
(u) satisfy the recurrence relation

(n+1)
(u) = 
(n)
(u) 
Z
u
0

(n)
(v)dv;
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with initial conditions p
(0)
(u) = e
 au
and q
(0)
(u) = 1  e
 au
. More explicitly, p
(n)
(u)
and q
(n)
(u) can be represented in the following form:
p
(n)
(u) =  
1
a
n 1
X
k=0
r
n
k
( u)
k
k!
+

a+ 1
a

n
e
 au
; (3.19)
and
q
(n)
(u) = L
n
(u)  p
(n)
(u); (3.20)
where the sequence (r
n
k
) satises the recurrence relation:
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
r
n+1
0
= r
n
0
+

a+ 1
a

n
; 8 n  0;
r
n+1
n
= 1; 8 n  1;
r
n+1
k
= r
n
k
+ r
n
k 1
; 8 0 < k < n;
r
p
q
 0; for p  q;
(3.21)
and (L
n
(u))
n0
is the sequence of Laguerre polynomials given by (3.5).
Proof. Let p
(0)
(u) = e
 au
and q
(0)
(u) = 1 e
 au
. From (3.13) and the stochastic
Fubini Theorem (see, e.g., Protter [51]) we have
X
(n)
t
=
Z
t
0
p
(0)
(log
t
u
)dT
n
(W )
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(0)
(log
t
u
)dT
n
(
~
W )
u
=
Z
t
0

p
(0)
(log
t
u
) 
Z
t
u
1
v
p
(0)
(log
t
v
)dv

dT
n 1
(W )
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0

q
(0)
(log
t
u
) 
Z
t
u
1
v
q
(0)
(log
t
v
)dv

dT
n 1
(
~
W )
u
=
Z
t
0
p
(1)
(log
t
u
)dT
n 1
(W )
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(1)
(log
t
u
)dT
n 1
(
~
W )
u
=    =
Z
t
0
p
(n)
(log
t
u
)dW
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(n)
(log
t
u
)d
~
W
u
;
where

(k+1)
(log
t
u
) = 
(k)
(log
t
u
) 
Z
t
u
1
v

(k)
(log
t
v
)dv;
for 
(k)
= p
(k)
or q
(k)
, and for all k  0. Applying a change of variable, we obtain

(n+1)
(u) = 
(n)
(u) 
Z
u
0

(n)
(v)dv:
The relations (3.19) and (3.20) follow directly by induction.
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Remark 3.4. We can write the recurrence relation (3.21) as
r
n
m
=
n 1
X
i
1
=m
i
1
 1
X
i
2
=m 1
  
i
m 1
 1
X
i
m
=1
i
m
 1
X
i
m+1
=0

a+ 1
a

i
m+1
;
for n > m, with initial conditions r
n
n 1
= 1 and r
n
0
= a(
a+1
a
)
n
  a.
In Section 3.1 it has been shown that
T
n
(B)
1
=
Z
1
0
L
n
(log(
1
u
))dB
u
;
for a sequence of orthonormal polynomials (L
n
(u)) for the measure e
 u
du in R
+
.
For our two new sequences of Brownian motions X
(n)
and Y
(n)
, we want to know
whether the corresponding p
(n)
(u) and q
(n)
(u) are also orthonormal. The following
proposition shows that they are not. But we can see some further properties of these
two sequences.
Proposition 3.3. Let m;n be nonnegative integers, then the sequences of func-
tions (p
(n)
(u))
n0
and (q
(n)
(u))
n0
possess the following properties:
(a)
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)e
 u
du =
8
>
<
>
:
1  c
2
; n = 0;
0; n  1:
(b)
Z
1
0
q
(n)
(u)e
 u
du =
8
>
<
>
:
c
2
; n = 0;
0; n  1:
(c)
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)p
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
c
2m
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
, for all m  0.
(d)
Z
1
0
q
(n)
(u)q
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
2c
4
1 + c
2
; m = 0;
 
c
2(m+1)
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m  1:
(e)
Z
1
0
p
(n+m)
(u)q
(n)
(u)e
 u
du =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
c
2
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m = 0;
 
c
2m
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m  1:
(f)
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)q
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
c
2
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m = 0;
 
c
2(m+1)
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m  1:
(g)
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)p
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du+
1
c
2
Z
1
0
q
(n)
(u)q
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
8
>
<
>
:
1; m = 0;
0; m 6= 0:
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Proof. 1) For n = 0,
Z
1
0
p
(0)
(u)e
 u
du =
Z
1
0
e
 (a+1)u
du =
1
a+ 1
= 1  c
2
;
and
Z
1
0
q
(0)
(u)e
 u
du =
Z
1
0
 
1  p
(0)
(u)

e
 u
du =
a
a+ 1
= c
2
:
For n > 0, from (3.19), we know that
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)e
 u
du =  
1
a
n 1
X
k=0
r
n
k
( 1)
k
+
1
a+ 1

a+ 1
a

n
:
Due to (3.21), we get
n 1
X
k=0
r
n
k
( 1)
k
= r
n
0
+
n 2
X
k=1
r
n 1
k
( 1)
k
 
n 2
X
k=0
r
n 1
k
( 1)
k
=

a+ 1
a

n 1
;
and this implies
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)e
 u
du =  
1
a
(
a + 1
a
)
n 1
+
1
a+ 1

a+ 1
a

n
= 0:
Using (3.20), we have, for n  1,
Z
1
0
q
(n)
(u)e
 u
du =
Z
1
0
 
L
n
(u)  p
(n)
(u)

e
 u
du =
Z
1
0
L
n
(u)e
 u
du
=
n
X
k=0
 
n
k
!
1
k!
Z
1
0
( u)
k
e
 u
du =
n
X
k=0
 
n
k
!
( 1)
k
= 0:
These ensure the assertions (a) and (b).
2) Since
X
(n)
t
=
Z
t
0
p
(n)
(log
t
u
)dW
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(n)
(log
t
u
)d
~
W
u
=
Z
t
0
p
(0)
(log
t
u
)dT
n
(W )
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(n)
(log
t
u
)d
~
W
u
;
and
X
(n+m)
t
=
Z
t
0
p
(n+m)
(log
t
u
)dW
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(n+m)
(log
t
u
)d
~
W
u
=
Z
t
0
p
(m)
(log
t
u
)dT
n
(W )
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0
q
(n+m)
(log
t
u
)d
~
W
u
;
for all n  0, and the processes T
n
(W ) and T
n
(
~
W ) are Brownian motions, we get
E[X
(n)
t
X
(n+m)
t
] =
Z
t
0
p
(n)
(log
t
u
)p
(n+m)
(log
t
u
)du+
1
c
2
Z
t
0
q
(n)
(log
t
u
)q
(n+m)
(log
t
u
)du
=
Z
t
0
p
(0)
(log
t
u
)p
(m)
(log
t
u
)du+
1
c
2
Z
t
0
q
(n)
(log
t
u
)q
(n+m)
(log
t
u
)du:
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Hence, due to the change of variables and (3.19), we have
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)p
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
1
t
Z
t
0
p
(n)
(log
t
u
)p
(n+m)
(log
t
u
)du
=
1
t
Z
t
0
p
(0)
(log
t
u
)p
(m)
(log
t
u
)du =
Z
1
0
p
(0)
(u)p
(m)
(u)e
 u
du
=
Z
1
0
(
 
1
a
m 1
X
k=0
r
m
k
( u)
k
k!
+

a+ 1
a

m
e
 au
)
e
 (a+1)u
du
=  
1
a
m 1
X
k=0
r
m
k
( 1)
k
(a+ 1)
k+1
+
1
2a + 1

a + 1
a

m
:
If m = 0, we get
Z
1
0
(p
(n)
(u))
2
e
 u
du =
1
2a+ 1
=
1  c
2
1 + c
2
;
which is exactly the same form in assertion (c) for the case m = 0. As for m  1,
we have to compute
A(m) :=
m 1
X
k=0
r
m
k
( 1)
k
(a + 1)
k+1
:
From the recurrence relation (3.21), we conclude that
A(m) =
r
m
0
a+ 1
+
m 1
X
k=1
(r
m 1
k
+ r
m 1
k 1
)
( 1)
k
(a+ 1)
k+1
=
r
m
0
a+ 1
+
(
m 2
X
k=0
r
m 1
k
( 1)
k
(a+ 1)
k+1
 
r
m 1
0
a+ 1
)
 
1
a+ 1
m 2
X
k=0
r
m 1
k
( 1)
k
(a+ 1)
k+1
=
a
a+ 1
A(m  1) +
1
a+ 1
(r
m
0
  r
m 1
0
) =
a
a+ 1
A(m  1) +
(a+ 1)
m 2
a
m 1
:
By induction, we obtain
A(m) =
a
2a+ 1

a + 1
a

m
 

a
a + 1

m

:
This implies
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)p
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
1
2a+ 1

a
a+ 1

m
=
c
2m
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
:
Using the same argument and the fact that (L
n
(u))
n0
is orthonormal with respect
to the measure e
 u
du, we get
Z
1
0
q
(n)
(u)q
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
Z
1
0
q
(0)
(u)q
(m)
(u)e
 u
du
=
Z
1
0
(L
0
(u)  p
(0)
(u))(L
m
(u)  p
(m)
(u))e
 u
du
= Æ
0;m
+
Z
1
0
p
(0)
(u)p
(m)
(u)e
 u
du 
Z
1
0
p
(m)
(u)e
 u
du 
Z
1
0
L
m
(u)e
 (a+1)u
du:
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For the case m = 0,
Z
1
0
(q
(n)
(u))
2
e
 u
du = 1 +
Z
1
0
(p
(0)
(u))
2
e
 u
du  2
Z
1
0
p
(0)
(u)e
 u
du
= 1 +
1
2a+ 1
 
2
a+ 1
=
2a
2
(2a+ 1)(a+ 1)
=
2c
4
1 + c
2
:
For m  1, from the denition of L
n
(u) we get
Z
1
0
L
m
(u)e
 (a+1)u
du =
m
X
k=0
 
m
k
!
1
k!
Z
1
0
( u)
k
e
 (a+1)u
du
=
m
X
k=0
 
m
k
!
( 1)
k
(a + 1)
k+1
=
a
m
(a + 1)
m+1
:
Due to assertion (a), we have
Z
1
0
q
(n)
(u)q
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =  
1
2a+ 1

a
a+ 1

m+1
=  
c
2(m+1)
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
:
Hence, the statements (c) and (d) are proved. And it follows (g).
3) It remains to show the assertions (e) and (f). Since for m;n  0, the processes
X
(n)
and Y
(n+m)
are independent, using the same argument at the beginning of 2),
we know that the values of the integrals
Z
1
0
p
(n+m)
(u)q
(n)
(u)e
 u
du and
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)q
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du
are independent of n. It follows from (3.20) and the assertions (a) to (d) that
Z
1
0
p
(n+m)
(u)q
(n)
(u)e
 u
du =
Z
1
0
p
(m)
(u)q
(0)
(u)e
 u
du
=
Z
1
0
p
(m)
(u)e
 u
du 
Z
1
0
p
(m)
(u)p
(0)
(u)e
 u
du
=
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
1  c
2
 
1  c
2
1 + c
2
=
c
2
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m = 0;
0 
c
2m
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
=  
c
2m
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m  1;
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as well as
Z
1
0
p
(n)
(u)q
(n+m)
(u)e
 u
du =
Z
1
0
p
(0)
(u)q
(m)
(u)e
 u
du
=
Z
1
0
q
(m)
(u)e
 u
du 
Z
1
0
q
(m)
(u)q
(0)
(u)e
 u
du
=
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
c
2
 
2c
4
1 + c
2
=
c
2
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m = 0;
 
c
2(m+1)
(1  c
2
)
1 + c
2
; m  1:
This completes the proofs.
Remark 3.5. From the construction of X
(n)
, Y
(n)
and the assertion (g) of
Proposition 3.3, we know that for every t > 0 and every n  0, m  1, X
(n)
t
,
X
(n+m)
t
, Y
(n)
t
and Y
(n+m)
t
are mutually independent.
In fact, from this Proposition we even know that
E[X
(n+1)
s
X
(n)
t
] = E[Y
(n+1)
s
Y
(n)
t
] = 0
for all s  t, i.e., (X
(n+1)
s
)
st
and (Y
(n+1)
s
)
st
are independent of X
(n)
t
and Y
(n)
t
,
respectively. The next proposition gives us more information about these two se-
quences of stochastic processes.
Proposition 3.4. For n  0 and t  0, we have
X
(n+1)
t
= T (X
(n)
)
t
and
Y
(n+1)
t
= T (Y
(n)
)
t
:
Proof. From (3.13), (3.14), the denition of T (X
(n)
)
t
, T (Y
(n)
)
t
and the sto-
chastic Fubini Theorem, we get the desired results.
Due to this Proposition we can rewrite (3.15) and (3.16) as
T
n
(X)
t
= T
n
(W )
t
+
Z
t
0
cT
n
(
~
W )
u
  c
2
T
n
(X)
u
(1  c
2
)u
du;
and
T
n
(Y )
t
= T
n+1
(
~
W )
t
+
Z
t
0
cT
n
(W )
u
  c
2
T
n
(Y )
u
(1  c
2
)u
du:
And from these results we see the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. For f
n
; g
n
2 C(0; 1) \

A(0;1), the expectations
E

X
(n+1)
t

Z
1
0
f
n
(u)dX
(n)
u
+
Z
1
0
g
n
(u)dY
(n)
u

= 0;
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and
E

Y
(n+1)
t

Z
1
0
f
n
(u)dX
(n)
u
+
Z
1
0
g
n
(u)dY
(n)
u

= 0;
for all t  1 if and only if f
n
and g
n
are constant. More precisely, for constants A,
B and every n  0,
E[X
(n+1)
t
(AX
(n)
1
+BY
(n)
1
)] = 0;
E[Y
(n+1)
t
(AX
(n)
1
+BY
(n)
1
)] = 0:
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume n = 0. Furthermore, for the
sake of convenience, we denote f = f
0
and g = g
0
. Hence, we have only to check
that
E

T (X)
t
Z
1
0
f(u)dX
u

= 0 and E

T (Y )
t
Z
1
0
g(u)dY
u

= 0;
for all t  1 if and only if f and g are constant. From
E

T (X)
t
Z
1
0
f(u)dX
u

=
Z
t
0
f(u)du 
Z
t
0
1
u
Z
u
0
f(v)dvdu;
we see that this expectation is equal to 0 if and only if f is a constant. In the same
way, we get

T (Y )
t
Z
1
0
g(u)dY
u

= 0 if and only if g = constant:
From Remark 3.1 we know that the processes (T
n
(X)
t
)
n0
and (T
n
(Y )
t
)
n0
do not L
2
-converge strongly, but weakly to 0 in L
2
. Furthermore, the orthogonal
decompositions of the ltrations generated by (X
t
)
t0
and by (Y
t
)
t0
, respectively,
are given by:
F
X
t
= F
X
(0)
t
= (X
(0)
t
) (X
(1)
t
)     (X
(n)
t
) F
X
(n+1)
t
;
F
Y
t
= F
Y
(0)
t
= (Y
(0)
t
) (Y
(1)
t
)     (Y
(n)
t
) F
Y
(n+1)
t
;
for all t  0. Now, we look at some more relations between the natural ltrations
of X
(n)
, Y
(n)
, T
n
(W ) and T
n
(
~
W ).
Proposition 3.5. (i) The ltration generated by X
(n)
and Y
(n)
is strictly smaller
than that generated by T
n
(W ) and T
n
(
~
W ), i.e., for all n  0 and t  0,
F
X
(n)
;Y
(n)
t
= F
X
(n)
t
F
Y
(n)
t
$ F
T
n
(W )
t
 F
T
n
(
~
W )
t
= F
T
n
(W );T
n
(
~
W )
t
:
Moreover, we have
F
X
(n+1)
;Y
(n)
t
= F
X
(n+1)
t
F
Y
(n)
t
$ F
T
n
(W )
t
 F
T
n+1
(
~
W )
t
= F
T
n
(W );T
n+1
(
~
W )
t
:
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(ii) For all 0  n < m, the -algebras F
X
(n)
t
 F
Y
(n)
t
and F
T
m
(W )
t
 F
T
m
(
~
W )
t
do not
contain each other. The same result is also valid for the -algebras F
X
(n+1)
t
F
Y
(n)
t
and F
T
m
(W )
t
F
T
m+1
(
~
W )
t
.
(iii) For jcj < 1 and t  0,
F
X+cY
t
= F
W+c
~
W
t
:
Proof. Here we prove only the case
F
X
(1)
t
 F
Y
(0)
t
$ F
W
t
 F
T (
~
W )
t
:
The general case can be proved by a similar method. We can easily check the
inclusion
F
X
(1)
t
 F
Y
(0)
t
 F
W
t
 F
T (
~
W )
t
;
due to the denitions of (X
(1)
t
) and (Y
(0)
t
). Suppose the -algebras F
X
(1)
t
F
Y
(0)
t
and
F
W
t
 F
T (
~
W )
t
coincide. Then we know from the above proposition that the random
variable X
(0)
t
is independent of F
X
(1)
t
 F
Y
(0)
t
. It is therefore also independent of
F
W
t
 F
T (
~
W )
t
. But it is easy to compute
E[X
(0)
t
T (
~
W )
t
] =
1
c
Z
t
0

1  (
u
t
)
a

du 
1
c
Z
t
0
1
u
Z
u
0

1  (
v
t
)
a

dvdu
=
 a
c(a+ 1)
2
t =  c(1  c
2
)t;
which obviously contradicts the above assumption. The second assertion follows by
the same argument and the property E[X
(n)
t
T
m 1
(W )
t
] 6= 0 for all m > n. The last
statement follows directly from the relation:
X
t
+ cY
t
=W
t
+ c
~
W
t
;
for all t  0.
3.3. Some related decompositions
Let us look at some further properties of the process X. Consider the process
(Z
t
)
t0
dened by
Z
t
:= t
Z
1
t
1
u
dX
u
:
From Chapter 1 in Yor [57] we see that this process Z is a Brownian motion.
Furthermore, it is easy to check that X
t
and Z
t
are independent for any t, but that
the processes X and Z are not. In this section we want to give a representation of
Z in terms of W and
~
W , and compare it with the representation of X.
Lemma 3.2. The process X with (3.7) satises
Z
t
= t
Z
1
t
dX
u
u
= V
1
t
(W ) + V
2
t
(
~
W ); (3.22)
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where
V
1
t
(W ) := (1  c
2
)t
Z
1
t
dW
u
u
  c
2
t
 a
Z
t
0
u
a
dW
u
;
V
2
t
(
~
W ) :=
ct
1  c
2
Z
1
t
u
 a 2
Z
u
0
v
a
d
~
W
v
du:
Proof. It follows from Ito^'s formula and (3.9) that
t
 a 1
Z
t
0
u
a
dW
u
  s
 a 1
Z
s
0
u
a
dW
u
=
Z
t
s
d

u
 a 1
Z
u
0
v
a
dW
v

=
Z
t
s

 (a + 1)u
 a 2
Z
u
0
v
a
dW
v
du+ u
 1
dW
u

=  
1
a
Z
t
s
dW
u
u
+
a + 1
a
Z
t
s
dX
u
u
 
a + 1
c
Z
t
s
u
 a 2
Z
u
0
v
a
d
~
W
v
du: (3.23)
Due to the time-change there exists a standard Brownian motion   such that
t
 a 1
Z
t
0
u
a
dW
u
= t
 a 1
 
R
t
0
u
2a
du
= t
 (a+1)
 
1
2a+1
t
2a+1
:
Applying the law of large numbers we get
lim
t!1
t
 (
1
2
r+)
 
t
r
= 0;
for any  > 0, hence
lim
t!1
t
 a 1
Z
t
0
u
a
dW
u
= 0:
Letting t go to 1, it follows that (3.23) can be written in the form (3.22).
From the decomposition in the previous Lemma, we can derive another repre-
sentation for (3.22).
Proposition 3.6. If the process X satises (3.7), then
Z
t
= t
Z
1
t
dX
u
u
=
Z
t
0

u
t

a
dB
u
+
1
c
Z
t
0

1 

u
t

a

d
~
B
u
; (3.24)
with B and
~
B are two independent Brownian motions given by
B
t
=  W
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
1
u
dW
v
v
du;
and
~
B
t
=  
~
W
t
+
Z
t
0
Z
1
u
d
~
W
v
v
du:
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Proof. The covariance function of (V
1
t
(W ))
t0
is given by
E[V
1
s
(W )V
1
t
(W )] = (1  c
2
)
2
stE

Z
1
s
dW
u
u
Z
1
t
dW
u
u

+ c
4
s
 a
t
 a
Z
s
0
u
2a
du
 (1  c
2
)c
2
st
 a
E

Z
1
s
dW
u
u
Z
t
0
u
a
dW
u

= (1  c
2
)
2
s+
c
4
2a + 1
s
a+1
t
 a
 
(1  c
2
)c
2
a
(s  s
a+1
t
 a
)
=

1  c
2
1 + c
2

s
a+1
t
 a
:
This is exactly the covariance function of the process (
R
t
0
(
u
t
)
a
dB
u
)
t0
for some stan-
dard Brownian motion B. Similarly, we have
E[V
2
s
(
~
W )V
2
t
(
~
W )] = s 

1  c
2
1 + c
2

s
a+1
t
 a
;
which coincides with the covariance function of (
1
c
R
t
0
(1   (
u
t
)
a
)d
~
B
u
)
t0
for some
standard Brownian motion
~
B. Since the processes (V
1
t
(W )) and (V
2
t
(
~
W )) are inde-
pendent, B and
~
B can therefore be selected to be independent. Hence, we get the
representation (3.24). Furthermore, from
Z
t
0

u
t

a
dB
u
= V
1
t
(W ) = (1  c
2
)t
Z
1
t
dW
u
u
  c
2
t
 a
Z
t
0
u
a
dW
u
;
and
1
c
Z
t
0

1 

u
t

a

d
~
B
u
= V
2
t
(
~
W ) =
ct
1  c
2
Z
1
t
u
 a 2
Z
u
0
v
a
d
~
W
v
du;
we get the representations of B and
~
B in terms of W and
~
W , respectively.
3.4. A related class of Brownian motions
Let (W
t
)
t0
and (
~
W
t
)
t0
be two independent Brownian motions. Deheuvels [21]
has shown that the process (X
t
)
t0
dened by
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
g(u)W
u
du;
is a Brownian motion if and only if g(t)  0 or g(t) =  1=t. Now we want to
generalize this result; see also Wu-Yor [56]. For two functions f and g in C(0;1)\

A(0;1) we consider the process X given by
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
(f(u)
~
W
u
+ g(u)W
u
)du; (3.25)
and we ask for which functions f and g the resulting process X can be again a
Brownian motion.
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Theorem 3.1. Denote
U
t
=
Z
t
0
W
s
s
ds and
~
U
t
=
Z
t
0
~
W
s
s
ds:
For the functions f; g 2 C(0;1) \

A(0;1), the process (X
t
)
t0
given by (3.25) is
a Brownian motion if and only if f(t) = 
p
   
2
=t and g(t) =  =t, for some
 2 [0; 1]. In particular, both processes
X

t
:= W
t
 
Z
t
0


s
W
s

p
   
2
s
~
W
s

ds; (3.26)
are Brownian motions.
Proof. (i) Denote Z
t
= W
t
+ i
p
   
2
~
U
t
, and  
t
= W
t
  U
t
. Therefore,
essentially from the previous computations, we nd
E( 
s
 
t
) = E(Z
s
Z
t
) = E(W
s
W
t
)  (   
2
)E(
~
U
s
~
U
t
):
Hence, the covariance of the process (W
t
  U
t

p
   
2
~
U
t
)
t0
is
E( 
s
 
t
) + (   
2
)E(
~
U
s
~
U
t
) = s+ (
2
  )('(s; t)  E[
~
U
s
~
U
t
]) = s;
which implies that the process X

are Brownian motions.
(ii) Conversely, since in Deheuvels [21] the case f  0 has been proved, here we may
assume f 6 0. Suppose (X
t
)
t0
is a Brownian motion. Then from Lemma 1.2, we
know that, for s  t,
f(t)E(X
s
~
W
t
) + g(t)E(X
s
W
t
) = 0:
Due to (3.25) we can compute E(X
s
~
W
t
) and E(X
s
W
t
), which yields:
f(t)
Z
s
0
uf(u)du+ g(t)

s+
Z
s
0
ug(u)du

= 0:
Taking derivatives with respect to s, we get
sf(s)f(t) + (1 + sg(s))g(t) = 0: (3.27)
Since f is continuous, there exists a countable collection of disjoint component in-
tervals f(a
i
; b
i
) : i 2 Ng in (0;1), such that
f(t)
8
>
<
>
:
6= 0; 8t 2
1
S
i=1
(a
i
; b
i
);
= 0; 8t 2 (0;1) n
1
S
i=1
(a
i
; b
i
):
Without loss of generality, we have only to look at the case: f 2 C(0;1)\

A(0;1),
f(t) 6= 0 for all t 2 (a; b), and f(t)  0 on the set (0;1) n (a; b). Then for all
s; t 2 (a; b), s < t, we can rewrite (3.27) as
sf(s) +
g(t)
f(t)
(1 + sg(s)) = 0;
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which implies g(t) = cf(t) for some nonzero constant c, for all t 2 (a; b). Plugging
this result into (3.27) it follows that
f(s) =  
c
(1 + c
2
)s
;
which is not equal to 0 on R
+
. Since f is continuous, we get (a; b) = (0;1), which
gives the results.
Remark 3.6. The intersection of the class of all processes X of the form (3.26)
and of the class of processes satisfying (3.7) for some c 2 ( 1; 1) contains exactly
one element, namely, the Brownian motion X = W .
Proposition 3.7. The processes Y

t
dened by
Y

t
:=
~
W
t
 
Z
t
0

1  
s
~
W
s

p
   
2
s
W
s

ds;
are Brownian motions independent of the processes X

t
, respectively.
Proof. If we change the roles of W and
~
W in the process X

, we get that the
resulting process is still a Brownian motion. Hence, we see that the process Y

is a
Brownian motion. Furthermore, it is easy to check E[X

t
Y

s
] = E[X

s
Y

t
] = 0 for
all s  t.
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CHAPTER 4
An equilibrium model of insider trading
From this chapter on we are concerned with insider trading of a large investor.
We want to investigate a mathematical model of a nancial market, in which some
investors have more information than others, and where the investment of the traders
can inuence the price of the stock. Several such models have been proposed by a
number of authors, e.g., Back [7], Bagehot [12], Copeland-Galai [17], Easley-O'Hara
[22], Glosten-Milgram [26], Grossman [30], Kyle [42]. Our study will be based on
the model introduced by Kyle [42] and Back [7]. They develop a model with a risk
neutral informed trader who knows in advance the nal stock price at time 1. As an
extension of their study, we also consider the case where the insider obtains more
information as time increases. This idea already appears in Back-Pedersen [11].
Our purpose is to analyze the structure of insider strategies in such an extended
setting. Our analysis will be based on the results on stochastic ltering in Chapter
2.
In Section 4.1 we specify the basic assumptions on our model and a denition
of equilibrium introduced by K. Back. We shall review some results of Kyle [42]
and Back [7] in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we derive generalized versions of the
results in Back-Pedersen [11]. Moreover, we consider special cases of sequential
information where information is obtained by observing some Gaussian martingale,
and in particular a standard Brownian motion.
4.1. Denition of equilibrium in the sense of K. Back
In this section we introduce a simple model of insider trading and formulate a
notion of equilibrium due to K. Back [7].
Assume that there are only one bond and one stock in the nancial market. The
interest rate of the bond is equal to 0. Trading occurs continuously during the time
interval [0; 1]. Before the trading begins, the nal stock price P
1
at time 1 is already
determined by the outcome of some N(0; 1)-distributed random variable S
1
. More
precisely, we assume
P
1
= h(S
1
; 1); (4.1)
where h(; 1) is some continuous, strictly increasing function satisfying
E[h
2
(S
1
; 1)] <1: (4.2)
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Suppose all market participants are risk neutral. We can classify the agents
in the market into three groups: uninformed traders, informed trader and market
maker.
(1) uninformed traders: The uninformed traders have no information about
the future price of the stock, and they can only observe their own cumulative
demands. Their cumulative demand at time t is a standard Brownian motion
(W
t
), which is price-inelastic and independent of the nal price P
1
. We call
the uninformed traders also noise traders or liquidity traders.
(2) informed trader: There is only one informed trader in the market, also
called insider. He gains continuously some extra information about the -
nal price of the stock. This information process is a continuous centered
square-integrable Gaussian martingale, denoted by (S
t
)
0t1
. Furthermore,
the informed trader can observe the cumulative orders in the whole market,
from which he can derive, in particular, the cumulative orders W of the noise
traders. Hence, the insider can choose his cumulative orders, denoted by
(I
t
), depending on his additional information ow (S
t
) and the cumulative
demands by the noise traders W . Technically, this means that the insider
strategy (I
t
) is (F
W;S
t
)-adapted. In the sequel, we assume that the process
(I
t
) is a semimartingale with respect to the ltration (F
W;S
t
). We denote the
collection of such strategies by I, i.e.,
I := f(I
t
)
0t1
: I is an (F
W;S
t
)-adapted semimartingaleg:
(3) market maker: There is only one market maker in the market. He knows
from the very beginning of the trading the distribution of the stock price at
time 1. He decides the stock price according to the cumulative orders in the
whole market. Thus, at each time t 2 [0; 1) the stock price is a functional of
the demand process (X
u
)
ut
, where X
t
:= W
t
+ I
t
is the sum of cumulative
demands of the uninformed and informed traders. This is a semimartingale
with respect to its own ltration.
In this chapter we discuss only the case where the market maker uses a price
functional of the form
P
t
= h(X
t
; t); (0  t < 1) (4.3)
for some continuous function h(; t). Since stock prices rise with increasing demand,
we assume that the function h(x; t) is strictly increasing in x for each t 2 [0; 1].
Due to this assumption the inverse function h
 1
(; t) exists for every xed time t.
Furthermore, we suppose that h(x; t) is twice continuously dierentiable with respect
to x, and once with respect to t 2 [0; 1). We also assume that h(x; t) satises the
integrability condition
E

Z
1
0
h
2
(W
u
; u)du

<1: (4.4)
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Definition 4.1. A function h(; ) satisfying the preceding conditions will be
called a pricing rule. The pricing rule is called space-time harmonic if it is a solution
of the heat equation
1
2
h
xx
(x; t) + h
t
(x; t) = 0; (4.5)
for all 0  t < 1.
Lemma 4.1. There is exactly one space-time harmonic pricing rule h(; ) whose
boundary values h(; 1) are given by the function in (4:1), namely the function dened
by
h(x; t) = E [h(x +W
1
 W
t
; 1)]
=
1
p
2(1  t)
Z
1
 1
h(y; 1) exp

 
(y   x)
2
2(1  t)

dy: (4.6)
Proof. Assumption (4.2) means that
1
p
2
Z
1
 1
h
2
(x; 1) exp

 
x
2
2

dx <1: (4.7)
Under condition (4.7), equation (4.6) denes a smooth function h(x; t) which satises
(4.4) and (4.5); this is well known from the theory of the heat equation. Moreover,
h
x
(x; t) =
1
p
2(1  t)
Z
1
 1
h
x
(y; 1) exp

 
(y   x)
2
2(1  t)

dy > 0; (4.8)
and this implies that h(; t) is strictly increasing in x for all t 2 [0; 1).
Recall that at the terminal time t = 1 we assume the stock price to be given by
a function of the nal signal S
1
, i.e., P
1
= h(S
1
; 1). Thus, given the development
(X
t
) of the cumulated demand in the whole market, the resulting price process (P
t
)
is given by
P
t
=
8
>
<
>
:
h(X
t
; t); for 0  t < 1;
h(S
1
; 1); for t = 1:
Note that although the price process can (and will) be inuenced by the trading
activities over the time interval [0; 1), at the terminal time 1 it will assume to the
value h(S
1
; 1) regardless of what has happened before.
With this formalization of the price process at hand we are now in a position to
dene the prot resulting from a given process of cumulative demands  by
(P
1
  P
1 
)
1 
+
Z
1 
0

u 
dP
u
; (4.9)
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where we assume, for simplicity, that all agents have initial capital 0. For an informed
trader using strategy I = (I
t
) 2 I, his nal prot is given by

1
:= 
1
(h; I) := (h(S
1
; 1)  h(X
1 
; 1 ))I
1
+
Z
1 
0
I
u 
dh(X
u
; u)
= (P
1
  P
1 
)I
1
+
Z
1 
0
I
u 
dP
u
=
Z
1
0
(P
1
  P
u 
)dI
u
  [P; I]
1 
; (4.10)
where for the last equality we used Ito^'s product rule and where ([P; I]
t
)
0t1
denotes
the optional quadratic variation of the processes (P
t
) and (I
t
).
Let us now recall the denition of equilibrium in Back [7].
Definition 4.2. (1) (Market EÆciency) Given an insider strategy I = (I
t
) 2
I, a pricing rule h(x; t) is called rational given I if it satises
h(X
t
; t) = E[h(S
1
; 1)jF
X
t
]; (4.11)
for all t  1.
(2) (Prot Maximization) Given a pricing rule h(x; t), the insider strategy I
?
=
(I
?
t
)
0t1
2 I is said to be optimal given h if it maximizes the corresponding expected
nal prot
E[
1
(h; I
?
)] = max
I2I
E[
1
(h; I)]:
(3) (Equilibrium) A pricing rule h and a strategy I
?
for the insider dene an
equilibrium (h; I
?
) if h is a rational pricing rule given I
?
and I
?
is an optimal insider
strategy given h. In this case, we call h an equilibrium pricing rule.
Let us now address the question of existence of an equilibrium in the above sense.
First we investigate the case of an insider with full information (Section 4.2) and
then the case of an insider with increasing extra information (Section 4.3).
4.2. Equilibrium in the case of full information
In this section we assume, as in Kyle [42] and Back [7], that the insider has full
information about the nal stock price already at the beginning of the trading. It
is also assumed that the nal signal S
1
is independent of the Brownian motion W ,
the cumulative orders of the uninformed traders.
By using a discrete time approximation, Kyle [42] shows that there exists a
unique linear equilibrium (h; I
?
) for which the function h(x; t) does not depend on t
and is linear in x, provided the nal stock price is normally distributed. Note that
Kyle [42] uses a denition of equilibrium dierent from our Denition 4.2. Rochet-
Vila [53] construct a nonlinear equilibrium model in the sense of Kyle. In the more
general setup reviewed in the previous section, Back [7] shows that there exists an
equilibrium in the sense of Denition 4.2. He proves that the insider reaches his
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maximal prot if and only if he drives the cumulative orders in the whole market to
the nal value X
1
= S
1
. He also gives an explicit description of the equilibrium:
(B1) The rational pricing rule is given by
dP
t
= h
x
(X
t
; t)dX
t
; (4.12)
where h(; ) is the space-time harmonic pricing rule dened in (4.6).
(B2) The optimal strategy for the insider is given by
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
1
 X
s
1  s
ds; (4.13)
which is continuous and of bounded variation. Therefore, the optional qua-
dratic variation of P and I
?
vanishes identically.
(B3) The cumulative demand in the whole market (X
t
)
0t1
forms a Brownian
motion with respect to its own ltration (see Example 2.3), and it converges
to S
1
as t ! 1. In fact, equation(4.13) shows that the optimal strategy
consists in constructing a Brownian bridge tied to the nal value S
1
.
Recall that Back [7] does not assume the insider strategy I to be absolutely
continuous a priori. Using Bellman's equation and an optimization argument he
shows that any optimal strategy must have this property.
Remark 4.1. Property (B3) means, in particular, that the market maker cannot
discover that there is an insider in the market. This is due to our assumption that he
can only observe the cumulative orders in the whole market. But these cumulative
orders evolve like a Brownian motion whether there is an insider (using an optimal
strategy) or not.
4.3. Equilibrium with increasing information
In this section we would like to consider a more general setup. We assume
that instead of possessing the full information from the beginning the informed
trader now gains an increasing amount of information by observing a signal process
(S
t
)
0t1
. Here S is supposed to be a continuous centered square-integrable Gaussian
martingale with respect to its own ltration and with nal value S
1
 N(0; 1). Back-
Pedersen [11] consider the special case
S
t
= S
0
+
Z
t
0
(u)d
~
W
u
;
where S
0
is normally distributed with mean 0, and (
~
W
t
)
0t1
is a Wiener process,
both independent ofW . Moreover, (u) is assumed to be a deterministic continuous
function satisfying
var(S
0
) +
Z
1
0

2
(u)du = 1;
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and
Z
1
t

2
(u)du <
1  t
1 + 
; (4.14)
for all 0  t < 1, with some constant  > 0. Furthermore, Back-Pedersen [11] restrict
the insider to use only absolutely continuous strategies. Under these assumptions
Back-Pedersen [11] show that there exists an equilibrium in the sense of Denition
4.2. More precisely, the optimal strategy for the insider is of the form
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
R
1
u
(1  
2
(v))dv
du; (4.15)
and the pricing rule is given by (4.6). Again the cumulative demand in the whole
market turns out to be a Brownian motion. Hence, we are again in a situation where
the market maker will not be able to discover the insider (c.f. Remark 4.1).
Let us now consider the existence of equilibrium in our extended model where
S is only a continuous centered square-integrable Gaussian martingale. We follow
Back-Pedersen [11] in restricting the insider to absolutely continuous strategies.
Next we are going to discuss the insider's optimization problem under this as-
sumptions. Using the same argument as in Back [7] we get the following result.
Lemma 4.2. Let I
?
2 I be an absolutely continuous insider strategy and let h be
the space-time harmonic pricing rule of (4:6). If I
?
satises S
1
= W
1
+ I
?
1
, then it
is an optimal strategy, i.e.,
E[
1
(h; I
?
)]  E[
1
(h; I)];
for all I 2 I
0
. Moreover, if I
??
is another optimal insider strategy, then I
?
1
= I
??
1
.
Proof. For a constant a in the range of h(; 1), let
G
a
(z; 1) =
Z
z
h
 1
(;1)(a)
(h(y; 1)  a)dy; (4.16)
so that
G
a
x
(x; 1) = h(x; 1)  a: (4.17)
Since h(; 1) is strictly increasing, G
a
x
(; 1) is strictly increasing. Hence, G
a
(; 1)
is strictly convex, and has its minimum at the point h
 1
(; 1)(a). It follows from
G
a
(h
 1
(; 1)(a); 1) = 0 that G
a
(; 1) is nonnegative. We dene
G
a
(x; t) = E [G
a
(x +W
1
 W
t
; 1)]
=
1
p
2
Z
1
 1
G
a
(x +
p
1  t y; 1) exp

 
y
2
2

dy
for 0  t < 1. Then G
a
is a solution of the heat equation

1
2
 +
@
@t

G
a
= 0 (4.18)
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on the strip R  [0; 1) with boundary condition (4.16). As in (4.8), we have
G
a
x
(x; t) = E[G
a
x
(x +W
1
 W
t
; 1)] = E[h(x +W
1
 W
t
; 1)]  a;
hence
G
a
x
(x; t) = h(x; t)  a;
since h is assumed to be space-time harmonic. Alternatively, we could directly dene
the function
G
a
(x; t) =
Z
x
h
 1
(;1)(a)
(h(y; t)  a)dy +
1
2
Z
1
t
h
x
(h
 1
(; 1)(a); s)ds;
and check that this function does satisfy conditions (4.17) and (4.18). Let us now
apply this construction pathwise for a = h(S
1
; 1). It follows from (4.17) and Ito^'s
formula that
G
h(S
1
;1)
(X
t
; t) G
h(S
1
;1)
(0; 0)
=
Z
t
0
G
h(S
1
;1)
x
(X
s
; s)dX
s
+
Z
t
0
G
h(S
1
;1)
t
(X
s
; s)ds+
1
2
Z
t
0
G
h(S
1
;1)
xx
(X
s
; s)dhXi
s
=
Z
t
0
(h(X
s
; s)  h(S
1
; 1))dX
s
+
Z
t
0

1
2
 +
@
@t

G
h(S
1
;1)
(X
s
; s)ds
=
Z
t
0
(h(X
s
; s)  h(S
1
; 1))dX
s
: (4.19)
Thanks to (4.18) the last term on the third line vanishes. Since W is a Brownian
motion with respect to its natural ltration, and sinceW and S
1
are independent, we
know that W is a Brownian motion relative to the enlarged ltration (F
W
t
_(S
1
)).
Hence, for all t  1,
E

Z
t
0
(h(X
s
; s)  h(S
1
; 1))dW
s

= 0; (4.20)
due to (4.2) and (4.3). Using (4.20), (4.17) and (4.19), we can rewrite the expected
prot of the insider as
E[
1
] = E

Z
t
0
(h(S
1
; 1)  h(X
s
; s))dI
s

= E

Z
t
0
(h(S
1
; 1)  h(X
s
; s))dX
s

= E[G
h(S
1
;1)
(0; 0)]  E[G
h(S
1
;1)
(X
1
; 1)]:
The rst term on the third line is xed, since the nal signal S
1
is determined before
the trading begins. Therefore, we can reformulate the optimization problem as
E[G
h(S
1
;1)
(X
1
; 1)]
!
= min
I2I
: (4.21)
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Since G
h(S
1
;1)
(; 1) is nonnegative and achieves its minimum 0 in S
1
, (4.21) certainly
holds if X
1
= S
1
. This means that the insider can reach his maximal prot if he can
drive the cumulative orders X
t
to the nal value S
1
as t! 1.
From now on, we assume that the informed trader does not want to be discovered.
From Remark 4.1 we infer that this is assured if we allow the insider to use only
strategies such that the resulting demand process (W
t
+I
t
) is again a Wiener process;
such strategies will also be called inconspicuous. More precisely, let us introduce
the class of strategies
I
0
:=

(I
t
)
0t1
: I
t
=
Z
t
0
Y
u
du; where (Y
u
) is (F
W;S
t
)-adapted,
E

Z
t
0
Y
2
u
du

<1; for all t < 1; and (W
t
+ I
t
)
0t1
is a Wiener process

:
Proposition 4.1. Consider an inconspicuous insider strategy I
?
2 I
0
. If X
?
t
=
W
t
+ I
?
t
converges to S
1
as t! 1, then there exists an equilibrium. The pricing rule
h(x; t) is given by (4:6). Furthermore, there is no jump of the stock price at time 1,
i.e., P
1 
= P
1
.
Proof. Lemma 4.2 shows that the absolutely continuous strategy I
?
is optimal
as soon as X
?
t
! S
1
. Moreover, X
?
is a Brownian motion for I
?
2 I
0
. Market
eÆciency (4.11) now follows from the fact that h(X
t
; t) is a martingale, since h(; )
is space-time harmonic.
Therefore if the insider can use a strategy I
?
driving the terminal cumulative
demand W
1
+ I
?
1
to S
1
, this strategy I
?
is optimal, and (h; I
?
) is an equilibrium,
where h(; t) is dened by (4.6). But conversely, if I
?
yields
E[
1
(h; I
?
)] = max
I2I
E[(h; I)];
we cannot say that W
1
+ I
?
1
must be equal to S
1
, because it can happen that there
is no process I 2 I such that W
1
+ I
1
= S
1
. In Subsection 4.3.2 and in the next
chapter we will give several examples for such a situation. Therefore the converse
of the lemma fails to be true in general.
In Proposition 4.1, we consider just those insider strategies which turn the cu-
mulative order process into a Brownian motion. In other words, the primary goal of
the insider is not to be discovered (cf. Remark 4.1). The discussion in Section 2.3
suggests several classes of such strategies dened by certain linear transformations
of W and S.
In the following two subsections, we discuss existence of equilibria in the case
where (S
t
)
0t1
is a Gaussian square-integrable martingale whose variance satises
some integrability conditions, and in the case where S
t
=
~
W
t
, a standard Brownian
motion.
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4.3.1. Partial information given by observing a Gaussian martingale.
Assume that the insider's extra information is given by observing a continuous cen-
tered square-integrable Gaussian martingale (S
t
)
0t1
. We assume that its variance
function V (t) := var(S
t
) satises
V (1) = E[S
2
1
] = 1 (4.22)
and the two integrability conditions
1
V (u)  u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
loc
([0; 1)): (4.23)
Proposition 4.2. Assume condition (4:22) and (4:23) hold. Then there exists
an equilibrium (h; I
?
). Explicitly, the rational pricing rule is given by (4:6), and
I
?
t
:=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
V (u)  u
du (4.24)
is an optimal insider strategy.
Proof. It follows from the second assertion in Theorem 2.4 that the process X
satisfying
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
V (u)  u
du;
is a Wiener process and converges to S
1
as t ! 1. Due to Proposition 4.1 we get
the desired result.
This proposition shows the existence of an equilibrium in our present setting.
But regarding uniqueness, in the terminology in Cho-El Karoui [15] we are only
sure that there exists a weakly unique equilibrium (i.e., there is a unique pricing
rule, but there may be multiple optimal strategies in the class I
0
). Explicitly, due
to Lemma 4.1, we derive the uniqueness of the rational pricing rule (h(; t)). But
we cannot prove uniqueness of the optimal insider strategy. However, the insider
strategy (4.24) is the unique optimal strategy in the collection of linear strategies
I
1
:=
8
>
<
>
>
:
I = (I
t
)
0t1
2 I
0
: I
t
=
Z
t
0
(f(u)S
u
+ g(u)X
u
) du;
where f(t)
p
V (t); g(t) 2 C
1
(0; 1) \ L
2
loc
([0; 1));
9
>
=
>
>
;
:
Proposition 4.3. I
?
is the unique optimal strategy in I
1
.
Proof. From Corollary 2.4 we see that I 2 I
1
if and only if
I
t
=
Z
t
0
cS
u
  c
2
X
u
V (u)  c
2
u
du;
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for some jcj  1. Hence,
E[(W
1
+ I
1
  S
1
)
2
] = 2  2E[(W
1
+ I
1
)S
1
]
= 2  2
Z
1
0
exp

 
Z
1
u
c
2
V (v)  c
2
v
dv

cV (u)
V (u)  c
2
u
du
= 2(1  c);
which is equal to 0 if and only if c = 1.
Remark 4.2. Condition (4.23) holds if either there is enough insider information
at time 0 or the additional information at time 0 increases quickly enough. In the
next subsection and in the next chapter we will relax condition (4:23) and discuss
more general forms of insider information.
The following remark shows that Proposition 4.2 is an extension of the results
in Back-Pedersen [11].
Remark 4.3. Assume that the Gaussian martingale S is given by
S
t
= S
0
+
Z
t
0
(u)d
~
W
u
; (4.25)
where
~
W is a Wiener process and (t) satises
V (0) +
Z
1
0

2
(u)du = 1: (4.26)
To derive the results in Back-Pedersen [11] as a special case of Proposition 4.2 we
can apply the above discussion as follows. From (4.25) and (4.26) we see that
V (t) = V (0) +
Z
t
0

2
(u)du = 1 
Z
1
t

2
(u)du:
Thus, (4.15) coincides with our insider strategy (4.24). The condition (4.23) can be
written as
Z
t
0
u
(V (0) +
R
u
0

2
(v)dv)
2
du =
Z
t
0
u
(1 
R
1
u

2
(v)dv)
2
du <1 (4.27)
for all t < 1. Thus, the condition (4.14) as considered in Back-Pedersen [11] is
a special case of our condition (4.27). For instance, the case where S
0
= 0 and
(t) =
p
p t
p 1
does not satisfy (4.14), but we still have (4.27). Furthermore, not
all continuous centered Gaussian martingales (S
t
) can be represented in the form
(4.25) with a Brownian motion
~
W and a deterministic function . For example,
consider the process
S
t
= S
0
+B
g(t)
; (4.28)
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where S
0
is an N(0; 1=4)-distributed random variable and B is a Brownian motion
independent of S
0
. Moreover, suppose that g is given by
g(t) :=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
f(t); 0  t 
1
2
;
1
4
+
1
2
t;
1
2
< t  1;
where f(t) is the Cantor function. In this case we have hSi
t
= g(t) for all t  1.
And the variance
V (t) = E[S
2
t
] = E[S
2
0
] + g(t) =
1
4
+ g(t) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
1
4
+ f(t); 0  t 
1
2
;
1
2
+
1
2
t;
1
2
< t  1;
is strictly larger than t for all t < 1. Suppose S can be represented in the form
(4.25). From (4.25) we see that
E[(S
t
  S
0
)
2
] =
Z
t
0

2
(u)du;
which is absolutely continuous for all t. On the other hand, by (4.28), we conclude
that for 0  t  1=2,
E[(S
t
  S
0
)
2
] = E

B
2
g(t)

= g(t) =
1
4
+ f(t):
This is clearly a contradiction, since the Cantor function f(t) is not absolutely
continuous.
Now let us consider two typical examples.
Example 4.1. As in Kyle [42], we suppose the nal price of the stock is given
by
P
1
= m+ S
1
;
where m 2 R and  > 0. From Proposition 4.2 and the above discussion we see
that there exists a weakly unique equilibrium in this model. Explicitly, an optimal
strategy of the insider is given by
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
V (u)  u
du:
Using this strategy the informed trader can drive the cumulative demands X
t
to S
1
.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the pricing rule of the stock is given by
P
t
= h(X
t
; t) = E[P
1
jF
X
t
] = m+ E[S
1
jF
X
t
] = m + E[X
1
jF
X
t
] = m + X
t
:
Thus, the price process P satises the stochastic dierential equation
dP
t
= dX
t
;
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with initial value P
0
= m. Since P
1
and W
1
are independent, the processes X and
W are both Brownian motions. The insider's expected nal prot is therefore given
by
E[
1
] = E

P
1
I
1
 
Z
1
0
P
t
dI
t

= E

P
1
(X
1
 W
1
) 
Z
1
0
P
u
d(X
u
 W
u
)

= E[(m + S
1
)S
1
] = :
This value is independent of the expected value of the pricem. Moreover, it coincides
with the expected nal prot of an informed trader who owns the full information.
Furthermore, the noise traders' expected nal prot is given by
E

(P
1
  P
1 
)W
1
+
Z
1
0
W
u
dP
u

= E

P
1
W
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
dW
u
  hP;W i
1 

= E[(m + S
1
)W
1
]  E[hm+ X;W i
1 
]
=  E[hW;W i
1 
] =  :
Thus, the expected prot of the insider is at the expense of the noise traders.
Example 4.2. Suppose the nal price P
1
is log-normally distributed, i.e., P
1
is
given by
~v = P
1
= exp(m + S
1
);
where S
1
 N(0; 1), m 2 R and  > 0. Due to Proposition 4.2 we know that there
exists an equilibrium. Thus the price process of the stock P
t
is of the form
P (X
t
; t) = E[P
1
jF
X
t
] = exp

m+
1
2

2

E

exp

S
1
 
1
2

2





F
X
t

= exp

X
t
+m+
1
2

2
(1  t)

;
i.e., the equilibrium pricing rule is given by
h(x; t) = exp

x +m+
1
2

2
(1  t)

:
Therefore, the price process P satises the stochastic dierential equation of geo-
metric Brownian motion
dP
t
= P
t
dX
t
;
with initial condition P
0
= exp(m+
1
2

2
), i.e., we are in the context of the standard
Black-Scholes models. Furthermore, from the discussion above, we conclude that
the optimal insider strategy is of the form
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
V (u)  u
du;
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and that (h; I
?
) forms an equilibrium. Hence, the expectation of the nal prot of
the insider is given by
E[
1
] = E[X
1
h(S
1
; 1)] = E[S
1
exp(m + S
1
)] =  exp

m+

2
2

;
as in the case where the insider has full information. Using a similar argument as in
the last example, we see that the expected nal prot of the noise traders amounts
to   exp(m + 
2
=2).
Remark 4.4. From the two examples above, we see that the expected prot
of the insider does not depend on whether he has full or only partial information,
provided the latter satises the integrability condition (4.23). But what is the dif-
ference between these two cases? Let us compare the insider strategy in case of full
information
I
f
t
:=
Z
t
0
S
1
 X
f
u
1  u
du;
and that in case of partial information:
I
p
t
:=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
p
u
V (u)  u
du:
Here the processes X
f
and X
p
denote the cumulative demands in the whole market
in the cases of full information and of sequential information, respectively. We know
that both processes X
f
and X
p
are Brownian motions with respect to their own
ltrations, and that S
1
= X
f
1
= X
p
1
. Measuring the activity of the insider strategies
as
F
f
(t) :=
Z
t
0
E
"

S
1
 X
f
u
1  u

2
#
du =
Z
t
0
E[S
2
1
]  2E[S
1
X
f
u
] + E[(X
f
u
)
2
]
(1  u)
2
du
=
Z
t
0
1  2E[X
f
1
X
f
u
] + u
(1  u)
2
du =
Z
t
0
1
1  u
du = log

1
1  t

;
and
F
p
(t) :=
Z
t
0
E
"

S
u
 X
p
u
V (u)  u

2
#
du =
Z
t
0
E[S
2
u
]  2E[S
u
X
p
u
] + E[(X
p
u
)
2
]
(V (u)  u)
2
du
=
Z
t
0
V (u)  2E[S
1
X
p
u
] + u
(V (u)  u)
2
du =
Z
t
0
V (u)  2E[X
p
1
X
p
u
] + u
(V (u)  u)
2
du
=
Z
t
0
1
V (u)  u
du
>
Z
t
0
1
1  u
du = F
f
(t);
we see that the activity for the insider with partial information is strictly larger than
that of the insider with full information.
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Remark 4.5. Up to now we have only discussed the insider information as a
Gaussian martingale with variance function satisfying (4.23). Due to the rst asser-
tion in Theorem 2.4 we can relax condition (4.23) to get Brownian motions driven
by a more general class of Gaussian martingales. But these extra Brownian motions
may not converge to S
1
. In the end of Section 5.1 we shall investigate this general
situation.
4.3.2. Partial information given by a Brownian motion. In this sub-
section we want to investigate the case where the insider's additional information
consists in observing a standard Brownian motion
~
W . Clearly,
~
W does not satisfy
the integrability conditions (4.23). Therefore, the discussion in the last subsection
is not valid for this case. We want to ask whether there is an equilibrium in the
model. If so, what is the associated optimal insider strategy and the equilibrium
pricing rule? If not, which strategies can the insider apply to get a positive expected
prot?
Suppose the pricing rule h(x; t) is space-time harmonic. If the cumulative orders
in the whole market X
t
converge to
~
W
1
as t ! 1, we know from the discussion in
Section 4.2 that the insider reaches his maximal expected prot. But suppose that
X is a Brownian motion satisfying the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+ Y
t
dt; (4.29)
with initial value X
0
= 0, and where (Y
t
) is an (F
W;
~
W
t
)-adapted process. Then X
does not converge to
~
W
1
as t ! 1 as has been shown in Follmer-Wu-Yor [23] (see
Proposition 2.3 above). But this does yet not imply that there is no equilibrium in
this model. A priori, it might happen that there exists an insider strategy (I
?
t
) such
that
E[
1
(h; I
?
)] = max
I2I
E[
1
(h; I)];
but W
1
+ I
?
1
6=
~
W
1
.
Definition 4.3. We say a strategy I 2 I
0
belongs to I
2
if I is given by
I
t
=
Z
t
0
(f(u)
~
W
u
+
Z
u
0
G(u; v)dX
v
)du;
where f 2 A(0; 1) \ C(0; 1), G is a continuous square-integrable Volterra kernel.
In the following we rst want to give an explicit representation of such strategies
I 2 I
2
, then to check if there exists an insider strategy I
?
2 I
2
such that
E[
1
(P; I
?
)] = max
I2I
2
E[
1
(P; I)]:
Due to Corollary 2.6, we see that a strategy I 2 I
0
belongs to I
2
if and only if
I
t
=
Z
t
0
f(u)

~
W
u
 
Z
u
0
(v)dX
v

du; (4.30)
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where (t) is dened by
(t) =
f(t)	(t)
	
0
(t)
; (4.31)
and 	(t) is the solution of the Sturm-Liouville equation
	
00
(t) = f
2
(t)	(t)
with initial conditions 	(0) = 1 and 	
0
(0+) = 0. In addition, solving the equation
X = W + I, we get another representation of I as
I
t
=
Z
t
0
f(s)
	
0
(s)

Z
s
0
	
0
(u)d
~
W
u
 
Z
s
0
f(u)	(u)dW
u

ds (4.32)
(as in the equation (70) in Follmer-Wu-Yor [23]).
Now let us investigate the existence of an equilibrium in this model. To simplify,
we take here a simple example where the nal price is given by
~
W
1
, i.e., h(x; 1) = x.
Since the price process (P
t
) is (F
X
t
)-adapted and E[
R
1
0
P
2
u
du] <1, we have
E

Z
1
0
P
u
dW
u

= E

Z
1
0
P
u
dX
u

= 0:
Then the corresponding expected nal wealth of the insider is given by
E[
1
(h; I)] = E

Z
1
0
(P
1
  P
u
)dI
u

= E

P
1
I
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
d(I
u
+W
u
)

= E[
~
W
1
I
1
]
=
Z
1
0
f(s)
	
0
(s)
Z
s
0
	
0
(u)duds =
Z
1
0
(u)du:
Remark 4.6. Note that we do not need to compute the pricing rule explicitly
here, since from the above equation we see that the insider's expected nal prot is
independent of the behavior of the price process between 0 and 1 .
The following corollary provides an upper bound for the expected prot
R
1
0
(u)du.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that f 2 C
1
(0; 1) \ A(0; 1) and  is given by (4:31).
Then
Z
1
0
(s)ds < 1:
Proof. Due to (4.30), we have, for all 0  t  1,
E[(X
1
 
~
W
1
)
2
] = E[X
2
1
] + E[
~
W
2
1
]  2E[X
1
~
W
1
]
= 2  2
Z
1
0
f(s)
	
0
(s)
Z
s
0
	
0
(u)duds = 2  2
Z
1
0
(s)ds;
which is nonnegative. The equality holds if and only if X
1
=
~
W
1
. But as we have
shown in Proposition 2.3, these two random variables cannot coincide. This leads
to the desired result.
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Thus,
R
1
0
(s)ds, the expected nal wealth of the insider, cannot be equal to 1.
But how close can the insider come to the upper bound? Let us look at a simple
example.
Example 4.3. Let f(t) = c with a constant c  0. Then the solution of the
associated Sturm-Liouville equation is given by
	(t) =
1
2c
(e
ct
  e
 ct
):
This implies
(t) =
e
ct
  e
 ct
e
ct
+ e
 ct
:
Hence, the expected nal prot of the insider is
E[
1
] =
Z
1
0
(t)dt =
1
c
log

e
c
+ e
 c
2

;
which is a strictly increasing function in c which starts at 0, and approaches 1 as
c!1.
This example shows that the supremum of
R
1
0
(s)ds is equal to 1. But the
supremum cannot be reached. Hence, we conclude that there exist no equilibrium
if the insider observes an independent Brownian motion and is inconspicuous, even
though the insider can come as close to the value 1 as he wants.
CHAPTER 5
Weak equilibrium and extended models
In Chapter 4 we have seen that an equilibrium in the sense of K. Back exists if
the informed trader has either full information or a rather special kind of sequential
information. In the present chapter, we introduce a modied notion of equilibrium.
It is based on the idea that the pricing rule should minimize the expected combined
prot of noise trading and insider trading. In addition we consider some extensions
of the basic model: the insider information may jump at the nal time, it may be
delayed, and there may be several insiders with dierent degrees of information.
5.1. A modied notion of equilibrium
In the general context of Section 4.3, let us consider the expected nal prot of
an insider strategy I 2 I
0
. In contrast to the last chapter, we now admit general
pricing rules of the form
P
t
=
8
>
<
>
:
h((X
u
)
ut
; t); t < 1;
h(S
1
; 1); t = 1;
(5.1)
where h is a nonanticipative functional on C[0; 1] [0; 1] such that
E

Z
1
0
h
2
((W
u
)
ut
; t)dt

<1; (5.2)
see Denition 1.4. We assume that the process (P
t
)
0t1
dened by (5.1) is a semi-
martingale whose paths are continuous on [0; 1).
From now on, we only consider insider strategies belonging to I
0
. As before, the
cumulative order process induced by I 2 I
0
is given by
X
t
= W
t
+
Z
t
0
Y
u
du (0  t  1):
Lemma 5.1. Under the preceding assumptions on the pricing rule, the expected
prot of a strategy I 2 I
0
is given by
E[
1
(h; I)] = E[I
1
h(S
1
; 1)] = E[X
1
h(S
1
; 1)]: (5.3)
In particular, it is independent of the special choice of the pricing rule h(; t) for
time t < 1.
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Proof. Using the same argument as in Section 4.1 we see that the nal prot
of an absolutely continuous strategy I 2 I is given by

1
(h; I) = (P
1
  P
1 
)I
1
+
Z
1 
0
I
u
dP
u
= I
1
P
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
dI
u
;
where we have used Ito^'s product rule in the last step. Since (W
t
)
0t1
is a Brownian
motion with respect to the ltration(F
W;S
t
) and independent of S
1
, we get
E[
1
(h; I)] = E

(I
1
+W
1
)P
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
d(I
u
+W
u
)

= E

X
1
h(S
1
; 1) 
Z
1
0
P
u
dX
u

; (5.4)
here we use the fact that condition (5.2) implies
E

Z
1
0
P
u
dW
u

= 0:
If I belongs to I
0
, then (X
t
)
0t1
is again a Wiener process. Using again (5.2) we
see that equation (5.4) reduces to (5.3).
In view of Lemma 5.1, we denote the expected nal prot of the insider by
E[
1
(I)] instead of E[
1
(h; I)]. Let us introduce the following notion of prot
maximization for the insider.
Definition 5.1 (Inconspicuous prot maximization). An inconspicuous in-
sider strategy I
?
2 I
0
is called optimal if I
?
maximizes the expected nal prot
E[
1
(I)] = E[I
1
h(S
1
; 1)] of the insider for all I 2 I
0
, i.e.,
E[
1
(I
?
)] = max
I2I
0
E[
1
(I)]: (5.5)
In the following discussion we will restrict ourselves to certain subclasses
~
I
0
of
I
0
.
Lemma 5.2. Consider a subclass
~
I
0
of I
0
consisting of strategies of the form
I
t
=
Z
t
0

f(u)S
0
+
Z
u
0
F (u; v)dS
v
+
Z
u
0
H(u; v)dX
v

du;
where f 2 L
2
(0; 1)\C(0; 1) and F andH are Volterra kernels satisfying F (t; u)
p
V
0
(u),
H(t; u) 2 L
2
((0; 1) (0; 1)); see Section 2.2. A strategy I
?
2
~
I
0
satises
E[
1
(I
?
)] = max
I2
~
I
0
E[
1
(I)]
if and only if I
?
minimizes the L
2
-distance between X
1
= W
1
+I
1
and the nal signal
S
1
for all I 2
~
I
0
, i.e.,
E[(X
?
1
  S
1
)
2
] = min
I2
~
I
0
E[(X
1
  S
1
)
2
];
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where X
?
1
= W
1
+ I
?
1
. In particular, optimality of I
?
with respect to
~
I
0
does not
depend on the special choice of the pricing rule for all time 0  t  1. Furthermore,
if X
?
1
= S
1
, then I
?
is an optimal inconspicuous insider strategy (in I
0
).
Proof. 1) First we recall that
0  E[Nh(N; 1)] <1; (5.6)
for all N(0; 1)-distributed random variable N . In fact, since h(; 1) is strictly in-
creasing, we see that
h(x; 1)  h( x; 1)  0; for all x  0;
and this implies,
E[Nh(N; 1)] =
1
p
2
Z
1
 1
xh(x; 1) exp

 
x
2
2

dx
=
1
p
2
Z
1
0
(h(x; 1)  h( x; 1)) x exp

 
x
2
2

dx  0:
The second inequality in (5.6) follows from (4.2) and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
2) Due to the special linear form of the strategies in
~
I
0
, the distribution of (X
1
; S
1
)
is Gaussian. Thus, the conditional expectation of X
1
given S
1
is of the form
E[X
1
jS
1
] =
E[X
1
S
1
]
E[S
2
1
]
S
1
= E[X
1
S
1
]S
1
:
Due to (5.3) we get
E[
1
(I)] = E[h(S
1
; 1)X
1
] = E[h(S
1
; 1)E[X
1
jS
1
]] = E[S
1
h(S
1
; 1)]E[X
1
S
1
]: (5.7)
Moreover, we know that the nal signal S
1
and the price function h(; 1) are already
xed before the trading begins. Hence, the insider can only inuence the term
E[X
1
S
1
]. Furthermore, due to 1) and
E

(X
1
  S
1
)
2

= E

X
2
1

+ E

S
2
1

  2E [X
1
S
1
]
= 2 (1  E[X
1
S
1
]) ;
we conclude that
E [(X
?
1
  S
1
)
2
] = min
I2
~
I
E

(X
1
  S
1
)
2

() E[S
1
X
?
1
] = max
I2
~
I
E[S
1
X
1
]
() E[
1
(I
?
)] = max
I2
~
I
E[
1
(I)]:
3) If X
?
1
= S
1
, then
min
I2I
0
E

(X
1
  S
1
)
2

 min
I2
~
I
0
E

(X
1
  S
1
)
2

= 0:
This implies
E[
1
(I
?
)] = max
I2I
0
E[
1
(I)];
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i.e., I
?
is an optimal inconspicuous strategy in I
0
.
Let us now discuss the role of the market maker. Since the cumulative order pro-
cess in the whole market is (X
t
), the combined gain of the informed and uninformed
traders is given by

(P
1
  P
1 
)X
1
+
Z
1 
0
X
u
dP
u

; (5.8)
depending on the choice of the pricing rule in (5.1). We are going to characterize
those pricing rules which generate a martingale with respect to the ltration (F
X
t
)
up to time 1 , and which minimize expectation of the combined gain (5.8).
Definition 5.2 (Weak Market EÆciency). Given an inconspicuous strat-
egy I 2 I
0
, a pricing rule h(; t) is called rational with respect to I if the following
two conditions hold:
(i) The price process P
t
= h((X
u
)
ut
; t) satises
P
t
= E[P
1 
jF
X
t
]; (5.9)
for all t < 1, and L(P
1
) = L(P
1 
). In other words, the price process is a martingale
with respect to the information of the market maker (F
X
t
) up to time 1 , and the
distribution of P
1 
is the same as that of P
1
.
(ii) The expected combined prot of the informed and uninformed traders is minimal,
i.e.,
E

(h(S
1
; 1)  h((X
u
)
u<1
; 1 ))X
1
+
Z
1 
0
X
t
dh((X
u
)
ut
; u  t)

!
= min; (5.10)
over all pricing rules satisfying the assumptions preceding Lemma 5.1.
Remark 5.1. Suppose that the total prot on the market amounts to 0. Then
the prot of the market maker is equal to the entire loss of the insider and the noise
traders, i.e., at the terminal time 1 the market maker earns
 

(P
1
  P
1 
)X
1
+
Z
1 
0
X
u
dP
u

:
Thus, the problem (5.10) may be viewed as a problem of prot maximization for the
market maker. It means that the market maker has also a dealer function. This idea
appears in Stoll [55] and also in the the bid-ask spread model of Copeland-Galai
[17].
Dene the class H as the set of all pricing rules satisfying the rst condition in
Denition 5.2, i.e.,
H = fP = (P
t
)
0t<1
: P is a uniformly integrable martingale with respect to (F
X
t
)
and L(P
1
) = L(P
1 
)g:
First let us look at a lemma.
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Lemma 5.3. Let Z be an N(0; 1)-distributed random variable on (
;F ;P) and
let h() be a continuous increasing function. Then
max
N
E [Zh(N)] = E [Zh(Z)] ;
where the maximum is taken over all random variables N on (
;F ;P) with dis-
tribution N(0; 1). Furthermore, the maximum is attained if and only if N = Z,
P-a.s..
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume h(0) = 0. Let N be an
N(0; 1)-distributed random variable on (
;F ;P). Due to the Fubini Theorem we
get
E[Zh(N)] = E

Z
Z
1
0
1
(Ns)
dh(s)

  E

Z
Z
0
 1
1
(Ns)
dh(s)

=
Z
1
0
E

Z1
(Ns)

dh(s) 
Z
0
 1
E

Z1
(Ns)

dh(s):
Consider the maximum of E[Z1
A
] over all sets A with P(A) = 1 (s), where s  0
and 	 is the distribution function of N(0; 1). Let A
?
= fZ  sg. Then for any set
A with P(A) = 1  (s) and P(A n A
?
) > 0, we obtain that
E[Z1
A
] = E[Z1
AnA
?
] + E[Z1
A\A
?
]
< s P(A n A
?
) + E[Z1
A\A
?
] = s P(A
?
n A) + E[Z1
A\A
?
]
 E[Z1
A
?
nA
] + E[Z1
A\A
?
] = E[Z1
A
?
]:
We see that the maximum is attained if and only if A = A
?
= fZ  sg. In the
same way we see that the minimum of E[Z1
A
] over all sets A with P(A) = (s) and
s  0 is E[Z1
(Zs)
]. Hence,
E[Zh(N)] 
Z
1
0
E

Z1
(Zs)

dh(s) 
Z
0
 1
E

Z1
(Zs)

dh(s) = E[Zh(Z)]
for all N  N(0; 1), and the equality holds if and only if N = Z, P-a.s..
The following theorem gives the explicit form of a rational pricing rule in this
class H.
Theorem 5.1. Given an inconspicuous strategy I 2 I
0
, there exists a unique
pricing rule in the class H which is rational with respect to I in the sense of Def-
inition 5.2. It is given by the space-time harmonic function h(; ) in (4:6), hence
independent of the special choice of I 2 I
0
. In particular, the resulting price P
t
is
only a function of the current cumulative orders X
t
, not a functional of the past.
Proof. Let us x I 2 I
0
. Suppose P 2 H with P
1 
= h(N; 1), where N is
an N(0; 1)-distributed random variable. The expected combined nal prot of the
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informed and uninformed traders is given by
E

(P
1
  P
1 
)X
1
+
Z
1 
0
X
u
dP
u

= E [(P
1
  P
1 
)X
1
] ; (5.11)
since P is an (F
X
t
)-martingale up to 1  and X is a Brownian motion. Hence, the
market maker wants to minimize
E [(h(S
1
; 1)  h(N; 1))X
1
] = E [h(S
1
; 1)X
1
]  E [h(N; 1)X
1
] ;
over all N(0; 1)-distributed random variables N . Since P
1
= h(S
1
; 1) is xed and
X
1
= W
1
+ I
1
is also xed for the given insider strategy I, the market maker cannot
inuence the rst term on the right-hand side. Hence, this optimization problem can
be reformulated as follows: the market maker wants to nd an N(0; 1)-distributed
random variable N
?
such that
E [h(N
?
; 1)X
1
] = max
NN(0;1)
E [h (N; 1)X
1
] :
Due to Lemma 5.3 we see that N
?
= X
1
. Thus, if the market maker determines the
price (P
t
) with P
1 
= h(X
1
; 1), he minimizes the expected combined terminal prot
of the informed and uninformed traders. Moreover, from the martingale property
and the strong Markov property, the price process should be of the form
P
t
= E[P
1 
jF
X
t
] = E[h(X
1
; 1)jF
X
t
] = E
X
t
[h(X
1 t
; 1)] = h(X
t
; t); (5.12)
i.e., h is the space-time harmonic pricing rule given by (4.6) above.
Combining Denition 5.1 and Denition 5.2 we may dene a modied equilibrium
as follows.
Definition 5.3 (Weak Equilibrium). Consider a pricing rule h 2 H and an
insider strategy I
?
2 I
0
. The pair (h; I
?
) is called a weak equilibrium if h and I
?
satisfy the conditions of inconspicuous prot maximization (Denition 5.1) and weak
market eÆciency (Denition 5.2). Furthermore, if I
?
is an optimal inconspicuous
insider strategy in some subclass
~
I
0
, i.e.,
E[
1
(I
?
)] = max
I2
~
I
0
E[
1
(I)];
then (h; I
?
) is called a weak equilibrium in
~
I
0
.
Now let us look at the relation between the notion of equilibrium in the sense of
Denition 4.2 and of Denition 5.3.
Theorem 5.2. Let I
?
2 I
0
and W
1
+ I
?
1
= S
1
. Then the pair (h; I
?
), where h is
given by (4:6), is an equilibrium both in the sense of Denition 4.2 and in the sense
of Denition 5.3.
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Proof. 1) Due to Proposition 4.1 we see that (h; I
?
) is an equilibrium in the
sense of Denition 4.2.
2) From the proof of Theorem 5.1 we see that P
1 
= h(X
1
; 1). Since X
1
= S
1
, we
get P
1 
= h(X
1
; 1) = h(S
1
; 1) = P
1
. This implies that (P
t
)
0t1
is a martingale
with respect to (F
X
t
), which coincides with the rational pricing rule in the sense of
Denition 4.2.
This theorem implies that the equilibrium dened in Denition 4.2 is equivalent
to the one dened in Denition 5.3, provided that there is a process I 2 I
0
which
yields W
t
+ I
t
! S
1
as t ! 1. In Kyle [42], Back [7] and Back-Pedersen [11]
equilibrium is discussed only in this case. But if there is no insider in the market, a
pricing rule which is rational in the sense of Denition 4.2 satises
P
t
= E[P
1
jF
X
t
] = E[h(S
1
; 1)jF
W
t
] = E[h(S
1
; 1)];
and this is of course unrealistic. In our weak equilibrium, the resulting rational
pricing rule h(x; t) = x due to Theorem 5.1. In the next three sections, we will
introduce some other cases of insider information where the dierence between these
two notions of equilibrium will appear.
In the sequel, we consider two examples where a weak equilibrium can be com-
puted explicitly.
Example 5.1. As in Kyle [42], we suppose that the nal price of the stock is
given by P
1
= h(S
1
; 1) = m+S
1
, where m 2 R and  > 0. Thanks to Theorem 5.1
we know that the expected combined nal prot of the informed and uninformed
traders is minimal if the market maker determines the stock price at time t in the
following form:
P
t
= E[P
1 
jF
X
t
] = E[h(X
1
; 1)jF
X
t
] = E[m + X
1
jF
X
t
] = m+ X
t
:
Hence, the expected gain of the noise traders amounts to
E

(P
1
  P
1 
)W
1
+
Z
1 
0
W
u
dP
u

= E [P
1
W
1
]  E [hP;W i
1 
] =  :
The expected combined nal prot of the informed and uninformed traders is given
by
E[P
1
X
1
]  E[hP;Xi
1 
] = E[P
1
X
1
]  :
(a) If there is no insider in the market,
E[P
1
X
1
] = E[h(S
1
; 1)W
1
] = 0:
Thus, the expected combined nal prot of the informed and liquidity traders
equal to  .
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(b) If there is an informed trader with full information, we know from Theorem
5.2 that it is optimal for the insider to drive the cumulative demand (X
t
) to
the nal point S
1
, i.e., an optimal inconspicuous insider strategies is of the
form
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
1
 X
u
1  u
du: (5.13)
This implies that the expected nal prot of the insider is equal to , hence
the expectation of the informed and uninformed traders' combined nal gain
equals 0.
Example 5.2. Suppose that the nal price of the stock is a log-normally dis-
tributed random variable with positive constants m and , i.e, P
1
= exp(m+ S
1
).
Due to Theorem 5.1 we conclude that the equilibrium pricing rule is given by
P
t
= E[P
1 
jF
X
t
] = E[exp(m+ X
1
)jF
X
t
] = exp

m +
1
2

2
(1  t) + X
t

;
which is a geometric Brownian motion relative to (F
X
t
), i.e., P
t
satises
dP
t
= P
t
dX
t
;
with initial value P
0
= exp(m+
2
=2). The expected combined loss of the uninformed
traders is given by
 E

(P
1
  P
1 
)W
1
+
Z
1 
0
W
u
dP
u

= E[hP;W i
1 
] = E[hP;Xi
1 
]
=  exp

m +
1
2

2

:
On the other hand, if the total prot in the market is equal to 0, the expected prot
of the market maker is
E[hP;Xi
1 
]  E[P
1
X
1
] =  exp

m +
1
2

2

  E[P
1
X
1
];
which depends on the cumulative orders in the whole market at time 1. The associ-
ated expected prot of the informed trader is E[P
1
X
1
]. Let us consider two extreme
cases:
(a) If there is no insider in the market,
E[P
1
X
1
] = E[h(S
1
; s)W
1
] = 0:
We conclude that the expected nal gain of the market maker is given by
 exp
 
m+
1
2

2

.
(b) If the informed trader has full information, the optimal inconspicuous insider
strategy is given by (5.13), which implies X
1
= S
1
. Hence, the maximal prot
of the insider is given by
E[P
1
X
1
] = E [S
1
exp (m + S
1
)] =  exp

m+
1
2

2

:
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In this case, the expected prot of the market maker is equal to 0.
As the last two examples, we see that the expected loss of the noise trader is
given by
 E

(P
1
  P
1 
)W
1
+
Z
1 
0
W
u
dP
u

= E[hP;Xi
1 
] = E[hh(X; ); Xi
1 
];
which does not depend on the insider strategy, i.e., even though there is no insider
in the market, the noise traders will lose a certain amounts of wealth. But when
the uninformed traders always lose their money, why should they trade? Milgrom-
Strokey [47] propose a \no trade equilibrium", where the uninformed traders trade
because of some particular exogenous reasons.
At the end of this section let us consider the model of insider trading with
increasing extra information which we have introduced in Section 4.3. Suppose the
insider information consists in observing a continuous centered square-integrable
Gaussian martingale (S
t
) with var(S
1
) = 1.
1
10
1
10
V (t)
V (t)
Figure 5.1
Case 1: The variance function of the insider extra information V (t) satises the
integrability conditions
1
V (u)  u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
loc
([0; 1));
see Figure 5.1. Due to the second assertion of Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 5.2, we
conclude that the strategy
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
V (u)  u
du
is the unique optimal inconspicuous strategy for the insider in the class I
1
. Thus,
in this case, there exists a weak equilibrium.
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1
10
(c
?
)
2
V (t)
Figure 5.2
Case 2: Suppose the variance function of S satises
1
V (u)  c
2
u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
([0; 1)); (5.14)
for some positive constant c < 1, but it does not hold for c = 1 (See Figure 5.2. The
case c = 1 is concluded in case 1). Dene
~
I
1
as the class of all I 2 I
1
such that the
process X = W + I solves the linear stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
= dW
t
+
cS
t
  c
2
X
t
V (t)  c
2
t
dt; (5.15)
for some c satisfying (5.14). It follows from the rst assertion in Theorem 2.4 that
for all I 2
~
I
1
, W + I is a Brownian motion with respect to its own ltration.
Furthermore, given a process I 2
~
I
1
, we see that the solution of (5.15) is given by
X
t
=
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
c
2
V (v)  c
2
v
dv

dW
u
+
Z
t
0
exp

 
Z
t
u
c
2
V (v)  c
2
v
dv

cS
u
V (u)  c
2
u
du:
In fact, we only have to consider the case where P
1
= S
1
to get an optimal inconspic-
uous strategy in the general case; see Lemma 5.2. Hence, when the insider follows
the strategy I, the resulting expected nal prot amounts to
E[
1
(I)] = E[P
1
I
1
] = E[S
1
X
1
] =
Z
1
0
exp

 
Z
1
u
c
2
V (v)  c
2
v
dv

cV (u)
V (u)  c
2
u
du
= c:
Dene
c
?
:= sup

c > 0 :
1
V (u)  c
2
u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
(0; t) for all t < 1

;
whose square is the largest slope of the linear function under the curve V (t) and
passing through the origin. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.5,
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we conclude that (5.14) does not hold for c
?
. This implies
c
?
= sup
I2
~
I
1
E[
1
(I)];
but a maximum on the right-hand side is not attained. Thus, there is no equilibrium
in
~
I
1
in this case.
Case 3: Suppose S does not satisfy the above two cases, i.e.,
lim
t!0

V (t)
t

<1:
Figure 5.3 shows two typical examples. In the special case where S is a Wiener
process
~
W , we see from Subsection 4.3.2 that there exists no insider strategy I
?
such that
E[
1
(I
?
)] = max
I2I
0
E[
1
(I)]:
This implies that there exists no equilibrium in this case. In the case where the
variance of the insider information V (t) is t
p
for some p  1, (5.14) does not hold
for all c > 0. It follows from Theorem 2.4 that there exists no inconspicuous insider
strategy of the form
dX
t
= dW
t
+ (f(t)S
t
+ g(t)X
t
) dt;
with initial value X
0
= 0, where f and g are nonzero continuous functions satisfy
R
t
0
f
2
(u)u
p
du < 1, for all t < 1 and g 2 A(0; 1). However, it does not imply that
the insider should not trade at all. He could start to trade a little later. In Section
5.3 we will discuss this further.
1
10
1
10
V (t)
V (t)
Figure 5.3
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5.2. Noisy information
In this section we consider the case where the insider information is obtained by
observing the process
S
t
=
8
>
<
>
:
S
1
+ cN; 0  t < 1;
S
1
; t = 1;
where S
1
and N are independent with standard normal distribution N(0; 1), and
where c is a nonnegative constant. In contrast to the previous chapter, the Gaussian
process (S
t
) is now constant during the interval [0; 1) and then jumps to the nal
value S
1
. Thus, at time t < 1 the insider observes the nal signal corrupted by some
noise. We call c the size of the noise. In Karatzas-Pikovsky [39] the authors discuss
this kind of insider information, but in the context of a small investor model where
the insider is a price taker. In our model prices are aected in this context by the
insider strategy. We want to examine the existence of weak equilibrium. According
to Theorem 5.1 a rational pricing rule exists. Hence we have only to nd an optimal
inconspicuous strategy for the informed trader.
As before we denote by (X
t
)
0t1
the cumulative orders in the market. Suppose
that the insider follows a strategy given by a linear transformation of S
1
+ cN and
X. More precisely, we introduce the class I
c
of all strategies I = (I
t
)
0t1
2 I
0
such
that the process X =W + I solves the equation
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
0
(f(u)(S
1
+ cN) + g(u)X
u
)du; (5.16)
for some f 2 C
1
(0; 1) \ L
2
loc
([0; 1)) and g 2 C
1
(0; 1) \ A(0; 1). The requirement
I 2 I
0
means that X is again a Brownian motion. The following proposition gives
a characterization of these strategies. In other words, we characterize Brownian
motions in the class of processes X which are of the form (5.16).
Proposition 5.1. A process X satisfying (5.16) is a Brownian motion with
respect to its natural ltration if and only if f and g are of the following form
f(t) =
M
M
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
;
g(t) =
 1
M
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
;
(5.17)
where M
2
(1 + c
2
)  1. In other words, X is a solution of
dX
t
= dW
t
+
M(S
1
+ cN) X
t
M
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
dt; (5.18)
with initial value X
0
= 0.
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Proof. We use a similar technique as in Chapter 2. If a solution of X (5.16) is
a Wiener process, then due to the characterization in Theorem 2.2 the functions f
and g must satisfy the relation
f(s)f(t) = (sg(s)  1)g(t);
for almost all s  t. This implies f(t) =  Mg(t) for some constantM . Substituting
this result again into the above equation, we get (5.17). Conversely, the solution of
the process X satisfying (5.18) is of the form
X
t
= (M
2
(1 + c
2
)  t)
Z
t
0
dW
u
M
2
(1 + c
2
)  u
+
t
M(1 + c
2
)
(S
1
+ cN): (5.19)
Hence for s  t, we have
E[X
s
X
t
] = (M
2
(1 + c
2
)  s)(M
2
(1 + c
2
)  t)
Z
s
0
du
(M
2
(1 + c
2
)  u)
2
+
st(1 + c
2
)
M
2
(1 + c
2
)
2
= s:
This means that X is a Brownian motion.
From this proposition we know that all processes in the class I
c
are of the form
I
t
=
Z
t
0
M(S
1
+ cN) X
u
M
2
(1 + c
2
)  u
du
=
t
M(1 + c
2
)
(S
1
+ cN)  (M
2
(1 + c
2
)  t)
Z
t
0
W
u
(M
2
(1 + c
2
)  u)
2
du:
Using this strategy, the expected nal wealth of the insider is given by
E[
1
(I)] = E[P
1
I
1
] = E[P
1
X
1
] =
E[h(S
1
; 1)S
1
]
M(1 + c
2
)
:
It follows from M
2
(1 + c
2
)  1 and E[h(S
1
; 1)S
1
]  0 that
E[
1
(I)] 
E[h(S
1
; 1)S
1
]
p
1 + c
2
;
for all I 2 I
c
. The maximum is attained at M = 1=
p
1 + c
2
, and the corresponding
strategy of the informed trader is given by
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
(1 + c
2
)
 
1
2
(S
1
+ cN) X
u
1  u
du: (5.20)
Example 5.3. Suppose the nal price of the stock P
1
is normally distributed,
i.e., h(S
1
; 1) = m + S
1
with constants  > 0 and m 2 R. Then the nal prot of
the insider is given by
E[
1
] =
E[P
1
S
1
]
p
1 + c
2
=

p
1 + c
2
:
The associated optimal inconspicuous strategy in I
c
is of the form (5.20), which
converges to (S
1
+ cN)=
p
1 + c
2
as t! 1. Hence, we see that
E[(X
?
1
  S
1
)
2
] = min
I2I
c
E[(X
1
  S
1
)
2
] 6= 0:
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This means that no process I in I
c
yieldsW
1
+I
1
= S
1
. Furthermore, due to Example
5.1 we know that the price process is of the form P
t
= m+X
t
. Hence, the expected
prot of the uninformed traders is  , as in Example 5.1. The expected combined
prot of the informed and uninformed traders amounts to  (1  1=
p
1 + c
2
).
For the case c = 0, we see that the extra information is S
1
, the nal signal. The
corresponding optimal strategy is given by
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
1
 X
u
1  u
du:
This coincides with the results in Kyle [42] and Back [7] (see also Section 4.2).
Example 5.4. Suppose that the nal price is of the form P
1
= exp(m + S
1
)
with  > 0 and m 2 R. Then, due to Lemma 5.2 and the above example, the
strategy I
?
dened in (5.20) is an optimal inconspicuous strategy in I
c
and the
optimal nal prot of the insider is given by
E[(I
?
)] =
1
p
1 + c
2
 exp

m +
1
2

2

:
The expected gain of the uninformed traders is   exp(m + 
2
=2).
Remark 5.2. Let us consider the equilibrium in the sense of Denition 4.2 for
this case. We have shown in Example 5.3 that no process in I
c
converges to S
1
 W
1
and that the optimal strategy I
?
in I
c
is given by (5.20). If the nal price P
1
is
equal to m + S
1
, then the rational price process in the sense of Back's Denition
4.2 should be of the form
P
B
t
= E[h(S
1
; 1)jF
X
t
] = E[m+ S
1
jF
X
t
] = m+

p
1 + c
2
X
t
;
i.e., the rational pricing rule is given by
h
B
(x; t) = m+
 t
p
1 + c
2
;
for t < 1. Hence, (h
B
; I
?
) is an equilibrium in the sense of Denition 4.2. Further-
more, we see that this equilibrium depends on the insider information and P
B
t
6= P
t
if c 6= 0. In this equilibrium the expected nal wealth of the insider is =
p
1 + c
2
, as
in Example 5.3. But the expected combined prot of the informed and uninformed
traders amounts to
E

(P
1
  P
1 
)X
1
 
Z
1 
0
X
u
dP
u

= E

(m + S
1
) 

m +

p
1 + c
2
X
1

X
1

= 

E[S
1
X
1
] 
1
p
1 + c
2

= 0;
which is not equal to the result in Example 5.3.
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5.3. Delayed information
So far we have discussed the case where the insider gets his extra information
at the initial time 0. In the present section we deal with the case where the insider
gets his information at time t
0
> 0. Can he invest in such a way that the cumulative
demand in the market is again a Brownian motion? If so, which strategy yields the
maximal expected prot?
As before we suppose that the extra information is given by a continuous centered
square-integrable Gaussian martingale (S
t
)
0t1
with var(S
1
) = 1. The informed
trader starts to observe this process only at time t
0
. In order not to be discovered,
the informed trader has to invest in such a way that the cumulative demand in the
market X is again a Brownian motion.
Consider the stochastic dierential equation
dX
t
=
8
>
<
>
:
dW
t
; t  t
0
;
dW
t
+ (f(t)S
t
+ g(t)W
t
0
+ h(t)X
t
) dt; t
0
< t  1;
(5.21)
with X
0
= 0, X
t
0
= W
t
0
and continuously dierentiable functions f , g, h satisfying
R
t
t
0
f
2
(u)V (u)du <1, for all t 2 (t
0
; 1), g 2 L
1
loc
([t
0
; 1)) , h 2 A(t
0
; 1).
In the following proposition we characterize those cases where the process given
by (5.21) is again a Wiener process.
Proposition 5.2. A process X satisfying (5.21) is a Brownian motion if and
only if the functions f , g and h are of the form:
f(t) =
c
c
2
V (t) + t
0
  t
;
g(t) =
1
c
2
V (t) + t
0
  t
; (5.22)
h(t) =
 1
c
2
V (t) + t
0
  t
;
where c is a nonzero constant satisfying
1
c
2
V (u) + t
0
  u
2 A(t
0
; 1) \ L
1
loc
([t
0
; 1)): (5.23)
Thus, the process X satisfying
dX
t
=
8
>
<
>
>
:
dW
t
; for t < t
0
;
dW
t
+
cS
t
+W
t
0
 X
t
c
2
V (t) + t
0
  t
dt; for t  t
0
;
(5.24)
is a Brownian motion with respect to its own ltration.
Proof. 1) If the process X is a Brownian motion, the covariance function sat-
ises E[X
s
X
t
] = s for all 0  s  t  1. For t
0
 s  t, applying Theorem 2.1 and
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Theorem 2.2, we see that f , g and h must satisfy
h(t)(sh(s)  1) = V (s)f(s)f(t) + t
0
g(s)g(t): (5.25)
For s  t
0
 t, we have due to (5.21)
X
t
=W
t
+
Z
t
t
0
(f(u)S
u
+ g(u)W
t
0
+ h(u)X
u
) du:
Multiplying both sides by X
s
and taking expectation, we see that
s = E[X
s
X
t
] = E[X
s
W
t
] +
Z
t
t
0
(g(u)E[X
s
W
t
0
] + h(u)E[X
s
X
u
]) du
= s+ s
Z
t
t
0
(g(u) + h(u))du:
This yields g(t) + h(t) = 0. Substituting this result in (5.25), we see that the
associated solution is given by (5.22).
2) The solution of (5.24) is given by
X
t
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
W
t
; for t  t
0
;
W
t
0
+
1
G(t)
Z
t
t
0
G(u)dW
u
+
c
G(t)
Z
t
t
0
G(u)S
u
c
2
V (u) + t
0
  u
du; for t > t
0
;
(5.26)
with a deterministic function
G(t) := exp

Z
t
t
0
1
c
2
V (u) + t
0
  u
du

:
This implies E[X
s
X
t
] = s after some calculation.
Proposition 5.2 shows that possible inconspicuous insider strategies are of the
form
I
t
:=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < t
0
Z
t
t
0
cS
u
+W
t
0
 X
u
c
2
V (u) + t
0
  u
du; for t  t
0
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < t
0
Z
t
t
0

G(u)
G(t)
  1

dW
u
+
c
G(t)
Z
t
t
0
G(u)S
u
c
2
V (u) + t
0
  u
du; for t  t
0
;
(5.27)
for some c satisfying (5.23). We denote the set of such strategies by I(t
0
). In
particular, we have I(0) =
~
I
1
. Note that I(s) \ I(t) = f0g, if s 6= t.
Let us consider the condition (5.23). Using a similar argument as in Section 2.3
we see that a necessary condition for the constant c to satisfy (5.23) is given by
c
2
 sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
V (t)

; (5.28)
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i.e.,
1
c
2
 inf
t
0
t1

V (t)
t  t
0

:
This means, 1=c
2
is the positive slope of an aÆne linear function under V (t) which
passes t = t
0
and does not intersect V (t) on [t
0
; 1). Hence, we have to calculate the
lower bound of c by (5.28) and check whether all constants c larger than this lower
bound satisfy condition (5.23).
Sometimes, the insider is forced to delay his investment if he wants to remain
inconspicuous. For example, if the insider information yields lim
t!0
(V (t)=t) < 1,
he cannot apply linear strategies of the form
I
t
=
Z
t
0
(f(u)S
u
+ g(u)X
u
)du;
where f and g are continuous and satisfy some integrability conditions; see Theorem
2.4 above. But when he starts his trading later, he can use linear inconspicuous
strategies of the form (5.27). However, we have to nd the optimal time where the
insider starts his trading. We need three steps to compute this optimal starting
time.
a) For xed t
1
> t
0
, let
k = sup
t
1
t1

t  t
1
V (t)

1
2
:
Furthermore, we have to check whether k satises (5.23).
b) If the insider starts his trading at time t
1
, the supremum of his expected prot
is given by
sup
I2I(t
1
)
E[
1
(I)] =
1  t
1
k
:
If k satises (5.23), there exists an optimal inconspicuous insider strategy in I(t
1
).
c) Let
t
?
:= arg max
tt
0
sup
I2I(t)
E[
1
(I)]:
Then t
?
is the optimal time for the insider to start his trading.
In the next example, we will calculate this time explicitly.
Example 5.5. Consider Example 4.1 with  =  = 1, i.e., the nal price of the
stock is P
1
= S
1
. The price process P
t
is equal to X
t
, and the expected prot of the
insider is given by
E[
1
(I)] = E[S
1
X
1
] =
c
G(1)
Z
1
t
0
G(v)V (v)
c
2
V (v) + t
0
  v
dv =
1  t
0
c
;
where we use (5.26) and integration by parts. In order to obtain the maximal
expected prot of the insider in the class I(t
0
), we have to nd a minimal positive
constant c satisfying (5.28). Consider the following special cases:
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(1) Full information: Due to (5.28), we see that
c
2
 sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
V (t)

= 1  t
0
:
Furthermore, we see that for (c
?
)
2
= 1  t
0
,
1
(c
?
)
2
V (u) + t
0
  u
=
1
1  u
2 A(t
0
; 1) \ L
1
loc
([t
0
; 1)):
This implies that c
?
is valid for (5.23). Thus, the maximal value of E[
1
(I)] is
p
1  t
0
with c
?
=
p
1  t
0
. Therefore, the optimal strategy of the insider in this
class of strategies I(t
0
) is of the form:
I
?
t
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < t
0
;
Z
t
t
0
p
1  t
0
S
1
+W
t
0
 X
u
1  u
du; for t  t
0
:
(5.29)
The expected prot of the noise traders is  1. If t
0
= 0, the result coincides with
the one in Section 4.2.
(2) Sequential information (
~
W
t
)
t
0
t1
(t
0
> 0): Since var(
~
W
t
) = t, we have
c
2
 sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
var(
~
W
t
)

= sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
t

= 1  t
0
:
We see that for (c
?
)
2
= 1  t
0
,
1
(c
?
)
2
V (u) + t
0
  u
=
1
t
0
(1  u)
2 A(t
0
; 1) \ L
1
loc
([t
0
; 1));
provided t
0
6= 0. Therefore, if t
0
6= 0, the optimal strategy in I(t
0
) is of the form
I
?
t
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
0; for t < t
0
;
Z
t
t
0
p
1  t
0
~
W
u
+W
t
0
 X
u
t
0
(1  u)
du; for t  t
0
;
and the corresponding maximal prot is
p
1  t
0
. In fact, for t
0
! 0, we get the
expected nal prot of the insider converges to 1. Hence, there exists a sequence
of insider strategies whose expected prot converges to the supremum of E[(I)].
Nevertheless, if t
0
= 0, there exists no inconspicuous insider strategy in
S
0t1
I(t).
This coincides with the results in Section 4.3.2, i.e., there exists no optimal incon-
spicuous strategy for the insider, but he can come arbitrarily close to the maximal
value.
(3) Sequential information with V (t) = ((t  t
0
)=(1  t
0
))
p
for 0 < p < 1: Since
sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
V (t)

= sup
t
0
t1
(t  t
0
)
1 p
(1  t
0
)
p
= 1  t
0
;
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(5.23) holds for c
2
= 1  t
0
. The maximal insider prot in I(t
0
) is
p
1  t
0
and the
corresponding strategy is given by
I
?
t
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < t
0
;
Z
t
t
0
cS
u
+W
t
0
 X
u
(u  t
0
)[(u  t
0
)
p 1
(1  t
0
)
p 1
  1]
du; for t  t
0
:
The case p = 0 is just like the case (1) above, i.e., V (1) = 1 = E[S
2
1
].
(4) Partial information with V (t) = ((t  t
0
)=(1  t
0
))
p
for p > 1: Since
sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
V (t)

=
(1  t
0
)
p
(t  t
0
)
p 1
=1;
we have c = 1. This means that if the insider does not want to be discovered, he
cannot use strategies in the class
~
I
1
except I  0. Nevertheless, it does not mean
that the insider should not invest. If he submits orders after time t
1
> t
0
, he could
still get a positive prot without being discovered.
In the following we want to calculate the optimal time for the insider to begin
his investment. Let
k
2
= sup
t
1
t1

t  t
1
V (t)

= sup
t
1
t1
(t  t
1
)(1  t
0
)
p
(t  t
0
)
p
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:

p  1
t
1
  t
0

p 1

1  t
0
p

p
; if t
1
2 (t
0
; 1 
1  t
0
p
);
1  t
1
; if t
1
2 [1 
1  t
0
p
; 1]:
We can check that if t
1
2 (t
0
; 1  (1  t
0
)=p), the constant k does not satisfy (5.23).
On the other hand, if t
1
2 [1   (1  t
0
)=p; 1], (5.23) holds for k. Therefore, if the
insider starts to trade at time t
1
, the supremum of his expected gain for strategies
in I(t
1
) is given by
sup
I2I(t
1
)
E[
1
(I)] =
1  t
1
k
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
s
p
p
(1  t
1
)(t
1
  t
0
)
(p 1)
(p  1)
(p 1)
(1  t
0
)
p
; if t
1
2 (t
0
; 1 
1  t
0
p
);
p
1  t
1
; if t
1
2 [1 
1  t
0
p
; 1]:
Since for t
1
2 [1  (1  t
0
)=p; 1], k satises (5.23). This implies that
p
1  t
1
is not
only supremum, but also maximum of the expected nal prot. In order to calculate
t
?
= arg max
tt
0
sup
I2I(t)
E[
1
(I)]
and the corresponding expected prot, we have to consider two dierent cases.
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i) If 1 < p  2, the optimal time for the insider to start trading is t
?
= 1 (1  t
0
)=p.
He can use the strategy
I
?
t
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < t
?
;
Z
t
t
?
p
p(1  t
0
) S
u
+W
t
?
 X
u
(u  t
0
)
p
(1  t
0
)
1 p
+ p(1  u)  (1  t
0
)
du; for t  t
?
:
to attain his maximal prot
p
(1  t
0
)=p.
ii) If p > 2, we get that
arg max
tt
0
sup
I2I(t)
E[
1
(I)] =
1 + t
0
2
;
i.e., the optimal time for the insider to start his trading is (1 + t
0
)=2. But the insider
can only come arbitrarily close to the supremum of his expected prot
r
p
p
2
(p+1)
(p  1)
(p 1)
(1  t
0
):
In particular, we may consider the case where t
0
= 0, i.e., the insider information
consists in observing a continuous centered Gaussian martingale S with E[S
2
t
] = t
p
starting at time 0. Since inf
0t1
(V (t)=t) = 0, we conclude from the above discussion
that the insider should not trade immediately. Explicitly, we get the following
results.
1 < p < 2 p  2
optimal time to start trading 1  1=p 1=2
maximal expected nal prot
p
1=p
r
p
p
2
(p+1)
(p  1)
(p 1)
(maximum) (supremum)
Existence of equilibrium yes no
For the case 1 < p < 2, the optimal insider strategy in
S
0t1
I(t) is given by
I
?
t
=
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < 1 
1
p
;
Z
t
1 1=p
p
p S
u
+W
1 1=p
 X
u
u
p
+ p(1  u)  1
du; for t  1 
1
p
:
(5) Partial information with V (t) =
1
4
(2t
2
+ t+ 1).
i) t
0
> 0:2: The function (t   t
0
)=V (t) is increasing on the interval (t
0
; 1). This
implies
c
2
 sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
V (t)

=
1  t
0
V (1)
= 1  t
0
:
5.3. DELAYED INFORMATION 101
For c =
p
1  t
0
, the condition (5.23) holds. Therefore, the optimal strategy in I(t
0
)
is of the form
I
?
t
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < t
0
Z
t
t
0
4(
p
1  t
0
S
u
+W
t
0
 X
u
)
(1  u)(1 + 3t
0
  2u(1  t
0
))
du; for t  t
0
:
The maximal prot of the insider is given by
p
1  t
0
.
ii) t
0
 0:2: The function (t   t
0
)=V (t) attains its maximum on [t
0
; 1] at
~
t =
t
0
+
q
t
2
0
+
1
2
t
0
+
1
2
. Thus,
c
2
 sup
t
0
t1

t  t
0
V (t)

=
~
t  t
0
V (
~
t)
=
16
7
 
r
t
2
0
+
t
0
2
+
1
2
  t
0
 
1
4
!
=: ~c
2
:
Hence, the optimal insider strategy in I(t
0
) is of the form
I
?
t
=
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0; for t < t
0
;
Z
t
t
0
4(j~cjS
u
+W
t
0
 X
u
)
~c
2
(2u
2
+ u+ 1) + 4t
0
  4u
du; for t  t
0
:
The corresponding prot is given by (1   t
0
)
r
q
t
2
0
+
t
0
2
+
1
2
+ t
0
+
1
4
and it is easy
to check that this value is strictly smaller than
p
1  t
0
.
From the discussion of case (4), we see that the insider may not be able to use
linear strategies from the beginning of the trading, since otherwise he would be
discovered. However, we can also provide an example where the insider can get
some positive prot, provided that he invests from time 0 on. But if he delays his
orders and starts at some positive time, he could get more gain. For instance, let
V (t) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
7
6
t 
1
6
; if
1
4
 t < 1;
1
4
t +
1
16
; if t <
1
4
:
We see that sup
0t1
(V (t)=t) is equal to 1=2. The supremum of the insider's prot
in
~
I
1
is
p
2=2  0:707107. But this supremum will not be attained. Consequently,
there is no weak equilibrium in
~
I
1
. However, if the insider starts to trade a little
later, he could get more prot. Since
arg max
0t1
1  t
sup
ts1

s  t
V (s)

1=2
=
1
7
;
and since the associated expected prot amounts to (6=7)
3=2
 0:79356, we see
that in this case the insider obtains more prot if he begins to trade rst at time
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1=7 instead of trading from the beginning (see Figure 5.4). Moreover, this value is
maximal. It means there exists a weak equilibrium in
S
0t1
I(t).
1
1/16
1/4 10
1/8
1/2
1/7
V (t)
Figure 5.4
Example 5.6. Suppose that the nal price of the stock P
1
is of the form
P
1
= exp(m + S
1
);
with constants m 2 R and  > 0. Thanks to (5.7) we see that the nal prot of the
insider with the strategy (5.27) is given by
E[
1
(I)] = E[exp(m+ S
1
)X
1
] =
(1  t
0
)
c
exp

m+

2
2

:
We have to nd a minimal positive constant c satisfying (5.28). The rest of the
discussion is just as in the above example.
Remark 5.3. Now let us look at the equilibrium in the sense of Denition 4.2
in the model of delayed information. Consider the case (1) in Example 5.5, i.e., the
case where the insider knows the nal signal S
1
from the time t
0
on. We know that
the optimal inconspicuous strategy is of the form (5.29). Using this optimal strategy,
the cumulative order process (X
t
) converges to
p
1  t
0
S
1
+W
t
0
as t ! 1. If (P
B
t
)
is a rational price process in the sense of Back's Denition 4.2, it must satisfy the
martingale property for t 2 [0; 1]. Thus,
P
B
t
= E[S
1
jF
X
t
] = E

1
p
1  t
0
(X
t
 W
t
0
)




F
X
t

=
1
p
1  t
0
X
t
 
1
p
1  t
0
E[W
t
0
jF
X
t
] =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
0; t  t
0
;
1
p
1  t
0
(X
t
 X
t
0
); t > t
0
:
For t  t
0
, P
B
t
is not of the form h(X
t
; t). Hence, we conclude that there is no
equilibrium in the sense of Denition 4.2 if we consider only insider strategies in
I(t
0
),.
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5.4. A model with two insiders
Up to now we have discussed the situation where there is one insider in the
market. In the present section we want to consider the case of two insiders with
dierent degrees of information. Such model has been discussed in, for example,
Back-Cao-Willard [10].
Suppose the nal stock price is given by P
1
= h(N
1
; N
2
), where h is a smooth
function on R
2
and N
1
, N
2
are two independent N(0; 1)-distributed random vari-
ables. We classify the agents in the market into four groups: market maker, noise
traders, partially informed trader and fully informed trader. The roles of the market
maker and the noise traders are as before. The cumulative order of the noise trader
is a Brownian motion W which is independent of N
1
and N
2
. Both insiders can
observe the cumulative orders in the market. The partially informed trader knows
N
1
at time 0; he is not aware of the existence of the other signal N
2
and the other
insider, and he assumes that the nal price will be a function of N
1
. The discussion
in Section 4.2 suggests that his strategy will be given by
I
(1)
t
=
Z
t
0
N
1
 X
u
1  u
du; (5.30)
where X is the cumulative demand in the market. The fully informed traders is
aware of the presence of the partially informed trader, and he observes the signals
N
1
and N
2
. We want to consider the optimal strategy of the fully informed trader
under this condition.
For the fully informed trader, not to be discovered by the market maker is his
main purpose. Hence, we dene the class I
(2)
of all strategies (I
(2)
t
) of the fully
informed trader of the form
I
(2)
t
=
Z
t
0
(f(u)N
1
+ g(u)N
2
+ k(u)X
u
)du; (5.31)
where f; g 2 C
1
(0; 1)\L
2
[0; 1), h 2 C
1
(0; 1)\A(0; 1), and the process W +I
(1)
+I
(2)
is again a Wiener process. In the next proposition we want to characterize Brownian
motions of the form
dX
t
= dW
t
+ dI
(1)
t
+ dI
(2)
t
= dW
t
+

f(t) +
1
1  t

N
1
+ g(t)N
2
+

k(t) 
1
1  t

X
t

dt
= dW
t
+ (F (t)N
1
+G(t)N
2
+K(t)X
t
) dt: (5.32)
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Proposition 5.3. The process X satisfying (5.32) is a Brownian motion if and
only if the functions F , G, K are of the forms
F (t) =
k
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
;
G(t) =
ck
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
; (5.33)
K(t) =
 1
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
;
where k
2
(1 + c
2
)  1.
Proof. 1) Assume that X is a Brownian motion and the process (
t
)
0t1
is
dened by

t
= X
t
 
Z
t
0
K(u)X
u
du (5.34)
= W
t
+

Z
t
0
F (u)du

N
1
+

Z
t
0
G(u)du

N
2
: (5.35)
The covariance of  in (5.34) is given by
E[
s

t
] = s  2
Z
s
0
uK(u)du  s
Z
t
s
K(u)du+ 2
Z
s
0
Z
u
0
K(u)K(v)vdvdu
+

Z
s
0
uK(u)du

Z
t
s
K(u)du

:
The covariance of  in (5.35) is given by
E[
s

t
] = s+

Z
s
0
F (u)du

Z
t
0
F (u)du

+

Z
s
0
G(u)du

Z
t
0
G(u)du

:
These two values should be identical. Dierentiating with respect to s and t, we
know that if the process X is a Brownian motion, F , G and K must satisfy the
equation
K(t)(sK(s)  1) = F (s)F (t) +G(s)G(t);
for s  t. Solving this equation we get (5.33).
2) The solution of (5.32) with (5.33) is given by
X
t
= (k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t)
Z
t
0
dW
u
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  u
+
t
k(1 + c
2
)
(N
1
+ cN
2
): (5.36)
Hence,
E[X
s
X
t
] = (k
2
(1 + c
2
)  s)(k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t)
Z
s
0
du
(k
2
(1 + c
2
)  u)
2
+
st
k
2
(1 + c
2
)
=
(k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t)s
k
2
(1 + c
2
)
+
st
k
2
(1 + c
2
)
= s:
This means that X is a Brownian motion.
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From this proposition we see that a strategy I
(2)
of the form (5.31) in I
(2)
if and
only if
f(t) =
k
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
 
1
1  t
;
g(t) =
ck
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
;
k(t) =
 1
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  t
+
1
1  t
;
where k
2
(1 + c
2
)  1. Applying (5.36) we rewrite I
(2)
as
I
(2)
t
= B(W; t) +
Z
t
0

f(u) + k(u)
u
k(1 + c
2
)

du N
1
+
Z
t
0

g(u) + k(u)
cu
k(1 + c
2
)

du N
2
= B(W; t) +

1 
1
k(1 + c
2
)

N
1
 
cN
2
k(1 + c
2
)

log(1  t); (5.37)
where
B(W; t) :=
Z
t
0

k
2
(1 + c
2
)  u
1  u
  1

Z
u
0
dW
v
k
2
(1 + c
2
)  v
du
Let us look at an example.
Example 5.7. Suppose that the nal price of the stock is given by P
1
= S
1
=
AN
1
+
p
1  A
2
N
2
with 0  A  1. This implies P
1
 N(0; 1). From Example 5.1
we know that the pricing rule of the stock is h(x; t) = x, i.e., (P
t
)
0t<1
= (X
t
)
0t<1
and this implies
hP;W i
1 
= hP;Xi
1 
= 1:
Hence, the expected nal prot of the noise traders is given by
E

(P
1
  P
1 
)W
1
+
Z
1 
0
W
u
dP
u

= E

W
1
P
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
dW
u
  hP;W i
1 

= E
h
W
1
(AN
1
+
p
1  A
2
N
2
)  1
i
=  1;
which is independent of the strategies of both insiders. Now let us compute the
expected prot of the insiders. Due to Ito^'s product rule, we get that the expected
prot of the partially informed trader is given by
E

(P
1
  P
1 
)I
(1)
1
+
Z
1 
0
I
(1)
u
dP
u

= E

P
1
I
(1)
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
dI
(1)
u

and that the expected prot of the fully informed trader is of the form
E

(P
1
  P
1 
)I
(2)
1
+
Z
1 
0
I
(2)
u
dP
u

= E

P
1
I
(2)
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
dI
(2)
u

:
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Furthermore, if the fully informed trader applies a strategy of the form (5.37), the
cumulative order X is a Brownian motion satisfying (5.36). This implies that
E

P
1
I
(1)
t
 
Z
t
0
P
u
dI
(1)
u

= E

S
1
I
(1)
t
 
Z
t
0
X
u
dI
(1)
u

=
Z
t
0
E[S
1
N
1
]  E[S
1
X
u
]
1  u
du 
Z
t
0
E[N
1
X
1
]  E[X
2
u
]
1  u
du
=
Z
t
0
1
1  u

A 
u
k(1 + c
2
)
(A+ c
p
1  A
2
) 
u
k(1 + c
2
)
+ u

du
=

1
k(1 + c
2
)
  1

(A+ 1) +
c
p
1  A
2
k(1 + c
2
)

log(1  t)
+

A+ c
p
1  A
2
k(1 + c
2
)
+

1
k(1 + c
2
)
  1

t:
As t ! 1, this value converges to the expected prot of the partially informed
trader, and this is dependent on the parameters c and k of the strategies of the fully
informed trader. In addition, using a similar method we get that the expected prot
of the fully informed trader amounts to
E

P
1
I
(2)
1
 
Z
1
0
P
u
dI
(2)
u

= lim
t!1
E

P
1
I
(2)
t
 
Z
t
0
P
u
dI
(2)
u

= lim
t!1
E

S
1
I
(2)
t
 
Z
t
0
X
u
dI
(2)
u

= lim
t!1

1 
1
k(1 + c
2
)

(A+ 1) 
c
p
1  A
2
k(1 + c
2
)

log(1  t) 

1 
1
k(1 + c
2
)

t:
If the fully informed trader uses a strategy of the form (5.37) with
0 < c <
r
1  A
1 + A
and
1
p
1 + c
2
< k <
1
1 + c
2
 
1 + c
r
1  A
1 + A
!
;
then his expected nal prot is equal to1, but at the same time that of the partially
informed trader equals  1.
So far we have assumed that the partially informed trader is not aware of the
existence of the fully informed trader. But, since the partially informed trader can
observe the cumulative demand in the market, he also knows the process W + I
(2)
.
Hence, if the fully informed trader does not want to be discovered by the partially
informed, he has to drive the process W + I
(2)
to be again a Brownian motion.
However, we can prove that a process I
(2)
given by (5.31) turns both W + I
(1)
+ I
(2)
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and W + I
(2)
into Brownian motions if and only if f , g and k are of the form
f(t) =
k
k   t
 
1
1  t
;
g(t) =
p
k(k   1)
k   t
;
k(t) =  
1
k   t
+
1
1  t
;
with some constant k > 1. This implies that the expected prot of the fully informed
trader amounts to
lim
t!1
r
(k   1)(1  A
2
)
k
log

1
1  t

=1;
provided k > 1 and A < 1. Hence, if the fully informed trader applies the strategy
I
(2)
t
=
Z
t
0
 

k
k   u
 
1
1  u

N
1
+
p
k(k   1)
k   u
N
2
+

1
1  u
 
1
k   u

X
u
!
du
=

k log

k
k   t

+ log(1  t)

N
1
+
p
k(k   1) log

k
k   t

N
2
+
Z
t
0

1
1  u
 
1
k   u

X
u
du; (5.38)
with k > 1, then the fully informed trader can get an innite prot and the expected
loss of the partially informed trader is also innite. Moreover, we see that, if the fully
informed trader follows the strategy (5.38), then the combined cumulative demand
of the noise and fully informed traders is a Brownian motion independent of the
random variable N
1
. This means that the partially informed trader cannot discover
the fully informed trader if the latter follows the strategy (5.38).
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CHAPTER 6
Insider trading and information costs
In the last two chapters, we have studied pricing rules and insider strategies in
some models where the insider's extra information is simply given. In the paper of
Grossman-Stiglitz [30], the authors consider a model where the insider has to pay
certain costs to obtain this extra information. In this chapter, our main purpose is
to introduce information costs in our model and to analyze the optimal strategy of
the insider in such a setting.
As in Chapter 4 and 5, we assume that all market participants are risk neutral.
The uninformed traders have no extra information and their cumulative order pro-
cess W is a Brownian motion. There is a market maker who determines the price
of the stock according to the cumulative demand in the market. Furthermore, there
is an investor who may obtain some additional information. But in contrast to the
models we have discussed so far, we now consider the case where this agent has to
pay some costs to get this information.
6.1. Noisy information
Suppose the full information is S
1
, a standard normal random variable. The
insider can buy at time t = 0 the noisy information S
1
+ cN at costs (c)  0,
where N is an N(0; 1) distributed random variable independent of S
1
and c  0 is
the size of the noise. If c = 0, the insider buys the exact information about the
nal stock price. If the size of the noise increases, the costs will decrease. Hence,
we assume that the cost function (c) is non-increasing in c.
For a given value of c, it has been shown in Section 5.2 that the inconspicuous
insider strategy
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
(1 + c
2
)
 
1
2
(S
1
+ cN) X
u
1  u
du; (6.1)
yields the maximal expected prot
E[
1
(I
?
)] =
E[h(S
1
; 1)X
1
]
p
1 + c
2
:
Hence, after paying the information costs the expected nal net prot of the insider
amounts to
E[
1
(I
?
)  (c)] =
E[h(S
1
; 1)X
1
]
p
1 + c
2
  (c):
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Based on this quantity as a function of c, the insider will decide how much informa-
tion to buy.
Let us look at an example.
Example 6.1. Suppose the terminal stock price is given by S
1
. Then the nal
prot of the insider is given by
E[
1
] =
1
p
1 + c
2
  (c);
and the associated optimal strategy I
?
given by (6.1). Should the investor become
an insider? If yes, what kind of information should he buy? Let us now look at
some dierent cost functions (c) and the corresponding optimal constants c
?
.
(i)   0. In other words, the insider candidate does not need to pay any costs to
be an insider. The optimal expected nal wealth is given by 1=
p
1 + c
2
. Obviously,
it is always protable for the investor to get this information regardless of the size
of the noise. Figure 6.1 shows the expected prot of insider with noisy information
S
1
+ cN . We see that this value is maximal if he gets the exact information (c = 0)
at time t = 0. The corresponding optimal strategy is given by
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
~
W
1
 X
u
1  u
du:
This strategy coincides with the results in the papers of Kyle [42] and Back [7]; see
section 4.2.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
Figure 6.1. the case (i): (c)  0
(ii) (c) = 1=(1 + c
2
). The insider has to pay 1=(1 + c
2
) to obtain the information
S
1
+cN . Figure 6.2 shows that it is not optimal for the insider to buy the information
without noise, since the full information is too expensive. In fact, we see that if the
insider buys the exact information, his prot is exactly equal to 0. However, it is
always protable for the insider candidate to buy the information if c > 0. The
optimal c
?
is
p
3 and the corresponding prot is 1/4. This implies that the optimal
information for the insider is of the form S
1
+
p
3N and the corresponding optimal
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strategy for the insider is given by
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
1
+
p
3N   2X
u
2(1  u)
du:
2 4 6 8
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Figure 6.2. the case (ii): (c) =
1
1 + c
2
(iii) (c) = 1=(4c). Figure 6.3 shows that if the investor buys the exact information,
his prot will be  1. If the size of the noise c is larger than 1=
p
15, the informed
trader earns a positive prot. Thus, if c < 1=
p
15, it is not protable for the
insider candidate to buy the information. The optimal value of c is given by c
?
=
0:811149    , and the corresponding maximal gain is 0:468422    .
2 4 6 8 10
-0.4
-0.2
0.2
0.4
Figure 6.3. the case (iii): (c) =
1
4c
This example shows that the decision of the investor to become an insider or not
depends on the costs of the information. It may be protable to buy some noisy
information, and it may be better not to buy any information.
6.2. Increasing information
Suppose the investor can choose one of several dierent processes (S
t
) of in-
creasing extra information. Which process should he buy to maximize his expected
prot?
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Suppose that the insider can get increasing information by observing a continuous
centered square-integrable Gaussian martingale (S
t
)
0t1
with S
1
 N(0; 1). Denote
by V
S
(t) the variance function of S
t
. Let us consider the L
2
-distance between S
t
and
S
1
which is given by
E[(S
t
  S
1
)
2
] = 1  2E[S
1
S
t
] + E[S
2
t
] = 1  E[S
2
t
] = 1  V
S
(t):
The smaller this distance is, the more valuable this information is. Thus, we intro-
duce a cost function of the form
Z
1
0
(V
S
(u))du;
where  : [0; 1]  ! R is continuous and nondecreasing in t. For example, the insider
has to pay
Z
1
0
(V
S
(1))du = (1)
for obtaining the process S
t
 S
1
. If (S
t
) is a Wiener process, the information cost
is equal to
R
1
0
(u)du. Especially, if (t) = t for all t, then information cost of (S
t
)
is equal to the area under the curve V (t) (see the area A in Figure 6.4).
With these information costs we conclude that the expected nal net prot of
the informed trader is given by
E


1
(I) 
Z
1
0
(V
S
(u))du

= E

h(S
1
; 1)I
1
 
Z
1
0
(V
S
(u))du

:
Let us rst consider the following simple example.
Example 6.2. Suppose the nal price P
1
is given by a Gaussian random variable
S
1
 N(0; 1). Furthermore, suppose (u) is given by u with   0. Then the
expected nal prot of this information is given by
E[


1
] := E


1
(I) 
Z
1
0
(V
S
(u))du

= E[S
1
I
1
]  
Z
1
0
V
S
(u)du:
First we recall some results from Section 5.1 and use them to compute the expected
net prot of this information.
Case 1: If S satises the integrability conditions
1
V
S
(u)  u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
loc
([0; 1)); (6.2)
then using the strategy
I
?
t
=
Z
t
0
S
u
 X
u
V
S
(u)  u
du;
the expected gross prot is 1; see Example 4.1. Hence, the expected net prot of
the insider amounts to
E[


1
] = 1  
Z
1
0
V
S
(u)du:
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m  t
A
B
m
1
1
V
S
(t)
0
Figure 6.4
Since V
S
(t) satises (6.2), using the third assertion in Lemma 2.5 we conclude that
V
S
(t) > t for all t 2 (0; 1). This results in
E[


1
] < 1  
Z
1
0
udu = 1 

2
:
Case 2: If S is a Brownian motion
~
W , the information cost amounts to
Z
1
0
(V
S
(u))du =
Z
1
0
udu =

2
:
Due to the discussion in Subsection 4.3.2, we see that the insider can use this
information to realize an expected prot as close to 1  =2 as he wishes.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2, we see that if  > 1, the information as in the
above two cases is not valuable. If  < 1, it is protable to buy the information S
which forms a Brownian motion.
Case 3: Suppose (S
t
)
0t1
is a continuous Gaussian martingale satisfying
1
V
S
(u)  c
2
u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
loc
([0; 1)) (6.3)
for some positive constant c < 1. But S does not satisfy (6.2). Let
c
?
:= sup

c > 0 :
1
V (u)  c
2
u
2 A(0; 1) \ L
1
(0; t) for all t < 1

:
Thus, supremum of E[
1
(I)] amounts to c
?
. This implies that the expected gain
E[


1
] is bounded above by c
?
  
R
1
0
V
S
(u)du. Furthermore, from the discussion in
Section 2.3 we see that
c
2
 m := inf
0t1

V
S
(t)
t

 1
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for all c satisfying (6.3). This implies c
?

p
m. We can interprete m as the smallest
slope of the linear function passing the origin 0 which intersects the curve V
S
(u) on
the interval (0; 1]; see Figure 6.4. We see that the integral
R
1
0
V
S
(u)du is the area A
under the curve V
S
(u), and this is larger than the area B which is m=2. Hence,
E[


1
] < c
?
  
m
2

p
m 
 m
2

8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
1 

2
; if   1;
1
2

> 1 

2

; if  > 1:
If   1, the discussion is as in Cases 1 and 2. But if  > 1, it is advantageous for
the insider to buy a process S whose variance function is, for example, of the form
V
S
(t) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
Æ +
1

2
t; if 0  t  1  Æ;
1 

1 
1

2

1
Æ
  1

(1  t); if 1  Æ < t  1;
(6.4)
for some Æ > 0 small enough.
Case 4: Suppose the variance function of S satises
lim
t!0

V (t)
t

<1:
Then if the insider does not want to be discovered, he cannot use linear strategies
of the form
I
t
=
Z
t
0
(f(u)S
u
+ g(u)X
u
)du;
where f and g are continuous functions satisfying some integrability conditions; see
Theorem 2.4. However, he may start to trade at some later time t
0
, but he has
to pay the full information costs, since he obtains the information from time 0 on.
Suppose the insider uses a delayed strategy of the form (5.27) where the constant c
satises
1
c
2
 m := inf
t
0
t1

V (t)
t  t
0

;
see Section 5.3. Then the expected net prot of this information is given by
E[


1
] <
p
m(1  t
0
)  
Z
1
0
V
S
(u)du 
p
m(1  t
0
)  
m(1  t
0
)
2
= (1  t
0
)

p
m 
m
2


8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
(1  t
0
)

1 

2

; if   1;
1  t
0
2

<
1
2

; if  > 1:
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Figure 6.5
From the above discussion we conclude that it is protable for the insider to buy
information whose variance function is linear with slope 1=
2
^ 1 on the interval
[0; 1  Æ] for some small Æ > 0; for example, of the form (6.4).
6.3. Delayed information
In this section we look at the case where the insider can decide at which time
he buys his extra (full or partial) information (S
u
). When he buys the information
at time t > 0, he pays no information cost during the time interval [0; t]. Some
natural questions arise: At which point of time is it optimal for the investor to
buy the information? Can he achieve his maximal expected gain while remaining
inconspicuous?
Let (I
s
) be the process dened by
I
s
:=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
0; for s < t;
Z
s
t
cS
u
+W
t
 X
u
c
2
V (u) + t  u
du; for s  t;
(6.5)
with
1
c
2
V (u) + t  u
2 A(t; 1) \ L
1
loc
([t; 1)):
From the discussion in Section 5.3 we see that if the insider starts to trade at
time t 2 (0; 1) and follows the strategy I, he will not be discovered during the whole
trading interval. Due to the discussion in the last section we see that the information
cost from time t to 1 amounts to
R
1
t
(V
S
(u))du. Hence, the expected nal prot is
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given by
E


1
(I) 
Z
1
t
(V
S
(u))du

= E

h(S
1
; 1)X
1
 
Z
1
t
(V
S
(u))du

:
Let us look at a simple example.
Example 6.3. Suppose the nal price of the stock is given by P
1
= S
1
. Suppose
the insider decides to purchase the information (S
u
) rst at time t  0 and uses the
strategy given by (6.5). Then his prot is given by
G(t) = E


1
(I) 
Z
1
t
(V
S
(u))du

=
1  t
c
 
Z
1
t
(V
S
(u))du;
where  is the cost function. Let us consider the following cases:
(1) (u)  0, i.e., no information costs. Then the discussion is just the same as in
Example 5.5. The insider can reach his maximal prot if he gets the extra informa-
tion from the beginning, but in this case the cumulative demand in the market is not
necessarily a Brownian motion. This depends on the structure of the information
process (S
u
) the insider desires to buy. If (S
u
) is a standard Brownian motion, he
cannot use strategies of the form (6.5) if he does not want to be discovered. In the
case S
t
 S
1
he can achieve the maximum while remaining inconspicuous.
(2) (t) =   0. Since
Z
1
t
(V
S
(u))du =
Z
1
t
du = (1  t);
the expected prot of the insider is given by
G(t) =
p
1  t  (1  t):
If   1=2, it is protable for the insider to buy the information at time 0. But
whether he can reach his maximal prot without being discovered depends again on
the structure of (S
u
).
For the case  > 1=2, if the informed trader wants to reach his maximal prot,
he should not buy the information at the beginning of the trading. It is easy to check
that in this case the optimal point of time for the insider to buy the information is
1  1=(4
2
). In the following we look at the optimal time for the informed trader to
buy the information for dierent values of the constant .
(i)  = 0:8, i.e., the prot of the insider is given by
G(t) =
p
1  t  0:8(1  t):
Figure 6.6 shows that G(t) does not attain its maximum at t = 0, but at time
t = 39=64. Thus, in this case it is not optimal for the insider to buy the information
too early.
(ii)  = 1, i.e., the prot of the insider is given by
G(t) =
p
1  t  (1  t):
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Figure 6.6. the case  = 0:8
In this case the optimal time to buy the information is at t = 3=4. But whenever the
informed trader buys the information, he will get a non-negative prot; see Figure
6.7. Hence, it is always worth for the insider to buy the information.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Figure 6.7. the case  = 1
(iii)  = 1:2. From Figure 6.8, we see that the insider should not buy his information
too early, otherwise he will get a negative prot. More precisely, he should not buy
the information at time t < 11=36. After this time, he will get a positive prot. The
optimal time to buy the information is t = 119=144.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
0.2
Figure 6.8. the case  = 1:2
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(3) (u) = u with a constant . Then the information cost is given by
Z
1
t
(V
S
(u))du = 
Z
1
t
V
S
(u)du:
Hence, the prot of the insider is given by
G(t) =
p
1  t  
Z
1
t
V
S
(u)du:
(a) If S
u
= S
1
, i.e., V
S
(u) = 1 for all u, then the expected gain is of the form
G(t) =
p
1  t  (1  t):
The rest of the discussion is the same as in the case (2).
(b) If (S
u
) is a Brownian motion, then
G(t) =
p
1  t 
1
2
(1  t
2
):
(i)  = 1. If the investor wants to get the full information from time t, he has
to pay
1
2
(1   t
2
). From Figure 6.9, we see that it is optimal for him to buy the
information from the beginning of the trading. But as we have shown, there are no
such strategies which remain inconspicuous.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
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0.5
Figure 6.9. the case  = 1
(ii)  = 1:8. From Figure 6.10 we see that whenever the insider buys the infor-
mation, he gets a positive prot, and at time t = 0:927319    , he can reach his
maximal prot.
(iii)  = 2. See Figure 6.11. The optimal time to buy the information is t =
0:905997    . In contrast to the last case, the expected prot of the insider will be
negative if he buys the information too early.
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Figure 6.10. the case  = 1:8
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Figure 6.11. the case  = 2
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